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PREFACE
This study is divided into five main chapters, Chapters Two, 
and Four of which are subdivided into separate Sections and Parts.
Chapter One is an introduction setting out the basic Treaty
framework within which the competition rules are to be considered. 
The complete text of Articles 85 and 86 are to be found in Appendix 
I and references to all Regulations dealing with the Communities’ 
competition policy are to be found in Appendix II.
Chapter Two is a general chapter dealing with the basic con­
cepts which are to be found in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. 
It has been included because the author considers it essential to a 
proper understanding of the problems to be discussed in Chapter Four 
that the reader understands the linguistic effect of words and
phrases used in the two Articles.
Chapter Three which deals with the economics of the common
market has been included because the ’competition law’ of the 
Communities is in fact not so much ’law’ as an amalgam of social, 
economic and political policies and the only role which law has to 
play in this matter is in giving effect in precise terras to the 
vague notions expounded by these various disciplines. Without a 
knowledge, however elementary, of the economic policy considerations 
which underlie the jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to draw any conclusions as to the 
likely future application of previously considered questions.
Chapter Four deals with the application of Article 86 to supply 
and distribution and contains what can really be considered the
111.
heart of the study. Firstly the question of distribution systems 
is discussed and thereafter various types of abusive behaviour 
are considered because it is possible for a dominant firm to ensure 
that it is able to determine its sales policy without regard for 
others without having to resort to a refusal to supply as such if it 
is able to engage in some form of business conduct which, without 
going so far, is such as can only be considered in effect as a 
refusal to supply - for instance by the imposition of unreasonable 
terms and conditions on a would-be purchaser whom the dominant firm 
did not wish to supply.
The third part of Chapter Four deals with the question of 
refusal to supply as such, the possible justifications for a refusal 
to supply and the remedies available to the control authorities.
Finally Chapter Four considers the application of Article 86 to 
merger situations. Although the direct relevance of the inclusion 
of such a consideration may not be immediately apparent, the author 
considers that its inclusion is necessary in order to show the 
remedies available to the control authorities if a dominant firm 
sought to by-pass the normal controls and checks of Articles 85 and 
86 by the acquisition of all those firms which stood in its way to 
absolute market domination. The author does not believe that 
Article 86 can be applied to a merger situation but so long as there 
is any doubt as to this question, and the Commission consider that 
thney have a duty to examine mergers to ensure that they comply with 
the desired policy objectives, it is only proper that these matters 
be discussed.
Chapter Five draws a number of conclusions, particularly in 
relation to Chapter Four, but also makes a number of general
iv
conclusions with regard to the study as a whole. The conclusions 
in Chapter Five should, however, be read in conjunction with the 
conclusions made throughout the study at the end of each relevant 
Section or Part. The detailed conclusions made other than in 
Chapter Five are, for the main part, not repeated there.
The study, other than in parts of Chapter Two, concentrates 
almost exclusively upon Article 86 of the Treaty. This is not 
because the other Treaty provisions, and in particular Article 85, 
are not of importance but rather because for reasons of space it is 
not possible to go into those other Articles with the thoroughness 
which the author feels would be necessary. Also it is believed 
that since the study is concerned with 'refusal to supply', emphasis 
should be placed on express and direct refusals and,other than in 
the case of joint sales boycott and similar concerted practice, the 
only refusals which are likely to be encountered in terms of Article 
85 are implied refusals to supply - i.e. ifthe supplier only supp­
lies products through his selective distribution system, there must
necessarily be an implied refusal to supply all other would-be 
1
customers.
In the study, all references to Articles are to Articles of the 
EEC Treaty unless stated otherwise and the expressions 'firm', 
'enterprise' and 'undertaking' are, except where the context 
requires otherwise, used interchangeably.
Finally, it should be noted that the study has been prepared 
with the practitioner clearly in mind. It should, therefore, be 
understood that this is why there is a search for clarity and 
an understanding of what the present position with regard to
V .
the law is rather than the mere expression of opinion of what it 
should be. For the practicising lawyer what is required is to know 
what the law is at any given time so that he can advise his client 
how he should conduct his business affairs.
The law is stated as at 31st December 1980.
FOOTNOTES :
1. For a consideration of the possible position under Article 
85(1) see Bellamy & Child, op cit, pp 81 - 82 and Korah V, op 
cit p. 60.
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SUMMARY
The purpose of the study is to investigate the concept of a 
refusal to supply in the law of the European Economic Commun­
ity, to consider the effect of such a refusal, the possible justifi­
cations therefor and the remedies open to the control authorities in 
combatting any undesirable effects thereof. The aim of the study is 
to provide a readily understood guide to the position such as would 
assist a practitioner in advising his clients on the conduct of 
their affairs.
The study is primarily jurisprudentially based; an examination 
is made of each of the Decisions of the Commission and the judg­
ments of the Court dealing with the problem and a set of tests drawn 
up for determining the circumstances in which a refusal to supply 
will be prohibited. An examination of the jurisprudence dealing
with directly related topics is also made.
The study considers the basic concepts of market dominance and 
abuse, and notes the basic economic theory underlying the Community 
competition system. A consideration is thereafter made of the
application of Article 86 to distribution and supply and refusals to 
supply. Finally a brief consideration of concentration control is 
included.
It is noted that the position of the dominant firm wishing to 
organise its selling in a particular fashion is precarious, since it 
has not only to comply with the requirements of Article 85(1) but 
has also to consider the possible application of Article 86 to its 
conduct.
viii,
The study concludes that whilst Article 86 is able to deal with 
refusal to supply in most cases, there exists no doctrine of 'public 
utility' in the E.E.C. system. Should such a doctrine be required, 
the study concludes that this is a matter not so much for the 
Commission and the legal authorities but rather one for political 
determination.
IX .
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This study of the effects of a refusal to sell In terms of the 
rules of competition of the European Economic Community will begin 
by outlining the scope of such rules and the manner in which they 
may be applied.
Article 2 of the Treaty provides a number of tasks which the 
Community is to have, including the promotion of a harmonious 
development of economic activities and the raising of living stand­
ards. These objectives can, however, provide no more than a general 
outline of the role of the Community and Article 3 is concerned with 
some of the areas in which these general objectives are to be 
ensured.
For our purposes, the important paragraph is paragraph (f) 
which states that the activities of the Community are to include 
"the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common 
market is not distorted". Whilst this bland statement merely 
provides the general aim of the competition policy, it forms the 
basic tenet of that policy and one which is directly referred to in 
judgments of the Court, as is discussed infra.
One of the problems of Article 3(f) however is whether the 
competition which is not to be distorted is that of ’free' competit­
ion or that of 'fair' competition; the system cannot maintain both. 
'Free' competition assumes a laissez faire approach to the problem - 
letting natural market forces of supply and demand find their own 
levels and ensuring that the strong will prevail over the weak; 
'fair' competition on the other hand implies some control of the 
market to ensure that it develops in accordance with certain 
pre-determined norms of business behaviour.
As far as the EEC Competition Policy is concerned, the basic 
approach appears to be that of free competition, whilst having rules 
- particularly in relation to dominant firms - to ensure that the 
competitive structure of the market is not irreparably damaged by 
any use of unfair market behaviour.
In implement of the objectives of Article 3(f), the Treaty 
contains detailed provisions in Articles 85 - 94 indicating the 
types of behaviour which generally will and will not be permitt­
ed .
Articles 85 - 89 contain provisions applicable to private firms 
aimed at ensuring that the creation of effective conditions of 
competition is not hindered by the erection of barriers or restrict 
ions. The maintenance of competition is therefore an essential part 
of the Community's economic and legal order. Where any question of 
interpretation of these Articles arises, they are to be interpreted 
in accordance with Articles 2 and 3(f) of the Treaty.
Similarly, governmental procurement is to be made on the basis 
of non-discrimination, and Article 90 provides that public enter­
prises are to be treated no more favourably than private enter­
prises. However, public enterprises entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest are exempt from this rule, in 
so far as it would obstruct the performance, in fact or in law, of 
those tasks assigned to them.
Article 91 deals with dumping during the transitional period 
whilst Articles 92 - 94 are designed to ensure that competition 
between firms in different Member States is not distorted through 
the granting of state aids.
However, Articles 85-94 merely provide general statements of 
what will and will not be permitted within the framework of the 
Treaty and it requires implementing secondary legislation to give 
effect to those statements. The main piece of implementing legis­
lation is Regulation of the Council No. 17 of 6th February, 1962; 
Regulation 17/62 which was made by virtue of the powers contained in 
Article 87 of the Treaty lays down the types of agreement, decision 
and concerted practice which must be notified to the Commission and 
gives the Commission guidelines which are to be observed in the 
taking of formal Decisions under Article 85(3). It also provides 
for the granting of Negative Clearances stating that there are' no 
grounds for intervention in terms of Articles 85 and 86. Finally 
the Regulation gives to the Commission wide powers of investigation, 
requests for information and fines for any breach of the competition 
rules.
The forms to be used for complaints, notifications and appli­
cations for exemptions are laid down in Regulation No 27/62 of the 
Commission. Regulation 99/63 provides the procedural rules for 
hearings held by the Commission pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation 
17 to ensure that the rights of undertakings are preserved.
There exist special rules for the agricultural sector in 
Regulation 26/62 and for transport in Regulations 141/62 and 
1017/68, since these sectors are specifically excluded from the 
ambit of Regulation 17/62 by virtue of Article 42 of the Treaty and 
Article 1 of Regulation 141/62.
Exemption is provided in terms of Article 85 (3) to certain 
types of Agreement under Regulation of the Council No 19/65
and Commission Regulation 67/67 following thereon, the Council 
Regulation 2821/72 and Commission Regulation 2779/72 following 
thereon.
Unlike the general provisions of Article 85(1) as implemented 
by Regulation 17, a specific period of limitation in proceedings and 
sanctions is provided to agreements in the transport sector by 
Regulation 2988/7%. The period (which commences on the date on 
which the infringement is committed) is three years in the case of 
infringement of the provisions requiring information, or relating to 
applications or notifications and five years in all other cases.
Extra-statutory concessions are contained in five Commission 
Notices and one Opinion, although these concessions have no binding 
force.
There exist provisions similar to Articles 85 and 86 in the 
Agreements with Greece, Turkey, Austria, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Norway, Finland and Israel - although the Greek Agree­
ment has now lapsed on Greece's Accession. In addition, in the 
Agreements with Austria, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Norway, Finland and Israel the Community have made a declaration 
that they will apply the Treaty competition rules to any practices 
being assessed ; the Turkish Agreement specifically includes the 
Treaty Rules.
This, therefore, is the framework within which the competition 
policy of the Community must fit - it is up to the Court and to 
the Commission to put flesh on the bare bones of the legislation.
CHAPTER TWO 
DEFINITIONS AND ANALYSES
Introduction
Prior to any discussion as to the economic and legal aspects, 
causes and effects of a refusal to supply, it is necessary to 
explain and analyse the basic concepts which underlie the competit­
ion policy of the Communities and ascertain the degree to which they 
may provide a foundation on which the concept of refusal to supply 
may rest. For this purpose the relevant legal concepts will be 
related to the main topic of this Study at the end of this Chapter.
As outlined in Chapter One, the basic Treaty provision setting 
out the necessity of such a Policy is found in Article 3(f)* This 
provision, however, can do no more than provide a statement of 
intent and it is Articles 85 - 9% which provide the rules which are 
used to expand the framework of Article 3(f)* For the purposes of 
this study emphasis will be placed on Articles 85 and 86, although, 
necessarily, reference will be made, if and when considered appro­
priate, to other Articles of the Treaty.
The full text of Articles 85 and 86 will be found in Appendix 
1, but it is expedient for our purposes here to summarise the main 
elements thereof;
Article 85(1) states that:-
"The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market..."
Article 86 states that:-
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as 
it may affect trade between Member States..."
As can be seen from the above extracts there are to be found in
Articles 85 and 86 several elements which can be seen as sine qua
non for the application of the competition rules of the Treaty. It 
is these elements with which this Chapter is concerned.
The Analysis will consider those elements common to both 
Articles 85 and 86 before turning to deal with Article 86 in detail. 
Article 85 will not be discussed in more than passing in the analy­
sis.
I. ARTICLES 85 and 86
a . Undertaking
Article 85 states that the agreement, decision or concerted 
practice necessary to bring the behaviour within the scope of 
the control therein contained and Article 86 requires that the abuse 
of a dominant position required to incur the prohibition of that 
Article, must be between undertakings or by one or more undertak­
ings, as the case may be.
It is therefore fundamental, to the whole system envisaged by 
the authors of the Treaty, to consider what is meant by the concept 
of 'undertaking' in Community Law.
Although the linguistic covering in the two Articles is not 
completely clear it is incontestible, from a practical point of view 
that it is only behaviour by undertakings with which the Treaty is 
concerned. Article 90 makes it clear that the rules are equally 
applicable to public bodies as to private firms and this study will, 
for this reason, not distinguish between these two groups. It 
should, however, always be remembered that, because of the special, 
quasi-governmental functions which this former group often perform, 
it is particularly important to ensure that competition is not 
distorted by virtue of governmental priority.
For the purposes of Community antitrust policy, the notion of 
'undertaking' encompasses all forms of economic activity which are 
or have been found to exist in the world of commerce or
manufacture. Hence the sole trader is caught as equally by 
Articles 85 and 86 as the multi-national corporation, although the 
sole trader may fall outwith the scope of Article 86 through the 
nature of his activities. Competition policy applies to all 
economic activity, irrespective of the form under which such 
activity is conducted. Certain types of organisation and activities 
are, however, expressly excluded from the ambit of the restrictive 
practices legislation and are, therefore, excluded from consider­
ation in this study. The most obvious example of this exclusion is 
probably the removal of all industrial relations and labour matters 
from the scope of national rules. For the purposes of Community 
law, the author doubts whether, in practice although in stricto 
sensu properly to be included, a Trade Union would be classed as an 
’undertaking'.
One of the main problems in this area relates to industrial 
property rights. The Commission has always treated performing 
rights societies as undertakings with the meaning of Article 85 and
•j
86 . On the other hand, there have been a number of objections 
from these societies and from the authors who are their members, 
that these societies are, strictly speaking, too small to be treated 
as undertakings and should be treated in a way more analogous to a 
Trade Union. The argument is that the societies perform the same 
functions for their members as do Trade Unions for theirs and, 
accordingly, that the practices of the societies should be dealt 
with as Trade Union practices.
However, the question is not to be resolved from the point of 
view of the authors, or the societies, but rather by the determin­
ation of whether the activities of the society satisfy the market 
for the services which it controls, in which case the society will
exercise a commercial function and hence be an 'undertaking' within 
the meaning of Articles 85 and 86.
On the other hand, an author has been held not to be exercising
a commercial activity when he exploits his rights through the
2
performing rights society . The author, like a commercial
Q
agent , does not exercise any commercial autonomy in the exercise 
of his rights and a market for his particular services only exists 
through the medium of the society (This, of course, excludes any 
commercial function which the author may possess in his relationship 
with his publisher, agent etc., in the exercise of which function 
the author is performing an activity commensurate with a status of 
undertaking under Articles 85 and 86.)
Artistic activities have been held to be sufficient to estab­
lish a finding of undertaking in certain cases. In the Deutsche 
4
Grammophon Case , the European Court decided that recording 
artistes were undertakings in the sense of the competition rules of 
the Treaty as soon as they offered their works for sale on the 
market. The judgment shows that the question of whether entrepre- 
nurial activity exists will depend on the degree of participation in 
economic trade and not on whether this participation has been 
facilitated by performances based on variety or economic origin.
It should perhaps be noted, for the sake of completeness that 
by virtue of the nature of the Treaty system, the Member States 
themselves cannot be considered to be 'undertakings' within the 
meaning of Articles 85 and 86. This does not mean, however, 
that where the Member States perform commercial activities through 
commercial or statutory monopolies, or through governmental or other 
types of national agency, these organisations will not fall under
10
Articles 85 and 86. Note should be made in this respect of the
provisions of Article 90(1) and (2) which provide for certain
exemptions to be granted to this type of organisation in specific
5defined situations .
It should, however, be noted in this context that the question 
of whether or not an organisation is an 'undertaking* within the 
meaning of the Treaty rules on competition is not of much practical 
importance. It would be incompetent to base one's defences to an 
antitrust action on the premise that the organisation was not an 
'undertaking'. There has not been any significant case or Decision 
in which the non-existence of an undertaking has been of critical 
importance in granting a negative clearance under Regulation 17/62, 
an exemption under Article 85(3), or allowing an appeal from a 
Decision made by the Commission.
In the few cases where it has been decided that the organisat­
ion in question does not possess sufficient commercial autonomy to 
be considered an undertaking independently of any other enterprise, 
it has been possible to take the Decision against the parent company 
or against the parent and the subsidiary jointly^, or against the
7
subsidiary , or in the case of commercial agency, against the 
principal.
In general, the rule can be clearly stated that if the organis­
ation or individual performs any tasks or function which has any 
commercial character, whether for gain or as a public service, then 
it will be an 'undertaking' as that definition is understood within 
the meaning of the Treaty rules,
b. Affect trade between Member States
Competition Law is concerned in all systems with the
11
infringement of some pre-determined norms of behaviour. In national 
systems the norm is that of fair or free competition within the 
national territory; in federal systems such as the USA, one criter­
ion for the operation of the antitrust statute is the effect on 
trade or commerce between the several states or, with a foreign 
country^, inasmuch as the antitrust rules are those of the federal 
legislature. In the EEC, in terms of Articles 85 and 86, the 
necessary trigger to bring into play the control provisions, is that 
the behaviour with which those Articles are concerned (restrictive 
arrangements and abuse of a dominant position) 'may affect trade 
between Member States'. Without there being the possibility that 
the conduct being examined may affect trade between Member States, 
the Commission, as guardian of the Treaty rules, has no role to 
play. This provision is thus a sine qua non for the application of 
Articles 85 _et seq.
The starting point is what the Treaty means by 'trade*. The 
notion is one of more than the purchase and supply of goods. 
'Trade' encompasses the production and distribution of all types of 
product, including agricultural products (to which a special regime 
is applied by Regulation 26). It includes the provision of services 
of all types, including those of the liberal professions and those 
provided by State Agencies and nationalised industries, (under 
reservation of the fact that Article 37 and/or Article 90 may be 
applicable to these activities). From a reading of Article 223, it 
appears that the notion may not extend to those aspects of the 
defence and security industries to which that Article applies.
12
For Article 86 the question of whether the abuse of the domin­
ant position which has been found to exist affects trade between 
Member States will be a question of fact to be determined by exam­
ination of the whole circumstances of the case. For the purposes of 
this study, emphasis will be laid on the judgments and Decisions 
taken under Article 85 which set down criteria which are equally 
valid for Article 86.
The cases under Article 85 can be divided into two distinct 
groups; those where restrictive arrangements were found to exist 
between undertakings established in two or more Member States, and 
those in which the arrangements were between firms in the ' same 
Member State.
It is easier tb see that trade might more likely be affected in 
the first group than in the second but, as it will be shown, trade
may be affected in both cases. In the LTM -v- MBU Case in 1966^ .
the Court stated that the function of this concept was to determine 
the field of application of the prohibition of Article 85(1), by 
laying down the condition that it may be assumed that there is a 
possibility that the realisation of a single market between Member 
States (which, it will be recalled, is one of the primary functions 
of the EEC and of the competition rules in particular) might be
impeded.
"It is in fact to the extent that the agreement may affect
trade between Member States that the interference with com­
petition caused by that agreement is caught by the prohibitions 
in Community Law found in Article 85, whilst in the converse 
■ case, it escapes those prohibitions.
For this requirement to be fulfilled, it must be possible to 
foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of 
a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement 
in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual 
or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States".
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In the Consten^Grundig Case in July, 1966^^, the Court stated 
that
"the fact that an agreement encourages an increase, even a 
large one, in the volume of trade between States is not 
sufficient to exclude the possibility that the agreement may 
‘affect’ such trade ........ "
What this concern is directed at, is the possibility that such
’affecting’ of trade might ’harm the attainment of the objectives of
a single market between States’.
The LTM -V” MBU judgment, above-mentioned stated further that
in considering an agreement
"it is necessary to consider in particular whether it is 
capable of bringing about a partitioning of the . market in 
certain products between Member States and thus rendering more 
difficult the interpenetration of trade which the Treaty is 
intended to create"
From these extracts it can be seen that the basis of analysis 
of the agreement or other restrictive arrangements between the 
parties, is such as to make it difficult for the parties to maintain 
that their arrangement is one which is incapable of having any 
effect 'direct or indirect, actual or potential' on the pattern of 
trade between Member States. As has been shown, even if the
parties are able to show that the result of their arrangement has 
been a large increase in trade in the products in question between 
the States concerned the arrangement will still fall within Article 
85 (1). Whether, in such a case, an exemption could be granted
under Article 85 (3) is another question entirely^^.
It appears from the jurisprudence that the major ’effect' with 
which the control authorities are concerned is the possibility that 
the restrictive arrangement will lead to the partitioning of the 
market between the Member States.
14
Most of the remaining jurisprudence dealing with agreements
between firms situated in the same Member State concerns the actions
of national trade associations. In the German Ceramic Tiles Dis-
12count Agreement Decision, in December, 1970 , the Commission
considered the practice of granting wholesalers' rebates calculated
on the basis of their total purchase of tiles from German producers;
the rebate was cumulative and the wholesalers were, therefore more
likely to purchase their requirements from German producers in order
to obtain the most favourable rebate, notwithstanding the fact that
imported tiles were, in general, less expensive than German tiles.
The Commission considered that such a rebate system was likely to
affect trade between Member States.
"The present decision precisely provokes a concentration of 
orders of purchasers in the specialised trade in tiles on the 
German market upon the whole of the producers of that Member 
State, to the disadvantage of the other producers of the EEC 
who wish to export tiles to Germany and who are thereby 
placed, all other things being equal, in a disadvantageous
competitive position. That collectively introduced artificial 
obstacle renders their access to the German market more
difficult than it would have been if that decision had not 
been taken and is, therefore liable to affect trade between 
Member States in the abovementioned manner.
In the Belgian Central Heating Agreement Decision, in November 
131972 , the obligation on members of the association to deal only
with other members of the (national) association was found to affect 
trade between Member States since it limited, to a significant 
extent, the possibilities for producers in other Member States to 
export to the Belgian market and the possibility of Belgian buyers 
to import central heating equipment from other Member States.
In the VCH Case^^, the Court stated clearly that a national 
agreement could affect trade between Member States :
115
"An agreement which extends to the whole of the territory of a 
Member State has, by its very nature, the effect of consoli­
dating a national partitioning, thus hindering the economic 
interpenetration to which the Treaty is directed and ensuring 
a protection for the national production".
15In the Papier Feints Case , the Court annulled the Decision
of the Comraission^^ on the ground that it had not adequately shown
how trade between Member States was affected. This judgment is,
however, unique and it is submitted that it is most unlikely that
any future Decision under Article 85 would be annulled for this
17reason, although a Decision against Hugin under Article 86 was
annulled^^ on that ground.
Finally in this Section, mention will be made of the so-called
de minimis exception permitted under the Treaty rules. This
can, per definitionem, relate only to Article 85, as under Article
86 a de minimis firm could not be condemned.
ig
In the Volk -v- Vervaecke Case , the Court stated that in
examining whether an agreement affected trade between Member
States, the agreement would fall outwith the prohibition in Article
85 when it had only an insignificant effect on the market, taking
into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on
the market in question. This view was subsequently approved by the
20Court in the Beguelin Case
"to bring into play the prohibition set out in Article 85 the 
agreement must affect noticeably the trade between Member 
States and competition."
The Commission’s position on agreements of minor importance
21
was set out in its ^  minimis notice of 27th May 1970 , subse-
22quently replaced by the Notice of 29th December 1977 . This
Notice gives an indication of the criteria, the satisfaction of 
which will, in general, exclude the agreement from the scope of 
Article 85 (1). The Notice gives threshholds both in terms of
16
market share, and in terms of turnover for the establisment of a 
position of minor importance.
Two very important factors should be noted in this connection, 
however. Firstly, it is not only the firms which are parties to the 
agreement which should be considered. If the firms, although in 
themselves sufficiently small to take advantage of the exclusion 
provided by the Notice, are members of a large group of under­
takings, it is the whole group which will be required to satisfy the 
thresholds.
Secondly the Notice may be withdrawn by the Commission and it 
would, therefore, be unwise to rely on it overmuch. The Notice is, 
of course, also subject to any ruling which the Court may make in a 
particular case.
In conclusion it can be stated that trade will be ’affected' as 
in the case of a refusal to supply as discussed in Chapter Four, if, 
but for the existence of the agreement, decision, concerted practice 
or abuse of the dominant position, it would have developed in a 
different way from that in which it actually did.
II. ARTICLE 86 
a) Dominant Position 
1) Monopoly 
i. General Observations
The O.E.C.D. Glossary of Terras relating to Restrictive Busi­
ness Practices defines a Dominant Position as:
"The position occupied either
(a) by a single enterprise, or
(b) by a group of enterprises between which no effective 
competition exists, which does not encounter effective 
competition in a market".
This appears to be a suitable point at which to begin to consider
the concept of market dominance.
17
The purpose of the authorities’ control and examination of 
enterprises considered to possess a dominant position whether, in 
fact, such a position is held, is clear. Any enterprise which 
possesses a degree of dominance on a market can act to some degree 
as if it were a monopolist - the extent to which the behaviour of 
the dominant firm will approach that of the monopolist will be 
proportionate to the level of dominance which, in fact, is held.
There appear to be two fundamental criteria by which the 
possession of a dominant position may be categorised - the power or 
ability to fix and determine prices unilaterally, and the ability to 
limit or limit or exclude, to any significant degree, competition. 
It is the exploitation of this position which is seen as the evil 
which, above all else, must be avoided. It can only be through the 
continuous endeavour of enterprises to persuade consumers that it is 
with that firm that the consumer wishes to conclude a contract, that 
each participating enterprise is able to mark out its market share. 
Provided that this ’endeavour’ is seen to be sufficiently active, 
one can state, with an appreciable degree of accuracy, that competi­
tion is fulfilling one of its perceived functions - that of a 
regulatory mechanism for business behaviour.
For the consumer, competition means the possibility of making 
a choice between the different offers made by the various entre­
preneurs on the market, whereby each offer is comprised of a series 
of individual elements. Each element is, or at least may not be, 
decisive in influencing the purchasing or selective decision of the 
consumer, but the whole package will, vis-a-vis the offers of the 
other sellers, be more desirable to the particular consumer at that 
point in time. From the fact that each offer has been made up from
16
a series of elements, a test has been derived by which the existence 
or non-existence of a sufficient degree of competition can be
measured.
Firstly, an investigation of the individual elements has to 
take place; the question of whether a sufficiency of competition 
exists, is to be discovered through the investigation of whether 
these determined elements, taken in their entirety, are sufficient 
to restrict appreciably the business freedom and independence of any 
enterprise or enterprises.
It must also be mentioned that the existence or absence of 
competition is often gauged by the development of the market shares 
of the participating firms on the market. However, it is essential 
to bear in mind that this definition by percentages, is, by itself, 
merely one of the series of elements necessary to evidence the 
holding of a dominant position; a percentage market share is not, 
as is commonly but erroneously believed, conclusive evidence there­
of. There may well be special reasons why a high market share will 
not provide any degree of dominance, whilst vice versa it is not 
inconceivable that a low percentage market share could still be
sufficient to provide its holder with a great deal of market power.
23In the European Sugar Industry Decision , the Commission
presumed market dominance with market shares of 85% and 90-95%
respectively, and then brought into account other evidence as proof
of the existence of this dominant position. High market share need
not, as mentioned above, be conclusive as evidence of dominance if
the enterprise is exposed to the active competition of one or more
24other undertakings of equal strength and/or aggressiveness 
Alternatively a low market share might be consistent with dominance
19
if the remaining part of the market were fragmented amongst a large
25number of very small weak firms. In its BP Decision , the 
Commission presumed market dominance with a market share which was 
reckoned, at most, to amount to 8% of the relevant market.
The paramount question in this analysis of market power will 
be the investigation of the degree to which the investigated firm is 
exposed to real and effective competition on the market. In this 
investigation the supply from third countries must be included in 
addition to the supply originating in the country, or possibly the 
region, in which the investigated enterprise is situated.
Having established this test, however, it must be stated that 
it is necessary to determine whether potential competitors are 
restricted d£ facto or ^  jure from exercising any real competition 
on the relevant market e.g. because they are unable to compete on 
the same terms as the dominant firm as a result of, say, higher 
transport costs attributable to further distances. All theoretical 
competition must be excluded from the examination of dominance if it 
is not, in fact, practicably exercisable by the suppliers who are 
active on the same product market as the supplier being investigat­
ed .
ii. The Jurisprudence
Article 86, it will be recalled, prohibits ’any abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a dominant position’.
The interpretation of what constitutes a ’dominant position’ is 
a difficult one. It is not delimited by the necessity of a finding 
of a particular degree of market power. The position need not be 
monopolistic for that would be a too narrow interpretation of the
20
notion and would not be sufficient to achieve the aims of Article 
3(f) or Article 86. Market dominance is not an absolute concept 
capable of accurate a priori definition; each individual case must 
be examined and decided on its merits.
Market dominance is primarily the potential to influence 
business behaviour and exercise real and effective control or 
influence of market events. In its 9th General Report, the Com­
mission mentioned that it considered price leadership in oligopoly 
to be an instance of dominance^^.
27In the Decision in Continental Can , the Commission ruled
that an undertaking possesses a dominant position if it is so large
relatively that it is free to decide its own policy without regard
to the reactions of its customers, suppliers or competitors:
"Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the 
- power to behave independently which puts them in a position to 
act without taking into account their competitors, purchasers, 
or suppliers. That is the position where, because of their 
share of the market or their market share combined with the 
availability of technical knowledge, raw materials, or capital, 
they have the power to determine prices or to control product­
ion or distribution for a significant part of the products in 
question. This power does not necessarily have to derive from 
an absolute domination permitting the undertakings which hold 
it to eliminate all will on the part of their economic partners 
but it is enough that they be strong enough as a whole to 
ensure to those undertakings an overall independence of behav­
iour even if there are differences in intensity in their 
influence on the different partial markets".
28In the United Brands Decision , the Commission further
delimited this definition:
"Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the 
power to behave independently without taking into account to 
. any substantial extent their competitors, purchasers and 
suppliers. Such is the case where an undertaking's market 
share, either in itself or combined with its know-how, access 
to raw materials, capital or other major advantage such as 
trademark ownership, enables it to determine the prices or to 
control the production or distribution of a significant part of 
the relevant goods. It is not necessary for the undertaking to 
have total dominance such as would deprive all other market
21
participants of their commercial freedom, as long as it is 
strong enough in general terms to devise its own strategy as it
wishes even if there are difference in the extent to which it 
dominates individual sub-markets."
In the view of the Court of Justice, a firm finds itself in a 
dominant position "if it is in the position to restrict real compet-
2Q
ition on the market for the products or services in question"
It suffices that an enterprise has a dominant position on the market 
for a raw material essential for the production of another product, 
even if it does not possess a dominant position on the market for 
that latter product, or that latter product could be interchanged 
with other similar products. The market for a raw material neces­
sary for the production of another product can be distinguished from
30the market for the product .
An enterprise which is active on a number of separate product 
or geographical markets may possess a dominant position on only
31
one, or on only a few, of these markets in certain circumstances .
However, as it will be shown below, the fact that an undertaking is
the holder of a dominant position on one market will tend to lead to
a presumption of dominance on another market and may very well lead 
32thereto .
The possession of a dominant position may, according to the
jurisprudence of the Court, rely on the fact that the enterprise in
question is the holder of an existing protected right, such as 
patent or trademark. The European Court has repeatedly stated that 
the competition rules of the Treaty cannot disturb the existing 
protected rights of Article 36 and Article 222.
33The Court has stated that neither the holder of a trademark ,
34the holder of a patent , nor the holder of any other protected 
35right abuses a dominant position by the mere possession of such
right. Nevertheless, the exercise of any one of these rights can in
22
certain circumstances violate the competition rules of the Treaty.
"Although a patent confers on its holder a special protection 
within the framework of a State, it does not follow that the 
exercise of the rights so conferred implies the existence of 
the three elements mentioned [in Article 86]. It could only do 
so if the utilisation of the patent could, degenerate into an 
improper exploitation of that protection."
Mention should be made at this point of the so-called 'deep 
pocket' theory in relation to market dominance. Both the Comm­
ission and the Court have stated that, in deciding upon the degree 
of market dominance possessed by a particular firm, regard should be 
had to the size of the undertaking overall, or of a group of which 
it is a member, in addition to the share of the particular market 
which is held by the firm being considered. It is thought that the 
fact that a company has access to large amounts of money, know-how 
or other similar advantage, makes it more likely that that firm will 
be able to exert a degree of influence over events on the relevant 
market, or events on other markets as well as the relevant market, 
which might not be possible if it were not for these extra resources, 
It is conceivable, although unlikely in practice, that a 
financially strong enterprise might systematically undercut its 
rivals on a particular market over a long period of time in order to 
displace those rivals from the market. This long term undercutting, 
or predatory pricing policy, might be dependant on profits made by 
the enterprise on other markets being used to cross-subsidise the 
product, the market for which is subjected to severe competition. 
During the period of this type of exclusionary practice, there is 
likely to be very strong price competition. Nevertheless, the 
enterprise with the 'deep pocket' may find itslef in a position 
which enables it to evade the desired market-regulatory effect of 
competition by the execution of exclusionary practices carried 
through because of its financial background or potential.
23
It should be mentioned in passing, that the ^  minimis provis-
37ions of the Commission Notice of 29th December, 1977 are not
relevant in this situation, as, per definitionem, a firm which has a
dominant position cannot benefit from a de minimis type exemption.
2) Oligopoly^®
i. General Observations
The primary consideration for a finding of an oligopolistic
dominant position, is that oligopolistic structure, per definitionem
implies a market share for each participant less than that which
would be necessary to substantiate a finding of market domination,
in a monopoly type situation.
Each member of the oligopolistic industry would have to have
taken part in the exercise of the dominant position power, which is
possessed by the group as a whole. Collective Dominant Position is
simply the position of power held jointly by the members of an 
39oligopoly . There must be shown to be such a singleness of 
behaviour by the oligopolists as is necessary to indicate the 
existence of a single business policy.
To establish such a unity of policy, it would be necessary to 
prove that the oligopolists behave consciously as a group; para­
llelism of behaviour could be sufficient to evidence such unity, 
provided that such parallelism is not unconscious parallelism. It 
could be argued that, in addition to the evidencing of the conduct 
of the oligopolists, it would be necessary that the oligopolists, as 
a group, realise some form of monopolistic performance on the 
market.
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It is likely that at least one oligopolist in the industry - 
usually the price leader - will have power sufficient to found an 
analysis of individual market dominance. This market power becomes 
transformed into an abuse of a dominant position, within the 
meaning of the Treaty rules, the moment when the exercise of this 
power starts to limit the Individual opportunities of the other 
enterprises on the market. For a finding of collective market 
dominance, it is sufficient that the enterprises together possess a 
dominant position, it is not necessary that the enterprises in 
the oligopoly exploit this position together,
ii. The Jurisprudence
Article 86 prohibits ’the abuse by one or more undertakings of 
a dominant position . . . . . *  From this quotation it is clear that 
the provisions of the Article are such as to cover the situation of 
multi-enterprise domination of the type discussed above as collect­
ive market domination.
The Commission has not, however, taken a Decision on this point, and 
the Court has not been called upon to give its views on the scope of 
this provision. This does of course, exclude those decisions and 
judgments relating to oligopoly which have also involved some form 
of restrictive agreement of the type prohibited by Article 85 
( 1) .
The only indication of Commission thinking on this matter comes
40from the Oil Report of the Commission , where the Commission 
found that, during the Oil Crisis, the market position of the large 
integrated oil companies (those with their own refining facilities) 
was re-inforced by the relative scarcity of supply and even more so 
by the fear of real scarcity - even if such real scarcity never 
transpired in practice. The situation caused concern that there
25
were real risks of anti-competitive practices - notably market 
sharing, abusive policies and the elimination of less well-placed 
market competitors and independent dealers.
Once the shortage materialised, the supply of oil-based pro­
ducts was affected not only by this shortage of supply but also by 
the attitudes of the governments of the various Member States, 
notably the Netherlands, towards this threat. The Member States 
tended to pursue independent short term policies which involved the 
oil companies or their representative trade associations in the 
implementations of national energy policy objectives. This involve­
ment necessarily led to some degree of concertation between the oil 
majors which, although done with the blessing and approval of 
national authorities, could not avoid having some effect on the free 
play of competition on the relevant market and so ran the risk of 
falling within the rules of the Treaty on competition.
The Commission considered that the supply position was not 
radically different during the crisis from that which had previously 
existed but, bearing in mind the apparent scarcity of oil related 
products - insofar as the oil majors had at their disposal, trans­
ported and refined the bulk of all crude oil produced - the position 
of the independents, and some of the less powerful integrated 
companies, was seriously prejudiced.
Nevertheless, at the same time, the position of the companies 
with their own refining capacity was strengthened to such an extent 
that they, as a collective group, acquired a collective dominant 
position on the market.
From the point of view of the commentator seeking to clarify 
the jurisprudential approach to the problem of collective market
dominance, it is to be regretted that the Commission did not feel
able, in the sole Decision which it adopted on the basis of the Oil
41Report, the BP/ABG Decision , to base its findings on the 
concept of collective dominance.
In the absence of any Decision or judgment dealing with oligo­
polistic dominance, the problem must to a certain degree remain 
theoretical, but it appears reasonably clear that the provisions of 
Article 86 would be equally applicable to oligopolistic groups as to 
single enterprises. The question of whether Article 86 is applic­
able alone to this situation or whether it should be used in con­
junction with Article 85 (1) will be discussed in the section of 
this Chapter dealing with abuse of a dominant position in oligopoly,
b. Abuse of a Dominant Position 
1) _ Monopoly
i. General Observations
The question of whether a particular type of behaviour is 
’abusive' will, to a great extent, depend on the particular fact 
situation of the market being investigated. Whilst not all abuses 
can be grouped within a general formula, it is the task of the 
supervisory authorities, who have to ensure that enterprises which 
possess a dominant position are not able to abuse that position, to 
attempt to indicate that type, or those types, of behaviour which 
they anticipate will be found to be abusive in most cases.
These indications cannot, by their very nature, be exhaustive 
but, despite the relatively few Decisions taken under Article 86 
(and the high proportion thereof subsequently annulled by the 
Court), there can be seen a number of practices which have been 
clearly shown to be abusive.
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The mere possession of a dominant position cannot constitute an 
abuse; the dominant firm must, through its possession of a dominant 
position, be in a position to gain some form of advantage over other 
enterprises on the market, which it could not have gained had there 
been effective competition. Further, that advantage, and the 
exploitation thereof, must have led to some unjustifiable disadvant­
age for third parties. Without some disadvantage accruing to other 
firms on the market, or, more particularly to consumers on the 
market, it is unlikely that a finding of abuse can be upheld.
It has been stated that all behaviour, which is open to the 
dominant firm solely because of its power base, will be abusive 
insofar as it affects third parties in the exercise of their econom­
ic or commercial freedom of action in a way which would be imposs­
ible if effective competition existed.
This seems to be an accurate test of the existence, or possible 
existence of abuse,
ii. The Jurisprudence
Article 86 provides that :-
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it 
may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in 
particular consist in :
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competi­
tive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature, or according to commercial usage have no connec­
tion with the subjects of such contracts".
28
The Court of Justice has ruled that the situation envisaged in
42Article 86 consists of three separate elements , the existence of 
a dominant position; its abuse; and the possibility that such 
abuse may affect trade between Member States, The first and third 
of these elements have been discussed above and the second will be 
analysed here.
The existence of a dominant position per se is not prohibited 
by the Treaty rules - only such part of that dominance which 
offends against the regime of Article 86 if the firm has achieved 
its dominance as the result of internal growth as opposed to market 
behaviour. This corresponds to the monopolization approach of the
US antitrust policy, outlined in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
43As Judge Leahy stated in the Cellophane Case :
"A position achieved by ’superior skill, foresight or in­
dustry', or one resulting from ’a new discovery of an original entry 
into a new field’ cannot be achieved through circumstances beyond 
the defendant's control. Intense research activity, market develop­
ment and expansion of production capacity were a necessary pa.rt of 
du Font’s development of cellophane. The Sherman Act was not 
intended to discourage these things . . . "
The Commission, also recognises the need for firms in the 
Community to adapt to the larger market dimensions and encourages 
large enterprises mergers.
There is no absolute definition of abuse either in the Treaty 
or in the jurisprudence of the Commission or the Court. Article 86 
(a) - (d) are merely illustrative of those types of business 
behaviour which the Treaty founders, and necessarily also the 
Commission, considered would, in general, be such as to be termed 
as ’abusive’. None the less, it is thought that any extension of 
this list to other forms of business conduct would have to be 
extended to those forms of behaviour which are iusdem generis with
29
those examples.
The confines of this study to not make it possible to go into
the various abuses which the Commission and the Court have found to
exist in detail. However, some mention will be made of some of
these to enable the reader to perceive the type of conduct which is
likely to be struck at.
The Group of Professors appointed by the Commission has defined
abuse of a dominant position as ’the actual exercise of market
domination to obtain advantages which would have been impossible in
hli
■ the face of effective competition’
In its various Decisions, the Commission has perceived as
abuses the discrimination against nationals of other Member States
(this would also be contrary to Article 7), the imposition of
unnecessarily restrictive obligations on members of a Performing 
45Rights Society , and the imposition of unfair conditions on sup­
pliers by a purchaser with a near monopoly position on the
ons 
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46market . Refusal to supply has, in certain Decisi been seen
as an abuse but this question will be dealt with later
Unfair pricing policy has been condemned by the 
48Commission , but equally the Commission approach to this problem
49has been criticised by the Court , Restrictions on imports and
on exports have been condemned, as has the practice of granting
50fidelity rebates and the use of the so-called ’English Clause’
Practices often utilising protected rights such as patents or
trademarks have been struck at where these practices are used to
51partition the market or support differential pricing structures
The question of whether Article 86 can be used in merger 
situations is unclear. In the Continental Can Case the Commission 
considered that in the circumstances, the merger by Continental
Can's European subsidiary constituted an abuse of a dominant posi­
tion. This approach has been much criticised and it had been
53thought that, following the publication of a draft Regulation ,
on the control of concentrations, this road was no longer being
54followed. However in the United Brands Case , the Advocate 
General (Mayras) stated that 'to accept as a justification for this 
refusal that the ripener in question was said to have participated 
in an advertising campaign to promote the bananas which it was 
selling under a competing brand name, would mean that the undertak­
ing would be entitled to enlarge the dominant position which it 
enjoyed, and consequently to abuse it'. Is this a Continental Can 
approach in disguise? The Advocate General appears to be saying 
that the mere enlargement of a dominant position can thereby be an 
abuse thereof. If this is the case, and the Court does not comment 
on this point in its judgment, it is a radical departure from the 
previously understood state of affairs.
Notwithstanding the absolute prohibition of Article 86 the 
rules of the Treaty do not, and indeed cannot, have any degree of 
moral, ethical or criminal guilt. The only sanctions which the 
Commission can impose are administrative and the fines which it can 
impose are administrative penalties and not criminal sanctions.
Finally it should be noted that Article 86 unlike corresponding
54a 54b 54c
provisions in the US, British and German legislation does not
require any decision, judgment or finding by any Court, tribunal or
administrative authority to have been made before the sanction of a
fine can be imposed; under Article 86 the abuse of a dominant
position is directly prohibited by law.
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2. OLIGOPOLY
i. General Observations
Abuse of a dominant position in a situation of oligopoly (abuse 
of a collective dominant position) is merely the situation where 
there is an abusive exploitation of the position of power held by 
members of an oligopolistic group. It is not necessary that every, 
or even a number of enterprises in the group abuse the perceived 
dominant position, but merely that at least one of them does so. 
The question of whether there exists a sufficient degree of com­
petition between the participants in the oligopolistic group is also 
irrelevant for this study - it is the overall effect towards third 
parties which must be considered. That is not to say of course, 
that the relationship of the oligopolists inter se is not to be con­
sidered; their relationship may be important in determining whether 
there has been any infringement of any other Treaty rule, in part­
icular the provisions of Article 85 (1).
For the purposes of this Section, it is assumed that any 
parallelism of behaviour between the oligopolists is the result of a 
common reaction to an identically perceived problem facing the 
members of the group. This parallelism, whether conscious or 
unconscious may be considered as an abuse in certain circum­
stances (although where the parallelism is 'pure* - i.e., not 
depending upon any agreement, tacit or express, - or more particul­
arly, unconscious - i.e., not being more than a coincidence - it is 
doubted whether any abuse within the meaning of the Treaty framework 
could exist). The situation where the parallelism results from an 
agreement or understanding would fall under the provisions of 
Article 85 (1) and be dealt with accordingly.
The economic and legal implications of a long-term existence
of price parallelism, and the methods whereby such a parallelism can
be achieved and maintained, have been discussed elsewhere and it
suffices here to say that it is possible and in the case of certain
types of parallelism and the price leadership associated therewith
probable, that such a commonty of behaviour will be an abuse, as
that term is understood.
Certain types of behaviour have been regularly criticised by
the various control authorities who have had to consider the problem
55of abusive behaviour in oligopoly . Advertising expenditure, in 
particular, has caused the authorities a great deal of concern.
The problem seems to be that the uniform market behaviour of 
the members of the oligopolistic group, while of such a nature as 
to cause a certain degree of anxiety cannot be seen as other than 
the normal state of affairs in oligopoly. Should firms be condemned 
for acting in a normal and rational way? Certainly where the uni­
formity is based upon a type of concerted practice prohibited by the 
restrictive practices legislation action should be taken, but in 
those circumstances, the provisions of Article 86 would be superflu­
ous.
From this last mentioned point another often made suggestion
arises; should only Article 86 be applied to oligopolists or does
Article 85(1) also have a role to play? The jurisprudence of the
Communities, insofar as it has dealt with oligopolists seems to tend
to the view that Article 85(1) is to play the primary role and
Article 86 is a back-up provision to be used to supplement Article
5685(1) where appropriate , or to be used where there is no form of
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agreement etc., of the type envisaged by Article 85(1). This does 
not mean that, in particular circumstances, Article 86 could not 
have a primary function; indeed in a situation of pure parallelism, 
there could be no place for any other Article in the control,
ii. The Jurisprudence
The problem with any discussion of the role and position of the 
Communities' rules on competition as applied to oligopoly is that 
there is no Decision or judgment dealing with the problem, where the 
assessment has not been founded upon a restrictive agreement. The 
provisions of Article 86 allow the Commission to deal with the 
non-collusive, but anti-competitive behaviour of the firms in the 
oligopolistic group, whether this behaviour be exclusionary conduct 
or some other type of action resulting in an arrangement of market 
conditions.
Taking into consideration the view of the Court in the Sugar
57Case as regards concerted behaviour , it is quite conceivable 
that, should it so desire, the Commission could draw parallelism of 
conduct within the parameters of 'concerted practice'. The Author 
would argue however, that this interpretation would go beyond what 
the Treaty founders intended; it is contended that only Article 86
has a role to play in the absence of some form of restrictive
arrangement.
If one accepts that Article 86 is concerned only with action on
the market and is neutral towards the structure of the market as
existing (and this ignores the judgment in Continental Can and the 
Opinion of the Advocate General, discussed above) then it is diffi­
cult to accept that the very fact that an oligopoly exists - and
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consequently that competitive conditions on the market have been 
cemented - can be an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 86.
There is the problem with oligopoly in knowing how far the 
behaviour of the individual oligopolists can approximate to that of 
the other firms in the industry without running the risk of being 
accused of engaging in concerted practices or, subject to the 
limitations and comments made above, abusing their collective 
dominant position. It seems to be accepted, that failing any re­
strictive arrangement, no finding of concerted practice or abuse 
will be made, provided that the firm in question is, in its action, 
merely adapting its business policy and methods to the requirements 
or the market and, in particular, to the changes in that market 
occasioned by the behaviour or anticipated behaviour of its com­
petitors. This does of course assume that there is no exchange of 
information between the parties either directly or through an 
intermediate third party.
In the absence of any formal case dealing with the oligopolis­
tic abuse question, the major indication of the Commission’s 
view on the subject is to be found in the Oil Report of 1975 
The Report raised a number of questions but, overall, no abuse was 
found to have taken place; nor was any infringement of Article 85(1) 
discovered in relation to the supply of crude oil to the Community. 
The Report discussed the changes which had taken place in the oil 
market as a result of the oil shortage and, more particularly the 
fear of more acute shortage in the future. As a result of this 
supply crisis the oil companies necessarily changed their relation­
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ships vis-a-vis those who purchased oil products from them; a number 
of small firms were absorbed by the oil majors; other buyers con­
cluded long-term supply contracts with the oil companies, thus 
depriving themselves of genuinely free access to the market. 
Nevertheless, the Commission was unable to discover any occasion on 
which the oil refiners had abused the collective dominant position 
which had been thrust upon them collectively as a result of the oil 
shortage.
However, the Report stated that, arising out of their invest­
igations , a number of cases of presumed abuse of an individual 
dominant position by certain companies in respect of individual 
dealers who were their customers were being considered. From this 
statement followed the Commission Decision in the BP/ABG Case^^. 
This Decision which dealt with an alleged abuse consisting of a 
refusal to supply will be considered in more detail at a later point 
in this study^^. It was, in any case, subsequently annulled by 
the Court for failure to establish that there had, in fact, been any 
abuse of a dominant position (or per the Advocate General, whether 
there was even a dominant position)
As far as the Community is concerned it appears clear that the 
Treaty rules of Articles 85 and 86 provide the Commission with 
the necessary powers and authority to take action against any 
perceived abuse of a collective dominance. Whether they will 
choose to do so is another matter entirely; it will often be easier 
to take a Decision on the basis of an infringement of Article 85(1) 
or abuse of an individual dominant position under Article 86. The 
timing of any Decision on abuse of a collective dominant position
3 6
will to a certain degree, be a political as well as a competition 
one. The extension or application of the rules to this field is one 
which has never been seriously attempted in any of the Member 
States, although the United States has made tentative steps in that 
direction, and it may be that the Commission is awaiting a lead from 
one of the Member States before embarking on this new venture,
c. Common Market or a Substantial Part of it
Article 86 provides that the abuse with which that Article is 
concerned is that of a dominant position in the common market or a 
substantial part of it, (and there can be no contravention of the 
Treaty rules if the dominant firm abuses its position, provided that 
the position does not extend to a substantial part of the common 
market). It is therefore necessary to examine what is meant by the 
phrase 'a substantial part of it'. Whilst it is relatively simple 
to decide whether the dominant position is held over the whole 
common market, what constitutes a substantial part is open to 
dispute.
The problem, is basically to determine the relevant geographic­
al market. This point has been extensively discussed elsewhere^^, 
(as has the question of the relevant product or temporal market), 
but it can be said here that it will be a question of fact whether 
the area, over which the dominant position extends where this is 
less than the whole common market, is important enough to be con­
sidered 'substantial'.
Each Member State falls within this definition. It is probable 
that so also would each of the countries making up the United 
Kingdom (with the possible exception of Northern Ireland), each of
37
the German Lander, and the larger French administrative regions. It 
is only when the area being considered is less than these examples 
that a problem will arise; the dominant firm will necessarily argue 
that the area over which it has market power, is an area which is 
not substantial as that phrase is intended by Article 86.
It is for the control authority, (in this case the Commission) 
to decide whether the area is substantial. There appear to be no 
prima facie rules as to how they should approach this task, but it 
is considered that in addition to the actual geographical area 
covered, importance should be laid on the population residing in the 
area, on the level of economic development of the area, and on the 
type of product for which the dominant position is held^^.
As a background which may contribute to a better understanding 
of the concept of ’refusal to supply’, such basic concepts as 
’undertaking’, ’trade between Member States’, ’dominant position’, 
’market dominance’, ’monopoly’, ’abuse of a dominant position’, and 
’oligopoly’ have been considered in the preceding sections of this 
Chapter from the standpoint of a legal interpretation and definit­
ion. The terms ’undertaking' and 'trade between Member States’ may 
be qualified as being of contextual significance only, providing us 
as they do, with no significant contribution towards a direct legal 
clarification of the content and limit of 'refusal to supply' as a 
legal concept, although they assist in completing the framework 
within which the topic of this thesis is to be considered.
'Dominant position’, 'market dominance', 'monopoly' and 'oligo­
poly' relate more directly to 'refusal to supply’ in that they 
qualify as ’dominant’ or as enjoying a position of 'monopoly' 
undertakings or firms capable of exercising their will or discret­
ion, in economic terms, to supply or not to supply. It is through
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this medium that we approach a formal economic definition of the 
market power or capability of undertakings or firms which may decide 
to supply or not to supply. However, an analysis of the text of 
Articles 85 and, more particularly, Article 86, and the judicial 
interpretation thereof shows that these Articles, and the legal 
concepts to which they refer, cannot be interpreted or applied 
satisfactory in isolation from the economic or market context in 
which they are to play their role of regulating, controlling and in­
fluencing the firms in question from a competition standpoint.
In this respect, reference is made to the observations of 
Chapter 5 that whilst competition law relies for its interpretation 
and application on the economic or market environment or system 
within which it is expected to operate, the definition of the 
relevant economic or market environment or system depends ultimately 
on the policy, policies or intentions as to the direction which the 
given market is expected or influenced to take.
It is perhaps significant in this respect that, whilst in the 
legal sphere reference is made to ’EEC competition law' or 'Com­
munity competition rules’ etc., the most directly relevant provis­
ions - Articles 85 and 86 - are to be found in Part Three of the EEC 
Treaty under the heading 'Policy of the Community’, and not under a 
heading with specific reference to competition law. This makes it 
clear that the competition law is to be considered in an economic as 
well as a legal context. It is only through the economic context 
that the theory of lav/ is linked to the realities of the market or 
economic system in which that theory is to operate whilst, for legal 
purposes, competition in economic terms only would not be of use in 
determining legal or illegal conduct and the respective legal conse­
quences attached thereto.
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Returning then to the present Chapter within the framework of 
the thesis as a whole, we are unable as yet to give any firm legal 
definition of 'refusal to supply' as the determination of a refusal 
to supply as being lawful business conduct or as constituting an 
abuse of a dominant position will depend on the general definition 
of 'abuse' within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, As has 
been stated above (Section II (b) (1)(ii)) "there is no absolute
definition of abuse either in the Treaty or in the jurisprudence of 
the Commission or the Court."
In our endeavour to clarify the concept of 'refusal to supply' 
to the extent that this can be undertaken in a relevant economic and 
legal analytical approach, Chapter 3, will briefly survey the 
important economic or market factors which affect the mutual inter­
action of demand and supply. This is intended as an assessment of 
the extent to which the economic context of the topic can contribute 
to a better understanding of 'refusal to supply' as a legal concept, 
before this concept is dealt with analytically in Chapter A in the 
light of jurisprudential practice.
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CHAPTER THREE 
BASIC ECONOMICS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE E.E.C.
Although this study is concerned with the legal problems and 
rules relating to a refusal to supply in its widest sense, competit­
ion policy is not merely a legal doctrine, nor indeed is its main 
component element one of law; rather competition policy is a pol- 
itico/socio/economic theory, whose main connection with the law is 
that the broad guidelines which those other disciplines impose must 
be capable of legal interpretation and application by the courts 
and the control authorities by reference to the legal rules imple­
menting the guidelines.
It is therefore necessary to mention the basis economic frame­
work on which the Treaty rules on competition are based^. The
2basic concepts of economics are those of supply and demand and 
the competition policy is designed, inter alia, to ensure the free 
interplay of these concepts. In so far as refusal to supply is 
concerned, this will have an effect on this free interplay by 
preventing the supply of that which is demanded, so ensuring that 
the situation on the market is different from that which would 
otherwise have prevailed.
The principal facet of all economic systems is that of scar­
city^; consumers have unlimited wants but economic resources (men, 
machines, materials and management) are limited. It is therefore 
necessary in all systems for decisions to be taken; what to produce, 
where to produce, how to produce, how much to produce, when to 
produce and how to distribute the production. How these decisions 
are taken will depend on the co-ordinating mechanism of the economic 
system involved. Insofar as the EEC is concerned the main co­
ordinating mechanism is that of the market - if enough of a product 
is wanted and a price is offered, production will take place pro­
vided that the price is such that a profit can be made. The other 
main co-ordinating mechanism is that of command - a central overall
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plan is determined for the nation in terms of quotas, and industrial 
and management plans are derived therefrom.
It is the co-ordinating mechanism that allocates scarce resour­
ces; market economy - by market forces of supply and demand; command 
economy - by government.
In all the Member States of the Community and in the Community 
itself the economic system is that of the mixed economy - albeit the 
mix between market and command economies varies from Member State to 
Member State. Such a mixed economy is characterised by five main 
factors
(a) Basic private enterprise with state intervention in key 
sectors;
(b) Government provisions of goods and services which are not 
of commercial but of a vital nature to the development of 
the economy, e.g., electricity.
(c) Government can operate some industries more efficiently 
than can private enterprise e.g., Defence.
(d) Consumer protection and worker protection.
(e) Management of the economy (macro-economic management) to 
influence the levels of employment etc. This is obviously 
more readily achieved if the government itself controls 
large sectors of the economy through nationalised indus­
tries.
Although the EEC economy is mixed, it is the role of the market 
economy part with which the competition law is concerned primarily, 
and thus, emphasis will be placed on that segment.
The most important mechanism in the market economy is that of 
price, which is the means by which scarce resources are distri­
buted^; price acts as a link between producers and consumers and 
equates the amount sellers wish to offer for sale and the amount
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that buyers wish to purchase. Demand for a product is the desire to 
possess that product accompanied by the ability and willingness to 
pay for it. From this can be deduced two laws of demand
1. The higher the price - the less that will tend to be 
demanded ;
2. The lower the price - the more that will tend to be 
demanded.
Whilst this is not true in all cases, it holds good for most items
^ 5In the example shown , as price
p
increases from P to , the quantity
demanded will fall from Q to Q
What is important is not the level of demand,' but the change in 
demand which occurs as a result of the change in price^. From 
this can be calculated the price elasticity of demand, which is the 
way that demand responds to changes in price. The price elasticity 
of demand can be calculated by use of the formula
The & change in demand = X, where X is the elasticity of demand,
The % change in price
If X is greater than 1, demand is said to be elastic, i.e.,
that a certain percentage change in price will result in a larger 
percentage change in demand; if it is less than 1, demand is in­
elastic, i.e., a small change in demand will result; and if it is 1, 
then demand is said to have unit elasticity, i.e., a certain per­
centage change in price will result in the same percentage change in 
demand.
   ■ .
a,
Elasti c
q
/tv
Inelastic
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The tendency is for products having price elasticity to have 
a ’shallow’ slope, whilst those which are inelastic have a "steep" 
curve.
Elasticity of demand is probably the most important factor for 
a producer; unless he knows whether or not demand for the product he 
is producing is price elastic, he will not know whether the result 
of a price increase will be to raise total sales income or to reduce 
it due to falling demand.
The elasticity will be affected by a number of factors^ - the 
availability of substitutes; the degree of necessity; habit; value 
relative to income; credit facilities and terms therefor; frequency 
of purchase; fashion.
There exist types of elasticity of demand other than that of 
price elasticity; income elasticity of demand which indicates the 
way in which demand responds to changes in income ; and cross elas­
ticity of demand which shows the effect of changing the price of one 
product on demand for another. Thus if cars become 20% cheaper, 
there might be an increase in demand for petrol as more people found 
themselves able to buy a car. The same is true for products which 
are very close substitutes.
Having considered the behaviour of people in the economy 
relative to demand mention will now be made of the way suppliers 
behave.
Supply is the quantity of a commodity offered for sale per unit 
of time^. From this follow two laws of supply:-
1. As price rises more will tend to be supplied.
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2. As price falls less will tend to be supplied.
These laws, whilst generally true, do not hold for some pro­
ducts such as land or works of art by dead artists, since supply is 
fixed.
P. In the example shown, as price
increases from P to P the
quantity supplied will rise from
Q to .
As with demand, what is calculated is not the absolute amount
of supply but the change therein which will result from a change in
price. In this way the price elasticity of supply is calculated^.
The % change in quantity supplied - X, where X is the elasti- 
The % change in price of the good city of supply.
/A
Q
However, unlike demand, it is not possible for supply to
change immediately to meet 
increased demand. Thus in the 
very short term, no change in the 
quantity supplied will be pos­
sible at all - supply will 
be perfectly inelastic.
In the short term, when a 
slight increase in production is 
possible with existing production 
resources, worked more intensely, 
supply will still be very inelas­
tic.
In the long term, when it is 
p o s s i b l e  to a d j u s t  the
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pIn the Market economy, the
factors of production (employ 
more labour, use more machines 
etc.,) supply will be elastic.
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particular product will fluctuate until an equilibruim is reached at
which the quantity demanded will equal the quantity supplied,
10assuming that there exists competition in the marketplace . If a 
change in price occurs, the equilibrium will be lost and the demand 
and supply will fluctuate until either price is reduced and equili­
brium restored or a new equilibrium is reached at the new price 
level, either because purchasers decide to pay more or suppliers 
being confronted with an excess of supply on the market cut back 
their production. "It is for the competition law to promote the free 
attainment of this equilibrium.
Thus in the example opposite 
supply and demand are in perfect 
equilibrium at price P where quantity 
Q is both supplied and demanded.
The position is slightly different in the case of monopoly or 
of dominant positions on the m a r k e t ^ H o w e v e r ,  to have any 
appreciable degree of market power, the monopolist must control the 
supply of a product for which there are no close substitutes; there 
would be no benefit in being the sole producer of margarine, since 
consumers could buy butter, but if one supplier controlled the 
entire supply of salt this would be very significant since there is 
no substitute for salt.
Thus for the monopolist to have any significant power and 
discretion on the market, he must hold a monopoly in respect of 
products for which there is a low cross elasticity of demand -
A
irrespective of the increase in price, few consumers can or will 
change to substitute products. It is possible for price elasticity 
of demand to be low for a product as a whole, whilst the price 
elasticity of demand for individual suppliers is high. This is 
particularly true in the case of homogenuous products such as 
bread.
However, it is rare in the market to find any firm having 
complete control of a product with completely inelastic demand, but 
monopoly control can be obtained without such power. Monopoly 
power in the sense of being able to influence and, in particular, to 
raise prices depends on some restriction on entry to the market by 
new firms.
If a monopolist is able to raise the price of a product and 
make above average profits » and continue to do so for a consider­
able time - there must be something that keeps other suppliers out
1 2of the market. As with perfect competition , (a situation
where there are so many firms that each must accept the price set by
the forces of supply and demand, where each has no power over the
market and each firm’s ability to sell its product is uninfluenced
by the behaviour of any other single firm), as profits rise more
firms will be attracted to the market until all firms are making
just sufficient profits to keep them in the industry. (normal
profits) The monopolist can only make high abnormal profits if
1 "3something prevents other suppliers from entering the market .
There are many reasons why other potential suppliers are 
prevented from entering the market - not all of which give rise to 
proceedings under anti-trust legislation. The best example of this 
is superior business efficiency which drives competitors out of 
business - there is obviously no detrimental effect in attaining a
54
better position on the market by virtue of being better than one’s 
competitors. There is also the case where a firm makes such a 
breakthrough in product development that it attains a dominant 
position on the market - the ’better mousetrap’ situation or where 
the structure of the market requires such capital investment that 
would-be competitors are unable to enter the market at the same 
prices as the existing firms - eg., electricity, gas, water.
The monopolist can sometimes increase his profit by discrim­
inating on price, by selling the same commodity in different 
markets at different prices. By obtaining the maximum return 
possible for each market, the monopolist is able to increase 
his total profits. To have any degree of success in this, the
monopolist must be able to keep the two markets separate without too 
much difficulty; if he cannot keep the markets apart, enterprising 
consumers would buy cheap in one market to sell dear in another, so 
undercutting the monopolist in that latter market”*^ .
It is this market separation, by the prevention of parallel 
imports, that the Community rules on competition and in particular 
Articles 85 and 86 are designed to prevent. It is an essential 
facet of the Treaty system that the EEC as a whole constitutes a 
single economic market and that there exists no division, whether by 
price differentials or by national regulation, which cannot be 
overcome by enterprising operators.
In this striving to prevent the transparency of the market 
being prejudiced, the dangers of cartels are equal to those of 
monopoly; in both cases, the natural course of the market is 
distorted by the deliberate actings of a party, or parties, on the 
market to the detriment of consumers as a whole.
The advantages of monopoly - economies of scale, stability,
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less wastage of resources on unnecessary advertising - must be 
weighed against the potential dangers - excessive prices, stifling 
of research and innovation (although in a situation of perfect 
competition there would be neither research nor innovation) lack of 
variety for consumers, and the danger of the monopolist being able 
to exert political pressure to ensure the attainment of his aims.
It is within this general framework of economic theory that the 
aims of the EEC’s competition policy must be seen. Although 
the exact aims of the policy have never been defined with precision, 
the aim of Article 2 (promotion of harmonious development of econ­
omic activities, continuous and balanced expansion, increase in 
stability, and an accelerated raising of the standard of living) and 
of Article 3 (f) (the institution of a system ensuring that compet­
ition in the common market is not distorted) provides us with a 
general framework in which the goals of the competition policy may 
be considered.
The first suggested goal is that of the diffusion of economic 
power and thereby, possibly, the protection of the freedom of the 
individual. It remains one of the basic tenets of a competition 
policy that each citizen should have equal opportunity and the 
application of the competition policy is seen as a means of achiev­
ing this aim. It does however, seem to imply a basic distrust of 
big business as such. In this aim, the conflict between economic 
logic and political expedience may be seen; it is patently obvious 
in a large number of situations that the most efficient utilisation 
of resources requires some degree of market concentration, but there 
exist advantages of a political or social nature in the retention of 
a dispersal of power amongst a large number of smaller enterprises.
The second suggested goal is that of the protection of the
participants of the market - in the EEC context this appears specif­
ically to refer to small and medium-sized enterprises. The aid is 
more the protection of competitors rather than the defence of the 
competitive process as such. It is in this context that the 
problem of refusal to sell, predatory pricing practices and boycott 
must be considered ; all practices by which powerful firms might 
seek to endanger the existence of less strong competitors. This 
second goal may be seen as one of ensuring that ’fair’ competition 
(as opposed to ’free’ competition, which assumes a large degree of 
laissez faire) is protected; fair competition implies some form of 
control over the market behaviour of enterprises to ensure that 
their behaviour complies with the pre-deterrained behavioural norms.
There exist other possible goals of a competition policy, but 
they are more concerned with the technicalities of economic theory 
and will not be considered in detail here; suffice it to say that 
each system of competition law will have norms the attainment of 
which will be encouraged, and the violation of which will cause 
sanctions to ensue.
Whilst the traditional legal orders in Europe with regard to 
competition focussed upon substantive elements characterising 
economic behaviour - and prohibiting only those practices which were 
contrary to hones commercial conduct - the EEC approach is more 
concerned with the installation and safeguarding of certain object­
ive market conditions. As the Commission stated in the First 
Competition Report in 1972^".
’’Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity 
since it guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to 
all. An active competition policy makes it easier for the
supply and demand structures continually to adjust to tech­
nological development. Through the interplay of decentralised 
decision-making machinery, competition enables enterprises
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to improve their efficiency which is a sine qua non for a 
steady improvement in living standards. Such a policy encour­
ages the best possible use of productive resources for the 
greatest possible benefit of the economy as a whole and for the 
benefit, in particular, of the consumer".
However, in the same Report, the Commission also states^^ that:
"competition policy must ensure fair competition so that 
enterprises.can be in general, benefit from the same con­
ditions of competition".
This second aim is the reason why the Commission encourages certain
forms of cooperation between small and medium-sized undertakings in
17order to penetrate foreign markets , but it is an aim which can 
clearly be seen to be not always compatible with the first objective.
The first principle can be seen as encompassed within the 
general statement that the rules on competition were not adopted to 
give protection to individual competitors, but to maintain the 
competitive process. To a certain extent the two notions are not
totally incompatible; a sufficient number of competitors is essen­
tial to ensure a sufficiency of competition. However, strong 
competition implies a continuous ebb and flow of entry to and 
withdrawal from the market since the creation and closure of under­
takings is the basis of the market economy.
The second general principle can be seen as that of workable - 
as opposed to perfect - competition; to promote a process of 
rivalry under uncertain market conditions. Hence the Commission’s 
attacks on open information agreements leading to a transparency of 
the market.
These two statements, taken together with the earlier suggest­
ions of goals for the policy of the Community and the basic economic 
supply and demand theory give a framework against which the applic­
ation of the Treaty rules on competition must be seen.
Competition policy is, after all, no more than the application of a
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given set of predetermined performance indicators and economic tests 
to conduct on the market. Thus competition law is not ’law* in its 
purest sense, but rather the means by which the economic aims of the 
policy can be ensured and enforced.
For the subject of this study, refusal to supply, the danger is 
that the refusal may result in a permanent distortion of compet­
ition; if purchasers do not accept the terms offered by the seller 
immediately, supplies may be terminated. V/here, as in the case 
postulated here, the supplier is in a dominant position, the result 
is that purchasers will be compelled to accept whatever terms are 
offered. This will necessarily lead to a lesser degree of price 
elasticity and probably also to higher price levels. In addition, 
there exists the real danger that the mere threat of a refusal to 
supply will be sufficient to enable the dominant firm to enforce 
other forms of anti-competitive behaviour having a noticable effect 
on the nature of the market itself.
It is realised that this short discourse on the economic theory 
under-lying the EEC system of competition law in its relevance to 
our topic is in no way an exhaustive study of the problem; nor is 
it meant to be. For the practitioner what is of most relevance is 
the way in which the rules are applied and the results of such 
application on the behaviour of the participants on a given market. 
However, it is not possible for him to deal with such problems 
adequately if he does not have some insight into the economic theory 
which underpins such application; it is for this reason that this 
Chapter has been included.
The general conclusion to be drawn from this Chapter is that, 
while an economic approach to the question of supply (and demand) 
is helpful in the better understanding of the interaction of supply
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and demand with price as a nexus between them, in the light of the 
economic models taken as the basis thereof and not for the purpose 
of conclusions or predictions, an economic approach per se or prima 
facie does not answer the problem of which level of relationship or 
equilibrium would be the most desirable within a given market 
context or the context of economic development.
Once more we are faced with the problem of linking the economic 
and the legal approaches to ‘refusal to supply’ to the even more 
fundamental approach of policy. The link between these three 
approaches will be referred to in the conclusions in Chapter 5.
60
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. For background see B.T. Bayllss on Competition and Industrial
Policy in the European Community in ’Economics of the European
Community’; A.M. El-Agraa, Ed., 198O at pages 113 - 133* For 
economic theory see R.G. Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive 
Economics, 5th Edition, London, 1979; P.A. Samuelson, Econo­
mics, 11th Edition, 198O; R. Turney, Demand and Supply, 2nd 
Edition, London, 198O; Swann, The Economics of the Common 
Market, 3rd Edition, London 1975.
2. See Turney, op. cit. p. 13; Samuelson, op. cit. pp. 531 55.
3. See Lipsey, op. cit. pp. 52 - 53.
4. See Lipsey, pp. 78 - 80; Samuelson, p. 53.
5. Diagrams by author.
6. See Lipsey, pp. 101 - IO8; Samuelson, pp. 357 - 361 , 373;
Turney, pp. 20 - 21.
7. See Lipsey, pp. 109 - 110.
8. See Lipsey, pp. 88 - 91.
9. See Lipsey, pp. 112 - 113; Samuelson, pp. 362 - 364, 374;
Turney, pp. 88 - 89.
10. See Lipsey, pp. 93 - 100; Samuelson, pp. 57 - 58.
11. See Lipsey, pp. 261 - 273; Samuelson, p. 39.
12. See Lipsey, pp. 243 - 260,
13. See Lipsey, p. 265; Turney, pp. 63 - 64.
14. See Lipsey, pp. 266 - 270.
15. At page 11.
16. At page 13.
17. See Notice of the Commission of 29th July 1968; J.O. No C75, 
29 July 1968, p. 3; CM/L/III/3.
61
CHAPTER FOUR 
DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY 
UNDER ARTICLE 86
A. METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION
This Section is concerned with the ways in which the applicat­
ion of distribution systems could be considered to be part of an 
abuse of dominant position within the context of Article 86. It 
should be noted that, in considering the total competition impact of 
such systems in the light of Article 86, regard also should be had 
to Article 85 (1) as, it is submitted, the two Articles form a 
two-pronged attack against anti-competitive behaviour.
Mention will be made of the effect on such systems of positions 
of dominance both in monopoly and in oligopoly, although there are 
fewer formal Decisions concerned with the latter. Regard will also 
be had to the conditions upon which supplies are made or offered. 
An outright refusal to supply, or a refusal to do business other than 
on terms which, taken as a whole, can be considered as amounting to 
nothing less than an implied refusal to supply, will not be con­
sidered in this Section but in a separate Section of this Chapter, 
infra,
I. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION
The problem of exclusive distribution arrangements in light of 
Article 86 is a difficult one; such arrangements are, it will be 
recalled, specifically permitted in terms of Regulation 67/67 and, 
accordingly, need not be notified to the Commission in terras of 
Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation 17/62. Thus, if such an arrangement 
does not fall under Article 86, it can only be examined if a spe­
cific complaint is made to the Commission, or brought before the 
Court, or if the Commission comes upon the arrangement as a by-pro­
duct of one of its investigations.
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Such was the position in the Sugar Decision in 1973^* In 
its Decision the Commission stated that
"RT had abused this dominant position [on the Belgian 
and Luxembourg sugar markets] by exercising economic pressure 
on the undertakings Export and Hottlet [who had traditionally 
dealt with the export of Belgian sugar] so as to oblige them 
only to resell the sugar which it supplied to certain consumers 
and for certain uses, and to reimpose these limitations on 
their customers".
In addition the Dutch producers SU and GSM had obliged Dutch sugar 
dealers not to sell quantities of sugar imported from France at 
prices lower than those of the Dutch producers; not to undertake 
any further imports of sugar into the Netherlands without the 
consent of the Dutch producers; and to sell to Dutch producers the 
amounts to be imported in bags of specified sizes. These abuses 
were seen as limiting the sources of supply of the Dutch dealers who 
wanted to import freely into the Netherlands and, in this way, 
limiting the sources of supply of their customers. The position of 
the German producer SZV was also considered and this is discussed in 
connection with Commercial Agency contracts, infra.
Although the RT and SU/CSM situations were not of exclusive 
distribution in the sense that no formal agreement between the 
parties existed to that effect, it is submitted that the de facto 
economic relationship between the parties was of such a nature. In 
Belgium Hottlet and Export were reliant on RT for their supplies and 
since RT held 85^ of the market they were obliged to obtain their 
requirements from RT.
Hottlet and Export, were therefore obliged to deal exclusively in RT 
sugar or sugar over which RT had exercised an influence.
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When Advocate-General Mayras issued his Opinion in the Sugar 
2Case in June, 1975 , he stated that RT had granted Export and 
Hottlet the exclusive right to sell sugar in the Netherlands pro­
vided that they restricted their deliveries to those purchasers or 
consumers who were approved by Dutch producers. In A.G. Mayras’ 
opinion, RT had a dominant position in a substantial part of the 
common market and had abused that position in forcing Belgian 
exporters through its great economic pressure to come to terms with 
its concerted practice with German and Dutch producers, which 
concerted practice fell within Article 85 (1).
The fact that RT had a virtual monopoly on the relevant market, 
made it inevitable that Belgian dealers would have to buy sugar from 
it or one of the refineries it controlled if their survival was to 
be ‘assured. In addition, as a result of its relations with its 
counterparts in other Member States, RT was able to dispense with 
the use of dealers when disposing of a large part of its exports 
should it so wish. The dealers, therefore, had to give in to RT’s 
demands.
In short RT was using its dominant position to support and 
reinforce a situation which was clearly prohibited in terras of 
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty; such behaviour must necessarily
constitute an abuse of a dominant position in terms of Article 86. 
Indeed, it can be argued that such a use of market power would fall 
specifically under the practices mentioned in paragraphs 2 (a) and 2
(b) of Article 86. In the words of the Advocate-General
"it is sufficient, in order to show that there has been 
an abuse, that the undertaking in this position uses its 
dominant position for purposes contrary to the objectives of 
the Treaty".
It was clear to the Advocate-General that the conduct of the Dutch 
producers could not be held to conform with the objectives of the
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common organisation of the market (i.e. the sugar market) and that,
%
taking into account their dominant position, it represented an abuse 
of that position. It was expressly stated that Article 85 (1) was 
not applicable to the ’agreement* between the producers and the 
importers since, if there were an agreement it could only, in fact,
have been dictated by the producers.
•3
In its judgment , the Court stated that it was clear from 
the documents produced that RT either expressly or implicitly told 
the dealers, or deliberately created in their minds, the impression, 
that it would not supply them with sugar or would not supply them 
with all the quantities for which they applied unless they complied 
with its restrictive export policy. By compelling dealers to 
channel their exports to specific consignees or destinations and to 
impose these restrictions on their own customers, RT had restricted 
the outlets of those dealers and indirectly of their purchasers, 
which is a practice expressly mentioned in Article 86 (b).
With regard to the Dutch producers CSM and SU, the Court
considered that the Commission had failed in its submissions that
the producers had abused their dominant position by inducing their 
dealers to adopt a course of conduct prohibited by the Treaty. The 
Commission Decision, therefore had to be annulled to that extent.
Regrettably, the Sugar Case is the only piece of jurisprudence 
dealing with the interrelationship of exclusive distributorship 
agreements and Article 86. For Article 86 to have a role to play in 
this area, it is necessary that the ’agreement* with the distributor 
be imposed upon it by the supplier or the producer; for an abuse of 
a dominant position to exist it is necessary that the parties are of 
unequal economic strength, and one of the parties exploits that 
difference for its own advantage.
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The separate, but related question is whether a system of 
exclusive distribution or solus agreements entered into by a firm in 
a dominant position can amount to an abuse of that position. This 
is a point which has not been considered by the authorities al­
though, by analogy with the statement of the Court with regard to 
Commercial Agents in the Sugar Case, and discussed infra, it can 
possibly be deduced that if the effect of the series of agreements 
taken as a whole is to make market entry by other enterprises 
impossible or to make their penetration of the market very much 
harder than it would be in a normal situation, the agreements may 
indeed amount to an abuse of the dominant position.
In this connection, the Commission have proposed amending 
Regulation 57/67 so that the automatic exemption thereby provided is 
limited to situations where the goods sold by a manufacturer under 
such exclusive dealing arrangements do not represent more than 15% 
of the market for such goods in a substantial part of the common 
market. This is, it is submitted by the Author, designed specific­
ally to avoid the abuse which could exist.
If the Commission considers that there has been an unnatural or 
excessive foreclosing of the market by a dominant firm signing up 
all potential distributors in the sector exclusively in respect of 
his products, there is little doubt that it has the necessary powers 
to go against that firm, both in terms of Article 85 and Article 6 
of Regulation 67/67, and in terms of Article 86. Although the 
Continental Can doctrine is not favoured, there is still a school of 
opinion which suggests that Article 86 can be used to prevent the 
creation of an anticompetitive market structure per se. This is 
however, not a view which the author would support. It is submitted
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that Article 86 is concerned only with market behaviour, it is 
neutral towards the structure of the market as such.
In an oligopoly situation, it is thought that the same criteria
as in monopoly would apply. The attitude of the Commission towards
the distribution systems of the petrol companies has been extens-
5ively set out in the Oil Report and it is not intended to discuss 
those points further here. Suffice it to say that the Commission 
was unable to substantiate any breach of the Community antitrust 
rules in respect of the behaviour of the oil companies during the 
period covered by the Report.
In so far as the oligopolists could be dealt with in terms of 
Article 85, that Article would be applied. However, it is not 
considered that Article 85, nor indeed Article 86 can be applied 
to a situation of pure parallelism of behaviour, as has been argued 
by certain writers wishing to extend the concept of ’concerted 
practice’ beyond its natural boundaries. Article 86 could only be 
applied to the oligopolists where either each could be shown to 
have abused its individual dominant position, or they could together 
be shown to have abused a dominant position which they held joint­
ly. The author’s views on this possibility have been made clear 
elsewhere^, and they will not be reiterated here. Nevertheless, 
it can be stated that the Commission have failed to establish in any 
formal proceedings that there exists such a concept as a ’collective 
dominant position' never mind proving what collective behaviour 
could constitute an abuse thereof.
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II. COMMERCIAL AGENCY
The second form of distribution agreement or system which will 
be examined in light of Article 86 is that of Commercial Agency. A 
commercial agent properly so called has no economic independence 
from its principal and forms, in reality, merely an arm of the 
latter's business undertaking.
However, such a relationship may fall within the scope of
Article 86 as the Commission pointed out in its Decision in the
7 8Sugar Case , as subsequently ratified by the Court .
In that Decision, the Commission assessed the behaviour of the 
German producer SZV towards its buyers in terms of Article 86, SZV, 
which was a joint selling agency for producers in southern Germany, 
sold the greater part of the production of its members and decided 
its prices and sales conditions on a unilateral basis; when SZV 
members sold sugar independently they used the same agents ; SZV had 
a market share of some 90% to 95%, which enabled it, in the view of 
the Commission, to act independently of the views and actions of its 
competitors.
In the Commission’s opinion, SZV abused this dominant position 
by obliging its agents not to sell sugar from other sources without 
its consent. In this way it was able to ensure that no foreign 
suppliers could sell through dealers selling SZV sugar. The 
Commission thought that this restriction restricted the opportuni­
ties of foreign suppliers to sell on the southern German market by 
virtue of the fact that dealers appointed by SZV could not be 
customers of the foreign suppliers. In the analysis, it was 
considered that the obligation on agents not to sell foreign sugar
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without prior authorization, constituted an improper practice in 
contravention of Article 86 when it was imposed by a firm in a 
dominant position.
Thus, the position appears to be that whilst it is perfectly 
permissible for a firm to restrain its agents from dealing' in the 
products of competitors, that right ceases to exist as soon as the 
supplier acquires a dominant position. If this is the case, the
question for the practitioner is the stage at which a sufficient
degree of dominance is achieved for this right to cease to exist.
It is not surprising that this point was challenged by SZV 
before the Court, and although the Advocate-General had not dealt 
specifically with the question, the Court discussed the point at 
some length.
SZV challenged the Commission’s findings on the principle that, 
as its relationship with the intermediaries with whom it had 
entered into the disputed agreements was one of commercial repre­
sentation, Article 86 did not apply to the contracts. The Court 
decided that the agreements in question were, in fact, trade repre­
sentatives' contracts, in particular because they conferred on the 
intermediaries the attributes of a trade representative under German 
Law and because the representative was under an obligation to
negotiate or conclude contracts in the name and for the account of
the principal. Under German law it was stated that it was permis­
sible to include in such contracts a prohibition on trade represent­
atives competing with their principal without the latter's consent, 
even if there is no express provision to this effect.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of the application of Articles
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85 and 86, the relationship between a supplier and his intermed­
iaries must be examined only in terms of Community Law; the provi­
sions of national law, whilst relevant to the discussion, are not 
conclusive of the legal position in terras of those Articles. The 
Court then continued by discussing the nature of the relationship 
between the principal and the commercial agent and the requirements 
of such a relationship being properly constituted. Its conclusion 
was that an abuse could not exist where a principal forbade an 
auxiliary organ, such as the agent, to trade in products which could 
compete with his own.
The position would be different in the Court's view if the 
agreements allowed the 'agent* to carry out duties which from an 
economic point of view could be considered as similar to those 
carried out by an independent dealer, because in particular, they 
provided for the agents accepting the financial risk of the sales 
or the performance of contracts entered into with third parties. 
(Quare the Court would apply this view also to del credere agents ? 
The author considers probably not)
In such a case, "if a clause restricting competition is agreed 
between principal and agent and the principal is a firm occupying a 
dominant position, that clause may constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position, within the meaning of Article 86, as being likely to 
consolidate that dominant position". From the author's examination 
of the terms of Article 86, it is difficult to see into which of the 
categories of abuse listed such a practice might fall. Certainly 
the agreement between principal and 'agent* will fall within the 
terras of Article 85 (1) and may be dealt with in accordance with the 
terms of that provision. However, the Court does not make it clear 
why such an agreement is also an abuse of a dominant position.
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However, in the Court’s opinion "even clauses prohibiting 
competition imposed by an undertaking occupying a dominant position 
on trade representatives may constitute an abuse". This abuse is 
seen as the removal from the market of all suitably qualified agents 
with whom foreign suppliers could hope to deal with a view to 
penetrating the market in question. It is seen from this analysis 
that the Court appears to be returning to a Continental Can type of
9
approach to market structure .
Although that case has not been specifically mentioned by the 
Court in any of its subsequentjudgments, its rationale has at least 
been alluded to in a number of eases. The Continental Can case will 
be discussed infra.
In the Sugar Case, having made the general statement of prin­
ciple quoted above, the Court decided that, in the particular 
circumstances of the South German market, there existed a sufficient 
number of wholesalers and dealers who had no commercial or trading 
links with SZV and to whom foreign producers could turn if they 
wished to penetrate the German market. Consequently, the clauses in 
the agreements concluded by SZV could not be seen as being in 
contravention of Article 86,
As with exclusive distribution agreements discussed in Section 
I, supra, the Sugar Case is the only formal judgment dealing with 
the question of commercial agency in Article 86. The statement in 
that case does, however, appear to be clear. Whereas, commercial 
agency is unobjectionable so far as Article 85 (1) is concerned, it 
may in certain circumstances constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position prohibited by Article 86. For an abuse to "exist it seems 
to be necessary that the dominant firm, or in an oligopolistic
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situation a number of dominant firms, have entered into agency
arrangements with all, or almost all, the firms, in the area who are
able and qualified to engage in the trade in question. This would
appear to require that there be a number of potential agents in the
area, and, the author would suggest, some degree of monopolistic
intent on the part of the dominant firms must be a prerequisite. In
this context it is suggested that the abuse which is being struck at
is the monopolisation prohibited by the United States Sherman 
10Act . A dominant firm which finds itself in a position where all 
the agents in the area are tied to it cannot it is submitted, be 
condemned for something which it has not actively or at least pass­
ively striven to achieve.
The abuse appears to be that of consolidation or reinforcement 
of an existing dominant position. Whether such action is, in 
fact, an abuse has not been tested since the much-criticised 
Continental Can case, and there must be some doubt as to the 
applicability of Article 86 to such behaviour. The only paragraph 
of Article 86 which could be seen as having any relevance to the 
behaviour criticised is paragraph (b) dealing with the limiting of 
markets to the prejudice of consumers; certainly SZV's behaviour was 
to the detriment of consumers, but whether the sole fact of their 
having signed up most of the agents in the area can be considered 
as limiting markets is far from clear. It is not limiting its own 
markets, but making the markets of others more limited. It is
submitted that this is not what Article 86 (b) is aiming at.
In conclusion, it is certain that the Community authorities 
should have the power to deal with behaviour which leads to a
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foreclosing of the market and a resultant lack of competitive 
opportunities. However, Article 86 does not appear to provide such 
powers and, if the Commission consider them essential, they should 
approach the Council with a view to having an express grant made 
thereof.
III. GENERAL COMMENTS
The observations which are to be made in this part relate not 
only to exclusive distribution and commercial agency, although they 
are particularly relevant in those areas, but also to other methods
of distribution undertaken by a firm in a dominant position.
11In the Hoffmann-La Roche/Vitamins Case in 1979 , the Advo­
cate General (Reischl) stated that, in his opinion, the Commission 
had been correct in stating that an express obligation on purchasers 
to obtain their supplies from Hoffmann-La Roche, which had a domin­
ant position was incompatible with the competition rules of the 
Treaty, They took away the purchaser's freedom of action in pur­
chasing and excluded other competitors from those markets and thus 
served to reinforce competitive relationships and strengthen the 
dominant position in the market which already existed. In the
Advocate-General's opinion it was irrelevant whether the obligation
extended to all the requirements of the purchaser or merely a large 
part thereof.
In its judgment, the Court affirmed the view of the Advocate-
General, by stating that;-
"An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and 
ties purchaser - even if it does so at their request - by an
obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of
their requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses 
its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the 
Treaty..."
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The same position would apply even if the undertaking, instead 
of tying the purchasers by a formal undertaking applied, either 
under the terms of an agreement concluded with those purchasers 
or unilaterally, a system of fidelity rebates. This question will 
be further discussed in Section B infra.
Although the statement in the Vitamins case is in general 
terms, it appears to be directed particularly at instances in which 
the exclusive purchase obligation is reinforced by the application 
of a system of rebates to encourage the purchaser to obtain all his 
requirements, or a substantial proportion thereof from the dominant 
supplier.
However, it is submitted that the ratio of the statement would 
be equally applicable to a situation where no such rebate system 
were offered.
In conclusion, it appears to be the position that if a dominant
firm seeks to tie its purchasers to it, whether this tying is done
at the letter’s request in order to (say) ensure continued supplies, 
such an arrangement will fall foul of Article 86. If this is the 
case, it is difficult to see how the dominant firm can organise the 
distribution of its products, other than directly through some part 
of its enterprise without there being the danger that Article 86 
will be infringed.
Mention should also be made here for the sake of completeness,
of the fact that Article 86 is equally applicable to an abuse of a
dominant position on the demand side of the distribution system.
12The Commission made it clear in the Eurofima Case , that it would 
intervene where, because of the special characteristics of the
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market in question, buyers or a single purchaser had a dominant 
position vis-a-vis their suppliers. This situation will, of course, 
be the exception rather than the rule but may happen where the sole 
purchaser in a Member State is, for example, a nationalised in­
dustry.
In Eurofima, the position was that Eurofima was a purchasing 
agency used by the railway companies of several Member States 
for their purchases of rolling stock and accordingly it had a 
great deal of market power in relation to the producers of such 
goods whose only outlet was through Eurofima, In its investigat­
ions, the Commission found that certain of the practices in which 
Eurofima had engaged were abusive, and these were removed by that 
undertaking so making the adoption of a formal decision unnecessary.
B. . ABUSIVE■BEHAVIOUR
This Section of Chapter 4 is concerned with an examination of 
various types of behaviour which, when used by a firm in a dominant 
position, may be considered abusive. In some instances, such 
behaviour might be struck at on other bases even if it were that of 
a non-dominant undertaking, and some forms of conduct could also be 
considered in light of Article 85. However, this Section is con­
cerned only with the application of Article 86.
Mention is made in general at this point of the general de­
finitions of dominant position and abuse thereof discussed in Chaper 
2 supra, to which reference is made.
The discussion will relate to forms of tying conduct such as 
loyalty and fidelity rebates and related concepts, and to pricing 
behaviour falling within the ambit of Article 86. Equally, refusal 
to supply is considered in Section C, and concentration control in 
Section D of this Chapter.
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I. LOYALTY/FIDELITY REBATE SYSTEMS
The first type of potentially abusive behaviour which will be 
considered in this part of Section B is the use of systems of 
loyalty or fidelity rebates by the dominant firm to encourage 
its customers to continue to trade only, or primarily, with that 
dominant firm.
Systems of aggregate rebate may fall within the prohibition of 
Article 85(1) where they are applied by a number of undertakings 
acting together. Although in a dominant firm situation, aggregate 
rebates play a less important role, since it is usually only with 
regard to that undertaking’s products that the rebate is calculated, 
such systems may still be condemned where the dominant firm's 
pre-eminent market position on one market is used to ensure loyalty 
from its customers in other markets where there exist potential
competitors and on which market the dominant firm is less powerful.
11In the Sugar Industry Decision , the Commission condemned 
the behaviour of the German sugar sales agency SZV. In addition to 
various agreements with local representatives, binding those re­
presentatives to it, SZV had used a system of annual quantity and 
fidelity rebates. Indeed SZV invoices stated clearly that an annual 
quantity discount of DM 0.30 per 100 kg would be granted at the end 
of each contract year on the contract price where the purchaser's 
annual requirements were covered exclusively from members of SZV. 
In the case of some customers, the discount was granted immediately 
and deducted from the invoice. According to the parties, the 
discount continued to be available even if the buyers
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bought sugar elsewhere up to a certain amount. However, the Com­
mission could find no evidence of this, and indeed the Commission’s 
investigations showed that the discount had been removed at least in 
some cases where the buyer had imported sugar, and in others such 
removal had been threatened.
So far as the Commission could determine, the use ,or threat of 
use of the sanction of removal of the rebate offered by SZV had 
ensured that imports were discontinued.
In its analysis, the Commission stated that SZV had improperly 
exploited its dominant position by the granting of fidelity re­
bates. It considered that the granting of such rebates or dis­
counts, which did not depend on the amount bought, but only on 
whether the annual requirements of the buyer were covered exclusive­
ly by SZV was an unjustifiable discrimination against buyers who 
also bought sugar from sources other than SZV. In the situation in 
question, since the buyers relied on SZV for at least part of their 
requirements and needed regular supplies, the disadvantage of losing 
the rebate was usually greater than the benefits of buying sugar 
from other suppliers even if they offered it at more favourable 
rates.
The Commission saw the basic feature of the fidelity rebate 
system as being the means for the dominant firm to control the 
purchases from foreign producers made by each customer, whose annual 
requirements varied little. The fact that the rebate was granted in 
some cases even where the customer’s total requirements were not met 
exclusively from SZV did not alter the position, as the threat 
that such rebates would be withdrawn was sufficient to prevent 
customers from making large and regular imports.
In conclusion, the Commission stated that:-
"If a fidelity rebate of this kind is granted by an
undertaking which holds a dominant position in order to 
limit opportunities for imports still further and to 
strengthen that dominant position, it constitutes an abuse 
which is likely to affect trade between Member States.
The granting of a fidelity rebate by SZV is therefore a
violation of Article 86."
A fine was imposed by the Commission relative to this infringe­
ment of Article 86, and SZV appealed to the Court for annulment of 
the Decision.
In the case which f o l l o w e d t h e  Advocate-General (Mayras) 
stated that he considered that the granting of loyalty rebates by 
SZV amounted to an abuse of its dominant position prohibited by
Article 86 in that it amounted to the imposition of unfair purchase 
or selling prices and/or the application of dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading partners. The Court 
upheld the view of the Advocate-General arguing that the system was 
likely to limit markets to the prejudice to consumers because it 
gave other producers and particularly those having their places of 
business in other Member States no chance, or restricted their 
opportunities of competing with sugar sold by SZV. The loyalty 
rebate which might further consolidate SZV's position was therefore 
incompatible with Article 86(b)
In the Vitamins Decision taken against Hoffmann-La Roche in 
15June 1976 , the Commission attacked the fidelity system used by
Roche in its dealings with purchasers of certain vitamins.
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In the agreements concluded by Roche there were exclusivity 
clauses providing that the customer should buy all, or a very large 
proportion of its requirements from Roche. In the event that such 
an obligation was broken, the fidelity rebate offered by Roche was 
lost in respect of all that customer's purchases from Roche, and not 
only in respect of the amount of such purchase. In the particular 
facts of the case, the restrictive effects were aggravated by the 
fact that the rebates were calculated on the basis of all the 
purchases of that customer from Roche of vitamins and were not 
restricted to purchases of vitamins of that particular type, so that 
rebates were aggregated over the purchases of vitamins from other 
groups.
It should not be thought that such rebates, even if aggregated 
over the whole range of products produced by a manufacturer, will 
inevitably constitute a breach of Article 86. In the case of Roche, 
however, Roche held over 95% of the market in certain vitamins and 
accordingly, customers requiring to purchase several vitamins would 
need to buy at least some of their requirements from Roche. Roche 
was therefore able to abuse its dominant position on the markets on
which it held such a position to ensure that customers purchased
/
vitamins from it relative to other markets in which its position 
was less strong and in which customers would not necessarily have 
had to deal with it.
The Commission considered that, since the rebate was only 
available where the purchaser had retained its exclusivity towards 
Roche, the behaviour of Roche amounted to treating similar trans­
actions in a dissimilar fashion and the conditions of Article 86 (c) 
were therefore met.
As had been made clear in the Sugar Case, a fidelity rebate 
offered by a dominant firm cannot be analysed in the same way as a
quantity rebate calculated solely on purchases from the relevant
manufacturer, but as a form of price concession designed to deter 
customers from placing orders with competing manufacturers. Fide­
lity rebates which may reinforce dominance are incompatible with
Article 86.
Roche appealed to the Court and in a judgment of February,
1979”*^  the Court upheld the Commission's Decision in all respects
except with regard to Vitamin B3. In his Opinion, Advocate General
Reischl.stated that:-
"if advantages in relation to supply are granted in respect of 
customer loyalty and not on the basis of cost savings to the 
supplier, there is a compulsion very similar to that exerted by 
an express tie".
"if a purchaser receives rebates on the basis of his total 
supplies (total turnover rebate) , on the understanding that he 
obtains the whole or a large part of his supply from the party 
granting the rebate, a competitor can obtain the order only if 
his offer compensates for the loss of the rebate. Even where 
the rebate is not very high, this is frequently extremely 
difficult or quite impossible, so that in practice access to 
such customers is blocked".
These quotes from the Advocate-General's Opinion encapsulate 
the problem which the Commission are attempting to prevent. If the 
dominant firm is able to offer rebates to its customers on the 
basis that they obtain all their requirements from it or lose the
rebate for that year, the offeror firm seeking to compete with the
dominant firm must offer a very substantial discount to outweigh
the cost to the purchaser of the loss of the rebate which has been
calculated on the basis of purchases to that date. Thus even if the 
purchaser is offered substantially better prices for a single 
transaction from another manufacturer, it is unlikely that he can 
afford to accept such an offer.
In its judgment, the Court affirmed both the view of the 
Commission and of the Advocate-General and ruled that the effect of 
fidelity rebates was to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with the effect that Article 86(c) was infringed.
In its analysis of a related concept, the Commission and the 
Court considered the position of the so-called 'English Clause' in 
light of the EEC rules of competition.
In terms of the English Clause, a purchaser who wished to
obtain supplies from a manufacturer other than Roche was entitled to
approach Roche with details of the lower quote. If Roche was not 
prepared to match this lower quote, the purchaser was free to place 
his order with the competing manufacturer without losing the fide­
lity rebate earned to that time. The same principle applied if
Roche was unable to cover the entire requirements of the customer 
due to a shortage.
The Commission considered that the English Clause amounted to a 
very limited relaxation of the exclusivity system operated by 
Roche. Although the function of the clause, as described by Roche, 
was ostensibly to enable purchasers to obtain their requirements 
other than from Roche it was truly to enable Roche to learn the 
prices and terras offered by its competitors. Despite the fact that 
the prices charged by all vitamins producers were ostensibly public 
through the use of price lists and the like, the practice in the 
industry was to offer particular customers more beneficial prices or 
terms in order to secure their business. It was these particular 
terms and conditions, as opposed to the generalisations appearing on 
published price lists which Roche was able to discover. In Roche's 
case the scope of the English Clause was further delimited by the
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necessity that the more favourable offer came from a ’reputable’ 
dealer in the customer's territory - thereby excluding offers from 
other Member States.
In each case, it was open to Roche to decide whether or not the 
customer was to be permitted to accept the more favourable offer 
i.e, whether a competitor was to be allowed access (however re­
stricted) to the market. Since only 'reputable' manufacturers were 
included, it was open to Roche to exclude any offer made by a 
manufacturer which was in such terms as might lead Roche to believe 
that it was, say, selling below cost with a view to attaining a 
larger share of the market. On the practical level, Roche was 
unlikely to permit undercutting of its prices to take customers from 
it and it would usually reduce its prices to those of the offer so 
preserving its exclusivity of supply.
In the appeal before the Court, Advocate-General Reischl stated 
that the existence of the English Clause did not affect the exist­
ence of abuse resulting from the exclusive dealing arrangements/ 
into which Roche had entered. What was important was that, accord­
ing to the wording of the clause, Roche decided on the possibility 
of obtaining supplies from third parties, and that, in the event of 
Roche intervening, the purchaser was no longer free, and would no 
longer fulfil the conditions for the grant of the rebate, if he were 
to obtain supplies elsewhere.
In its judgment, the Court stated that it was possible for the 
English Clause to remedy some of the unfair consequences of the 
exclusive purchase obligation. However, the purchaser's oppor­
tunities for exploiting competition for his own benefit were more
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restricted than first appeared. The reasons for this have been 
dealt with in the Commission’s analysis. In the Court's view the 
English Clause did not remove the discrimination resulting from the 
fidelity rebates between purchasers in similar circumstances depend­
ing on whether or not they reserved their freedom to choose their 
suppliers. Further, the English Clause did not remedy the distort­
ion of competition resulting from the clauses obliging purchasers to 
obtain their requirements exclusively from Roche and from the 
fidelity rebates on a market where an undertaking in a dominant 
position was operating and where for this reason the structure of 
competition had already been weakened. Roche’s customers were 
obliged under the English Clause to inform it of more favourable 
offers made by competitors together with the particulars thereof - 
so that it would be simple for Roche to identify the competitor. By 
its very nature, this placed at the disposal of Roche information 
about market conditions and also about the alternatives open to, and 
the actions of, its competitors which was of great value for the 
carrying out of its market strategy. The obligation on customers to 
notify competitors’ offers, whilst the customers may have an obvious 
commercial interest in not disclosing them is of such a type as to 
aggravate the exploitation of the dominant position in an abusive 
way. Finally, by means of the English Clause it was for Roche to 
decide whether, by adjusting its prices or not, it will permit 
competition. It is able in this way to vary its market strategy in 
so far as it affects its customers and its competitors.
For all these reasons, the Court decided that the English 
Clause was not of such a kind as to take it out of the category of
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an abuse of a dominant position, which view of the Commission had 
been reached by means of a proper construction and application of 
Article 86 of the Treaty.
In conclusion, it can be stated that it appears from the ratio 
of this judgment and from the Commission’s Decision which preceded 
it, that the use of the English Clause by a firm in a dominant 
position will, in general, constitute an abuse of a dominant posit­
ion, Clearly, the clause will require to be examined in each 
individual case as the Court envisaged the possibility that the 
clause might have beneficial effects in lessening the abusive or 
anti-competitive effects of the use of the fidelity rebate system of 
exclusive purchase obligations. However, it is submitted that in 
the majority of cases, such an English Clause will not affect the 
position with regard to those other practices, and indeed may 
constitute a further abuse in that it enables the dominant firm to 
learn more about its competitors and their market policies than it 
could otherwise have done.
Also, the problem of the English Clause is only to be seen in 
light of Article 86; if the firm using such a clause is not in a 
dominant position, there will be little or no market sanction which 
could be applied in case of any breach thereof. The English Clause, 
and indeed the whole rationale of the fidelity/loyalty rebate system 
relies on the fact that the purchaser will have to deal with the 
firm using such systems for at least some of its requirements. If 
there exists a reasonable degree of competition, and several manu­
facturers offering the relevant products for sale, there will be no 
need for the purchaser to deal with the dominant firm and thus no
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reason why it should accept less favourable terms in respect of some 
of its purchases. Thus, the problem of fidelity rebates is one 
solely of relevance in a situation where the applicant of the system 
enjoys an actual or virtual monopoly in the product concerned or in 
one product of a series, where it is usual for purchasers and other 
intermediaries on the market to deal in all the products in the 
series.
II. ABUSIVE PRICING BEHAVIOUR
The problem of abusive pricing behaviour is central to any 
consideration of the abuse of a dominant position prohibited by 
Article 86 of the Treaty since such pricing behaviour is obviously 
the means by which the dominant firm will be able to reap the 
benefits which will be derived from the behaviour in question. As 
can be seen from an analysis of Article 86, the imposition of unfair 
prices is specifically mentioned as an abuse in sub-clause (a). 
Further as has been shown in Part I, supra, abusive pricing can also 
exist in terms of sub-clause (c) of Article 86 as being the appli­
cation of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties. However in this Part, consideration will be 
of two cases in which it was decided that the dominant firm’s 
pricing behaviour constituted an abuse of its dominant position per 
se.
17In General Motors Continental in December, 1974 the 
Commission imposed a fine of 100,000 ua for what it considered to be 
an abuse of a dominant position. The facts of the case were that 
CMC had been granted the sole right under Belgian Law to issue 
certificates of conformity for General Motors vehicles which had 
been registered abroad. Such a certificate was necessary for the 
vehicles to be used on Belgian roads.
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Since GMC had been made sole grantee of such certificates by 
Belgian law, it had a dominant position on the market for the issue 
of certificates of conformity for Opel vehicles manufactured by 
General Motors outwith Belgium. The Commission decided that CMC had 
abused this dominant position by charging importing consumers 
excessive prices for the issue of such certificates.
The existence of such an abuse was established by the Commiss­
ion from the fact that CMC had charged not only the cost element of 
the examination of vehicles for the issue of such certificates but 
also non-recurring items of expenditure on type approval. The 
average charge of Bfrs 500C was based exclusively on expenditure 
relating to General Motors American models; however, the cost of 
inspecting Opel vehicles was lower than that for American models 
and, since GMC could expect to sell considerably more Opel vehicles 
than American vehicles in Belgium, the apportioned cost per vehicle 
should have been considerably less. In fact, the cost analysis 
which GMC itself later carried out showed the type approval costs 
for Opel vehicles to be only Bfrs 123 as against Bfrs 3654 for 
American vehicles. Further, other Belgian firms which carried out 
inspections on behalf of other manufacturers similar to those 
undertaken by GMC had charged only Bfrs 2500 or less. In the 
Commission’s opinion, GMC’s situation could not be seen as so 
different from that of other examiners as to justify inspection fees 
twice those of other manufacturers.
As a result of these differences, the Commission decided that 
GMC had abused its dominant position because of the disparity 
between actual costs incurred and prices actually charged, within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 86 and heading (a) 
thereof.
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As an additional point the Commission pointed out that since 
GMC’s certificate pricing structure only affected cars which 
had been imported into Belgium by persons other than authorised Opel 
dealers appointed by GMC, who would only bear the Bfrs 123 actual 
costs of inspection, acted to detriment of parallel importers who 
were disadvantaged to a greater proportion than authorised dealers. 
There was therefore a discrimination within the meaning of Article 
86 because equivalent transactions were treated in a dissimilar 
fashion.
GMC appealed to the Court for annulment of the Decision and in
18October, 1975, Advocate-General Mayras stated in his Opinion , 
that the excessive price charged by GMC was an abuse of its dominant 
position by the mere fact that GMC had imposed unfair prices or 
trading conditions. However, the Advocate-General did not consider 
that GMC’s infringement of Article 86 had been intentional, but 
merely negligent and recommended that the Court annul the Commiss­
ion’s Decision insofar as it imposed a fine on GMC whilst rejecting 
the applicant’s other conclusions.
The Court, however, went further than the Advocate-General and 
annulled the Decision in its entirety. In the Court’s view, al­
though an abuse could exist in the imposition of a price which was 
excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided, 
GMC had quickly reduced its charges after complaints had been made
and had refunded the excess to the parties concerned, which reduct­
ion and refund had taken place before the Commission had commenced
its investigations. GMC had established that it had charged the
rate applicable to American vehicles only until it had calculated
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the actual cost of the service; once such calculation had been made, 
it had reduced its rates to the economic cost and reimbursed those 
persons who had complained to it.
As a result of this fact, the Court stated that, although the 
Decision could be explained by the Commission's wish to react and be 
seen to react energetically against any tendency to abuse what was 
clearly a dominant position, its intervention had been unjustified 
in the actual temporal and factual circumstances in which it took 
place. Therefore, it annulled the Decision but ordered the parties 
to bear their own costs.
Although the CMC Decision illustrates the potential abusiveness 
of the imposition of prices which bear no relation to the economic 
value of the product or service in question, the application of 
Article 86 to such a situation would, it is submitted, involve the 
Commission in a task for which it is unsuited and has insufficient 
staff. How the Commission are to determine what the economic value 
of the product or service is, is a problem which is of almost 
insurmountable proportions. Wliat profit margin is to be considered 
as appropriate? What share of the overheads of the firm is each 
product to bear? What is the cost of each product? What is its 
economic value? All these questions remain unanswered and Commiss­
ion incursions into this field have not met with much success as can
IQ
be seen from the Chiquita Decision
In conclusion, although the imposition of unfair prices is 
undoubtedly an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 of the 
Treaty, the problems inherent in the establishment of the fact that 
the prices in question are in fact unfair and therefore constitute
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an abuse are likely to prevent such a finding being made and sub­
sequently upheld before the Court.
The second case which will be examined in this context is that
20of Chiquita and United Brands Co in December, 1975
In its Decision, the Commission stated that UBC had abused its 
dominant position by charging its distributor/ripeners in the Member 
States concerned, different prices for Chiquita bananas - such a 
practice falling clearly within Article 86 (c) of the Treaty. 
Although in its definition of dominance in the UBC Decision, the 
Commission specifically refers to the power ’to determine the 
prices of the relevant goods’, it does not make much of UBC’s 
substantial pricing discretion in its findings.
Dominance per definitionem involves a substantial pricing 
discretion; that UBC possessed such discretion is evidenced by the 
fact that they were able to charge higher prices than their com­
petitors who, it can be argued, were selling bananas of comparable 
quality. Such discretion was not in UBC’s case, and indeed can 
never be, total; there must always exist a price (evidently higher 
than that which UBC was charging) at which consumers would presum­
ably switch to competing brands. What is to be ascertained by the 
control authorities is whether the degree of pricing discretion 
which exists is sufficient to found a presumption of market domin­
ance; this must of course, depend to a large extent on the manner in 
which the dominant firm exploits this discretion.
Such a practice of charging distributor/ripeners differing 
prices has a tendency to maintain different price levels in each of 
the Member States. Accordingly the distributor/ripeners
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are placed on an unequal basis if they wish to sell UBC bananas in 
Member States other than that in which they are established. This 
it would be relatively simple for them to do were they not prohibit­
ed from reselling green bananas. It is impossible to fault the 
Commission on this reasoning and, indeed, it is clear that such 
conduct will constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
However, the Commission then went on to state that UBC had also 
abused its dominant position by the charging of unfair prices to 
certain of its distributor/ripeners. UBC’s marketing policy - 
particularly its prohibition on the sale of green bananas - had led 
to the effective segregation of national markets and had enabled UBC 
to charge and maintain different prices on each market. The Com­
mission recalled that in the DGG/Metro case, the Court had stated 
that a difference in price between the controlled price in one 
Member State and the price of the product reimported from another 
Member State may be a determining factor in an abuse of a dominant 
position if it is unjustified by any objective criteria. In the 
case of Chiquita bananas, the Commission considered that the price 
differences were wide and could not be justified objectively.
UBC’s lowest prices were charged in Ireland and, according to 
UBC, still enabled it to make a profit, albeit a small one in 
relation to that achieved from sales in other Member States. 
Indeed customers in Germany and Benelux had to pay up to double 
the price charged in Ireland for Chiquita bananas. Further the 
Irish prices were c.i.f. Dublin and in other Member States the 
prices were all f.o.r. Bremenhaven or Rotterdam. Thus the Irish 
prices should have been higher than those in the other areas due to 
the higher transport costs, but this was not the case.
yi.
The Commission, therefore, concluded that the prices charged by 
UBC were excessive in relation to the economic value of the product 
supplied. Such excessiveness • was confirmed by the substantial 
difference of 30 - 40% between the prices of unbranded bananas sold 
by UBC and those sold under the Chiquita label, although the stan­
dard of unbranded bananas was only slightly lower than that of 
Chiquita bananas. Although the price charged by UBC for its Chi­
quita bananas was undoubtedly exploitative, this can be explained by 
reference to various factors including the brand loyalty which UBC 
had built up by means of an extensive advertising campaign. Also it 
could be argued that competition with lower priced bananas of other 
brands would eventually force UBC to lower its prices in any case.
It is not true to state, as the Commission did, that UBC’s 
marketing policy had led to the segregation of the market and had 
enabled UBC to charge prices for its bananas under the Chiquita 
label which were sheltered from effective competition, UBC’s 
marketing policy had merely led to the segregation of the market in 
unripened Chiquita bananas; prices of Chiquita bananas were not 
sheltered from competition from other banana importers such as 
Castle and Cook and Del Monte - both of which were major undertak­
ings in direct competition with UBC on most markets. Neither could 
Chiquita bananas be considered as sheltered from competition from 
UBC’s unbranded bananas.
21In the appeal to the Court for annulment of the Decision , 
the Advocate-General (Mayras) considered the question of abuse based 
on the differential pricing policy by UBC, UBC’s explanation of the 
differing prices appeared to be that the price it charged was a
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deduced price calculated by working back from the point of ultimate 
sale; it did not ’make' the price but simply took it passively from 
the strength of the demand on the market without attempting either 
to influence or direct it. However, the Advocate-General considered 
that in view of UBC's dominant position such an argument was tant­
amount to stating that it had the power to dictate its own laws. 
The reason that UBC charged what it liked on the market according to 
what the market could bear and applied discriminatory prices was 
because it did not consider that there was even a residual common 
market in bananas. Consequently, the Advocate-General considered 
that there was evidence that UBC had engaged in the abuse referred 
to in Article 86(c).
This does not appear to be a particularly conclusive finding; 
in essence, what is being said is that it can be inferred that 
abusive behaviour has been engaged in - it does not state that an 
abuse actually exists.
The Court, however, was able to state categorically that an 
abuse of a dominant position had been established. In particular, 
it referred to the fact that, armed with the market information 
which it had been given by its local representatives, UBC was able 
to impose its selling prices on the intermediate purchasers. Those 
discriminatory prices were obstacles to the free movement of goods 
reinforced by the prohibition on selling green bananas. A rigid 
partitioning of national markets was thus created at price levels 
which were artificially different ~ so placing certain distributor/- 
ripeners at a competitive disadvantage since competition had been 
distorted.
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Consequently, the policy of differing prices, enabling UBC to 
apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, 
was an abuse of a dominant position.
Turning then to the question of an abuse being constituted by 
the imposition of unfair business conditions, namely charging 
excessive prices, the Advocate-General addressed himself to the 
question of whether imposing excessive prices was per se an abuse by 
a dominant firm.
The Advocate-General considered that this was so, from his 
reading of Article 86(a) which specifically refers to 'directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions’. Reference was also made to Article 
85(1) which, whilst referring to the fixing of prices, does not 
state that they must be unfair. According to Mr. Mayras, the two 
situations could be distinguished by the different situations with 
which the two provisions were designed to deal ; in the case of 
Article 85 it is the fact that the firms concerned impose upon 
themselves a prohibition on any unilateral price reduction; in the 
case of a dominant undertaking, there is no question of any agree­
ment to fix price.
The mere fixing of prices is not an abuse; every firm requires 
to fix its prices. However, the infringement, according to Mr. 
Mayras arises when the dominant firm turns its position to account, 
in particular through imposing unfair prices on its customers. 
’Unfair prices’ were defined by the Advocate-General as ’’prices 
which are excessive and bear no reasonable relation to the con­
sideration" .
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Mr Mayras made specific reference to the fact that there was
no actual precedent in the Court's jurisprudence for such an abuse
22 23although in Sirena -v- Eda and DGG/Metro the question was
dealt with in relation to price levels and the differences between
domestically produced and imported products of the same type.
In conclusion it was stated that, in the Advocate-General's
view, when the Commission had to deal with selling prices which had
been imposed (i.e. fixed by a dominant undertaking) and were unfair
because they were excessive having regard to production costs, the
Commission has power under Article 86 to impose a mandatory price
reduction without prejudice to the power which it has to impose a
fine on the undertaking concerned.
However, it is not clear whether in the particular facts of the
UBC case, the Advocate-General considered that an abuse had been
found to exist although from his analysis of the fine which was
appropriate he appears to believe that the abuse by way of excessive
prices had been established.
The Court considered that the Commission had proceeded on the
wrong basis when it founded its argument of excessive prices on
a letter from UBC stating that it made a considerably smaller
margin on bananas sold in Ireland than in some Member States,
the contents of which letter had been retracted on two occasions by
UBC. It was considered arbitrary to proceed on the basis of Irish
sales which accounted for only 1.6% of the total volume of bananas
imported in 1974, in order to calculate the profits which had been
made on the remainder of the relevant market.
The Court stated that the imposition by a dominant firm of
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unfair purchase or selling prices was an abuse to which exception 
can be taken under Article 86 of the Treaty; it was therefore 
necessary to exEimine whether UBC had made use of the oppportunities 
arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap 
trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been 
normal and sufficient competition. In the UBC case, the Court 
considered that charging a price which was excessive because it had 
no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied 
was such an abuse.
Having established the existence of an abuse, the Court then 
went on to discuss how the excessive element was to be determined; 
the excess could, inter alia, be determined objectively if it were 
possible for it to be calculated by making a comparison between the 
selling price of the product in question and its costs of product­
ion, which would disclose the amount of the profit margin. Since 
the Commission had not done this, by not analysing UBC's structure, 
the Court decided that the Commission had not adduced adequate legal 
proof for the evaluation of its findings. After completion of the 
comparison of price and cost, the question to be determined is 
whether the difference is excessive; if it is, it is necessary to 
consider whether a price has been imposed which is excessive in 
itself or in relation to competing goods.
Although the Court recognised that the assessment was a diffi­
cult one, it felt that the problems were not insurmountable; in 
particular the Commission should have required UBC to produce 
particulars of the constituent elements of its production costs. In 
conclusion, the Court stated that, although the difference in price
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between Chiquita bananas and those of its principal competitors was 
about 7% such a percentage was not prima facie excessive and con­
sequently unfair.
For these reasons, the Court annulled that part of the Decision 
dealing with abuse by way of excessive prices.
The UBC case is the first attempt by the Community authorities 
to move towards a public utility regulation of dominant firms. The 
Court's rejection of the Commission’s findings illustrates the major 
shortcoming of such a regulation; nothing can be done to restore a 
competitive market structure ~ if UBC’s prices are cut, it will 
increase its market share. If on the other hand, UBC’s prices are 
not controlled, there is at least the possibility that competitive 
pressures will force them down eventually. The control of discri­
minatory prices and the removal of the prohibition of inter-dealer 
sales could ensure that inter-brand competition is not distorted and 
could prevent the abusive exploitation of the dominant position to 
the detriment of consumers. However, Article 86 is concerned only 
with the latter. The maintenance of effective and undlstorted 
competition in the common market is not one of the goals of Article 
86, although it does come within the overall cover of the Com­
munity’s competition policy by way of Article 3(f) of the Treaty.
The Commission’s Decision is, also open to criticism on other 
grounds; although in its Appraisal it states that UBC must be 
required to cease applying unfair prices, it does not state what 
reduction in price is to be made, nor does it reiterate this re­
quirement in the operative part of the Decision, which is the only 
part open to action for annulment. This is most unsatisfactory -
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either the Commission should make a price reduction order in the 
Decision or it should not attempt to regulate unfair prices. Is the 
statement in the Decision that UBC would satisfy its obligations 
under the Decision if it reduced its prices to customers in Benelux 
Denmark and Germany by 15%, a formal obligation which can be enforc­
ed and which if not complied with will lay UBC open to further 
sanction by the Commission? This point was never discussed by the 
Court and, with the annulment of the unfair prices section of the 
Decision, it is unlikely to have to be determined in the future. If 
UBC had reduced its price by the suggested 15% would this have 
precluded further action by the Commission?
The Commission adopts a strange pose on this matter ; in the UBC 
Decision it argues strongly that it is not seeking to adopt a public 
utility regulation of dominant firms yet it seeks to control their 
prices. It can be argued, as it has been done, that it is proper 
that the Commission should have power to control the prices of 
dominant firms by a public utility regulation. However, if it is to 
have this role - and this is in the final instance a political 
rather than a legal decision - it will be necessary to strengthen 
the Commission’s staff considerably to enable it to carry out the 
onerous obligations attached to such a control in an effective 
manner. It is submitted that, at the present time, the Commission 
lack the necessary expertise to conduct such a function,
III. ABUSIVE TYING PRACTICES
The third Part of this Section deals with forms of conduct on 
the part of a dominant enterprise, whereby that enterprise seeks to 
impose conditions or requirements on its customers or dealers
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preventing them from acting in certain ways; insofar as these types 
of conduct relate to distribution and to pricing, they have been 
discussed in Parts I and II supra.
24In United Brands Co. in 1975 . the Commission attacked the
requirement imposed by UBC on its distributors/ripeners that they 
must not resell UBC bananas to competing ripeners and were not to 
resell UBC bananas whilst these were green. In addition, restrict­
ions were placed on distributor/ripeners dealing in competing 
bananas and they were not able to sell bananas to dealers from other 
countries.
Owing to the highly perishable nature of bananas, it is only 
possible for them to be transported any distance whilst in a green 
state; once they have reached the yellow stage in which they are 
desirable to customers, they have only a very limited shelf life and 
are very prone to damage in transport, UBC's prohibition on the 
resale of green bananas therefore amounted to a prohibition on 
exports and thus maintained an effective market segregation - so 
facilitating UBC's differential pricing policies, discussed in Part 
II, supra.
UBC argued that the reason for the prohibtion was to guarantee 
the quality of products sold to the consumer; however, the Commiss­
ion rejected this view since it was not merely the sale of green 
bananas to consumers which was prohibited but all sales of green 
bananas. However, Article 86 is not concerned with the distortion 
of competition within the common market, but rather with ensuring 
that consumers (as that terra is used in its widest sense) are 
protected against exploitation of a dominant position. A clause 
which prohibits horizontal trading in green Chiquita bananas is such 
an abuse.
99
2 5As has been mentioned above, UBC appealed to the Court , and 
in that case, the Advocate-General stated that it appeared doubtful 
whether distributor/ripeners wished to resell the bananas which they 
had purchased; equally the possibility that it was in the interest 
of ripeners to sell bananas to other ripeners could be ruled out, in 
the Advocate-General's view - bananas were purchased to be ripened. 
VJhat was important was that the ripeners be in a position to buy, 
ripen and sell Chiquita and other bananas to customers of their own 
choice.
The Advocate-General considered whether the restriction on the 
sale of green bananas could be justified in terras of Article 85 (3) 
but concluded but it could not; insofar as UBC prohibited the sale 
of bananas which were 'unripe* and let it be known that only the 
sale of bananas which were completely yellow could be permitted, 
this requirement could be seen as going further than that which the 
generally accepted rules allowed.
In his view, the clause prohibiting the sale of green bananas 
was not merely a constituant part of the dominant position but one 
of the consequences flowing from that position and in itself an 
abuse.
The Court confirmed the opinion both of the Commission and of 
the Advocate-General and stated that the prohibition on the sale of 
unripened bananas - even although the perishable nature of the 
product limited the opportunities of selling to the duration of a 
specific period of time - was an abuse of a dominant position since 
it limited markets to the prejudice of consumers and affected trade 
between Member States by the partitioning of national markets.
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other forms of tying practice fall into the general category of 
refusal to supply and are, accordingly, dealt with in Section C, 
infra.
In conclusion to this Part of this Section, it can be stated 
that the ratio to be drawn from the UBC case quoted above is that it
will be an abuse of a dominant position if a dominant firm limits
the freedom of its purchaser to do as he thinks fit with the goods 
which he has purchased from the dominant firm. Such a restriction 
will contribute to the partitioning of the market, and, therefore, 
prevent the economic interpretation which the common market was 
intended to facilitate. It is thus apparent that, whilst the 
dominant firm may impose certain trading conditions unilaterally on 
its customers » subject to the provisos stated in Part II supra - 
once the goods have been transferred from the supplier to the 
customer, the dominant firm must not retain any control over the 
goods or their ultimate disposal.
C. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY 
I. The Jurisprudence
The third Section in Chapter 4 of this Study is devoted to what 
could be considered the pure subject of this study - the situation 
where a dominant firm refuses to do business with a customer or 
would-be customer, or only offers to do so on such terms and condit­
ions that it must be considered that it amounts to a refusal to 
supply.
There have been a number of Decisions and cases dealing with 
the problem and these will be examined in turn and an attempt made 
to determine in what circumstances a dominant firm may or may not 
refuse to do business. Also to be considered as an ancillary point 
is whether there is any difference in the legal approach where the 
customer is not a traditional customer of the dominant firm.
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Commercial Solvents/Zoja
In the Commercial Solvents Case, in 1972^^, the Commission 
ruled that the refusal of CSC, and its Italian subsidiary Institute 
Cheraioterapico Italiano (ICI) to supply Zoja had infringed Article 
86. This was the first Decision to concern refusal to supply, and 
it deserves close examination.
In 1962, CSC acquired 51% of the voting share capital of ICI; 
until 1970, ICI acted as a reseller of aminobutanol, produced by CSC 
in the United States, and sold this to many customers in the common 
market including Zoja, which had purchased the product since 1966 
for its production of ethambutol-based specialities. In 1968, CSC 
had attempted unsuccessfully to acquire Zoja, and at about the same 
time ICI had started to produce drugs based on ethambutol, so moving 
into competition with Zoja. Early in 1970 CSC decided to stop 
selling nitropropane and aminobutanol in the EEC but advised cus­
tomers that it would supply only dextro-aminobutanol - which was an 
upgraded intermediate product - to ICI, who could convert it into 
bulk ethambutol for sale in the EEC and elsewhere and for the 
manufacture of its own drugs. As a result of these changes, ICI 
advised its customers that nitropropane and aminobutanol would only 
be available in such quantities as had already been committed for 
resale.
Later in 1970, Zoja cancelled its order for aminobutanol 
provided for in its agreement with ICI. This step seems to have 
been prompted by the ready accessibility of other supplies from 
independent distributors at prices less than those offered under the 
agreement with ICI. At the end of 1970, ICI advised CSC that Zoja
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had placed a new order for aminobutanol and asked whether this 
intermediate product could again be supplied for resale to Zoja. 
CSC replied that none was available.
Zoja then attempted to obtain supplies elsewhere but failed as 
the trail always led to one source « CSC. Therefore Zoja applied to 
the Commission for initiation of proceedings against CSC.
In the Decision, the Commission determined that ICI and CSC had 
abused the dominant position which they possessed on the relevant 
market by refusing to supply Zoja. It ordered them to supply Zoja 
immediately with nitropropane and aminobutanol in stated quantities 
at a price not exceeding the highest then charged and asked them to 
submit proposals for future supplies to Zoja. A periodic penalty 
was imposed to ensure compliance with the supply obligation.
27ICI and CSC applied for the annulment of the Decision
The Court judgment deals with several aspects of Article 86, 
some of which have been mentioned in Chapter 2, but this section 
will be limited to the question of abuse of a dominant position.
The Advocate-General (Warner) commented on the fact that the 
Commission had held that the abuse by the CSC - ICI group of its 
dominant position had consisted in ceasing to supply the raw mater­
ials for which it held a monopoly to one of the principal producers 
of ethambutol in the EEC, namely Zoja, conduct which must lead to 
the elimination of Zoja as a producer of ethambutol and so to a 
reduction in competition. He considered that it was implicit in 
such a finding that there was discrimination against Zoja. It is 
not, however, clear how such a discrimination was created and the 
Advocate-General does not discuss the matter.
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The Advocate-General merely states that he has no doubt that 
the refusal by a dominant firm to supply a user of the raw material 
without reasonable justification will abuse that dominant position. 
The question of an exception to this general principle is raised by 
Mr. Warner when he indicates that the position may be different 
where the raw material only exists because of the efforts in re­
search and development of the dominant firm, and that firm decides 
to supply all the demand for the end product.
This appears to imply that, if the dominant firm retains for 
itself all the manufacturing and distributive functions relative to 
the product, it will not fall under the prohibition of Article 86, 
whereas if it uses other independent entities for these functions, 
Article 86 may come into play. This would seem to run counter to 
the Commission's aims in other areas to attempt to secure a wide 
share of the benefits arising from the exploitation of a new invent­
ion rather than to have all such benefits accrue to a single domin­
ant enterprise.
Mr Warner states that it must, a fortiori, be an abuse of a 
dominant position for a dominant firm to place another trading party 
at a disadvantage by refusing to supply him with a raw material 
which the dominant firm supplies to others in an equivalent posit­
ion. Such behaviour is patently an abuse of a dominant position as 
is made clear in Article 86 (c), However, the question which is 
addressed to the jurist is whether CSC/ICI had, in fact treated 
similar transactions in different fashions; certainly it had refused 
to supply Zoja and certainly other firms were being supplied with 
aminobutanol - but there is no evidence that such other firms were
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in the same position as Zoja. CSC/ICI had accepted responsibility 
to meet all existing contractual obligations in respect of amino­
butanol when it ceased to make such product generally available. 
However, Zoja had earlier forsaken the certainty of supplies from 
ICI in the long terra for the short-term benefits of cheaper prices 
on the international spot market. Surely it cannot be considered 
that such transactions were 'similar' as that term is used in 
Article 86(c),
The Advocate-General referred to the OECD Report on Refusal to 
28Supply" , which showed that such refusals were unlawful in France 
unless certain specified justifications existed; also refusals were 
controlled in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom where 
such refusal operated against the public interest. In the United 
Kingdom, express mention could be made of the Monopolies Commission 
Report, which cited the case of a vertically integrated supplier 
(such as CSC/ICI), not operating under reasonably competitive 
conditions, refusing to supply competitors, as one calling for 
investigation. Whilst it is important for the Court to look at the 
national legislation of the Member States when it is considering its 
response in a case, this does not mean that if these legislations 
adopt a common approach to a problem that is necessarily also the 
legal position under the EEC Treaty. It would be preferable if 
these authorities were afforded merely persuasive force and the 
problems and possible solutions reconsidered in the light of the 
Community Law.
It may be desirable, indeed necessary, that the Commission have 
the power to rule that a dominant position is abused through refusal 
to supply but such power must be based on the Treaty framework and 
not drawn from extraneous sources.
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The Court concurred with the Commision and the Advocate-General
in its judgment. It stated that:-
"An undertaking being in a dominant position as regards the 
production of raw material and therefore able to control the 
supply to manufacturers of derivatives, cannot, just because it 
decides to start manufacturing these derivatives (in competit­
ion with its former customers) act in such a way as to elimin­
ate their competition which in the case in question would 
amount to eliminating one of the principal manufacturers of 
ethambutol in the common market."
The Court stated that such conduct was prohibited in terms of 
Article 3(f) of the Treaty, and further eludicated in Articles 85 
and 86 thereof; certainly, elimination of competition would be 
contrary to the general objectives of Article 3(f), but it is 
arguable that it is not caught by the prohibtion contained in 
Article 86. Although the contrary has been argued, the author is of 
the opinion that it is only conduct which can be attacked under 
Article 86 - it is neutral towards the structure of the market as 
existing.
The approach which, it is submitted, should be adopted is that 
of the monopolization approach of Section 2 of the US Sherman Act - 
for a finding of abuse to be made there requires to be some form of 
positive conduct on the part of the dominant firm to attain and keep 
that position by conduct other than better business methods or 
superior product development.
One point in the CSC/ICI case which the author considers to 
have been given scanty consideration is the point that it was Zoja 
itself which had foresaken the certainty of supplies from ICI for 
the short term benefits which it foresaw on the open market. The
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Court dismissed this argument by stating that when the contract with 
Zoja had expired it would not have been renewed in any event. 
Whether or not this is true, and the information on which the Court 
bases its view is not in the published judgment, it seems irregular 
to take into account possible future action when considering present 
behaviour. The 'what if approach to competition law and policy is 
one fraught with problems and should be avoided at all costs.
For the practitioner, attempting to draw some conclusion from 
the case as to the position of a refusal to supply, the most lucid 
indication appears not in the formal part of the Court's judgment, 
but in the Commission's answers to questions put to it by the Court. 
Asked whether a refusal to sell was to be considered as an abuse in 
all cases where the supply of the relevant products had been dis­
continued, and if not, in what circumstances was it an abuse, the 
Commission stated that
"Under Community law a refusal to sell by an undertaking in a 
dominant position is likely to constitute an abuse of such a 
position. However, the possibility should not be excluded of 
such a refusal being legitimate in certain circumstances. Only 
by examining each individual case would it be possible to 
establish whether a refusal to sell by an undertaking in a 
dominant position is justified.
In any event, in cases in which:
the dominant position is a monopoly
the refusal to sell applies to one of the principal users, 
previously a customer;
the refusal to sell gravely affects maintenance of condit­
ions of effective competition in the Common Market; 
and
no objective justification is apparent.
the unlawful nature of the refusal to sell is particularly 
clear".
Several points arise out of this statement; do the control 
authoritiies start at the premise that a refusal to sell by a 
dominant firm is legal or that it is illegal; does the phrase 
'previously a customer' mean a customer until supplies were refused
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or* merely that that person had dealt with the dominant firm in the 
past - and if the latter is the case, how far into the past can the 
authorities go in determining who must be supplied.
Under the US antitrust legislation, individual sellers can be
29found in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act if their 
refusal to deal is conceived in a monopolistic purpose - i.e. with a 
view to eliminating competition; however, not all refusals are 
monopolistic - ICI might have started to produce specialties 
because Zoja was making large profits in Italy, Indeed Zoja 
charged five times as much for its ethambutol specialties as ICI 
later did. Even the US legislation would permit a monopolist to 
integrate forward or backward by internal expansion even if it leads 
to monopoly of those other stages provided it is by non-predatory, 
non-exclusionary and essentially fair practices - the 'better 
mousetrap' approach. The monopoly of the second stage might, of 
course, lead to a strengthening of the monopoly at the first stage, 
but the Commission did not attempt to argue this point in its 
Decision » possibly because aminobutanol could be used in the 
manufacture of products other than ethambutol. It is therefore far 
from certain whether CSC/ICI's behaviour would amount to monopol­
isation in the US sense.
In the CSC/ICI case, it is necessary to consider what the 
Commission was striving to achieve. Was it seeking to protect Zoja 
against the loss of what had been shown to be a highly profitable 
business for it or was it trying to protect sufferers from pulmonary 
TB from the elimination of one of the three manufacturers of etham­
butol in the common market. According to Mrs. Korah^^, Judge
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Pescatore has stated that the Court had protected Zoja, yet the 
Decision refers to competition both directly and indirectly in 
paragraph 25; it refers to Article 3(f) which objects to the dis­
tortion of competition and it refers to the elimination of com­
petition from Zoja and, since Zoja was one of only three manufact­
urers in the common market, this was important to competition.
It is submitted that what the Commission should have been 
attempting to protect was not the competitive structure, but that it 
should have been ensuring that CSC/ICI's dominant position was not 
being exploited to the detriment of consumers; in the particular 
case, the Commission may have equated such a task with the protect­
ion of the previously existing structure of the market but it is 
submitted this is not the function of Article 86,
On a logical base, it can be argued that a refusal to sell does 
not fall within Article 86(c) of the Treaty since that only relates 
to the application of dissimilar treatment to similar transactions. 
A refusal to deal is patently not a 'transaction' indeed it is a 
'non-transaction' and thus it cannot be the subject of an analysis 
in terras of pargraph (o) of Article 86. IVhat is the 'equivalent 
transaction' against which the refusal is to be measured - if it is 
another refusal, then the two situations have been dealt with 
identically. The only other approach would be that of public 
utility - the monopolist, or indeed the dominant firm would be under 
an obligation to supply every customer who approached him with a 
view to obtaining supplies. It would have to do so, irrespective of 
the behaviour of the customer, and notwithstanding the fact that the 
customer would be free to leave the supplier to obtain supplies 
elsewhere at any time.
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It is submitted that, except in the case of public utilities of 
a service nature, such as gas or electricity, such a regime would 
merely protect the status quo by insulating inefficient competitors 
from the rigours of competition - surely this would be as contrary 
to the aims of Article 3(f) and Article 86 as the danger which it 
was used to replace. If, however, this is the function of Article 
86, it merely serves to illustrate that Article’s shortcomings, and 
on the other hand, if that argument is rejected on the basis that a 
refusal to deal is not a 'transaction' it highlights the unsoundness 
of the Commercial Solvents' Decision and judgment.
United Brands Company
The second case to be examined here is the United Brands 
31Decision , and case which have been mentioned extensively in 
previous sections of this Chapter.
The relevant facts of the Decision, taken in December 1975, 
were as follows: for nearly 50 years, until 1952 A W Kirkebye A/S 
(Kirkebye) had been the exclusive distributor for UBC bananas in 
Denmark; thereafter UBC began selling to several distributor/ripen­
ers; in 1967, UBC reorganised its sales arrangements in Denmark and 
appointed eight distributor/ripeners for its Chiquita bananas. In 
1967, Olesen absorbed Kirkebye, thereby becoming UBC's second larges 
distributor/ripener in Denmark. In addition to bananas, Olesen is 
also a large importer of othe fruit and of vegetables. The other 
main companies distributing UBC bananas were Interfrugt, Holmskov 
and Kobenhavns Frugtauktioner.
In 1969, Olesen became the exclusive distributor in Denmark for 
the Dutch importer of Dole bananas, International Fruit Company of
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Rotterdam and in 1973, Kobenhavns Frugtauktioner became exclusive 
distributor in part of Denmark for the Alba group, Hamburg, which 
supplied Onkel Tuoa bananas; all UBC’s other distributor/ripeners 
in Denmark sold, in addition to Chiquita, varying quantities of 
other brands (Del Monte, Onkel Tuca, Turbana etc.) and unbranded 
bananas.
Since the time when Olesen became the exclusive distributor for 
Dole bananas, UBC had consistently reduced the orders placed by 
Olesen by anything up to 50%, All the orders placed by Olesen for 
Dole bananas were, however, met in full. From 1972, Olesen had been 
selling more Dole than Chiquita bananas - however, other UBC dis­
tributors also sold more of other brands than of Chiquita. In 
September, 1973, UBC launched a promotional campaign in Denmark 
based on the fact that Denmark's four largest banana importers, 
Lembana, Olesen, Interfrugt and Holmskov recommended Chiquita 
bananas.
In April, September and October, 1973, Castle and Cook launched 
an extensive campaign for their Dole brand covering the whole 
of Europe. In Denmark, the campaign was accompanied by further 
sales promotions in September, and October, 1973.
On 10th October, 1973, UBC informed Olesen that it would no 
longer supply it with Chiquita bananas giving as a reason the 
advertising campaign launched that month in Denmark for Dole ban­
anas. Olesen had been participating in that campaign in the same 
way as it had participated in campaigns for the other bananas, 
including Chiquita, which it sold.
After UBC's withdrawal of supplies, Olesen approached the
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other UBC distributor/ripeners in Denmark and the Scipio Group in 
Hamburg with a view to obtaining Chiquita bananas but without 
success. As a result of the withdrawal of supplies, Olesen lost a 
number of customers who no longer wished to do business with Olesen 
if it could not supply UBC bananas. Olesen also suffered loss as a 
result of its being unable to use the ripening facilities construct­
ed by it in I967/68 to enable it to distribute UBC bananas.
On 20th February, 1974, Olesen lodged a complaint with the 
Commission and on 11th February, 1975, UBC agreed to resume supplies 
when Olesen undertook not to discriminate between the various brands 
of bananas which it sold and also agreed to withdraw the complaints 
it had lodged with the Danish and Commission authorities. This 
withdrawal, accordingly, took place on 13th March, 1975. The 
Commission, however, faced with this withdrawal, decided to initiate 
own initiative proceedings against UBC on 19th March, 1975.
In its appraisal, the Commission states that UBC had abused its 
dominant position by ceasing to supply Chiquita bananas to one of 
its most important customers. The effect of this withdrawal 
was seen as being to damage the business interests of the firm 
involved; in addition it would discourage other distributor/ripeners 
from selling competing brands, or at least from participating in 
sales and advertising campaigns for such competing bananas, as was 
normally the practice, UBC thus succeeded in keeping its distri­
butor/ripeners within its marketing system and denied competitors 
access to them - so denying to competitors the essential facilities 
which they would require to ripen their bananas before they could be 
offered for sale.
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The Commission considered that the excuse given by UBC for 
ceasing supplies could not be justified in the case of a firm 
of a dominant position such as UBC. The mere fact of Olesen 
being a distributor, albeit an exclusive distributor, of a com­
petitor’s brand was not the reason why UBC terminated its supplies; 
it was to the fact that there had been an advertising and promotion­
al campaign in 1973 by Castle and Cook for Dole bananas that UBC 
objected. The Commission noted that UBC’s distributors in other 
countries carried out joint advertising campaigns for a number of 
brands including Chiquita without objections from UBC, and Olesen 
had frequently participated in UBC’s advertising campaigns. How­
ever, does the phrase ’joint advertising campaigns for a number of 
brands including Chiquita’ as used by the Commission mean that the 
distributor in question participated in campaigns of the ’eat more 
bananas’ type without a brand being specified and for the benefit of 
the industry as a whole, or does it mean advertising campaigns run 
by several competing companies? If it is the former the Olesen case 
is hardly comparable; the Commission does not make this point 
clear.
UBC also sought to justify its behaviour by reference to the 
fact that Olesen had been steadily reducing its sales of UBC bananas 
and, indeed, since 1972 had sold more Dole than Chiquita bananas. 
Two points may be made to reject this argument; firstly UBC had not 
objected to other Danish ripener/distributors doing the same thing, 
although the fact that the brand concerned, Del Monte, was not 
extensively advertised in Denmark may explain UBC’s attitude in this 
regard; secondly since 1969 when Olesen had become the exclusive
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distributor for Dole bananas in Denmark, UBC had, as mentioned 
above, consistently reduced the quantities ordered by Olesen - in 
some instances by as much as 50% at a time when Olesen *s orders for 
Dole bananas were hardly ever reduced. It is, therefore, not sur­
prising that UBC would end up selling more Dole than Chiquita 
bananas, nor that its sale of Chiquita bananas would fall. Con­
sequently, such facts cannot be a justification for the termination 
of supplies to Olesen.
As justification for its finding of abuse, the Commission 
states that by preventing Olesen from advertising competing brands, 
UBC hampered the effective selling of such brands. Surely this does 
not mean that a distributor of products of a dominant enterprise is 
entitled to take on other, even exclusive, distributorships, for 
competitors of the dominant firm without the dominant firm being 
able to take any action against him. The basic task of the distri­
butor is to use his best endeavours to sell the products of the 
supplier who appoints him, and this clearly cannot be done if there 
is a conflict of interests. This is, unfortunately, one of the 
instances where the necessities of the competition law negate one of 
the tenets of some other area of legislation and commercial pract­
ice; here that of agency.
The Commission states that a buyer must be free to decide what 
his business interests are and to choose products he will sell 
even if they are in competition with each other. Whilst this 
is certainly true, and indeed, is one of the foundations of the 
free market economy, surely such freedom on the part of the buyer 
must have as its counterpart the entitlement of the supplier to
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cease supplies to that buyer if he considers that his products could 
be better distributed by some other person. This may not be so 
relevant where the products are sold by a very wide range of deal­
ers, but it is surely important where distribution of the product is 
entrusted to a small group of firms who require actively to promote 
the product.
More logically, the Commission also pointed out that the 
advertising campaign to which UBC took objection was organised and 
paid for by Castle and Cook; in such circumstances, Olesen could 
hardly complain and so should not be blamed for the advertising. 
This rationale appears reasonable, given that UBC knew that all its 
distributor/ripeners were also distributors for other fruits and, in 
some cases, for competing brands of bananas; it is reasonable to 
presume that such other suppliers would wish to sell their respect­
ive products and so would run promotional campaigns possibly over 
the whole of the Community and pay for them with a view to promoting 
a brand image. Such a policy can scarcely be affected by the fact 
one of the distributors also distributes other .products, since to 
concede to such pressures would rob the campaign of much of its 
effect. These presumptions would be reinforced where, as in the UBC 
case, the distributor was not expected to bear directly any of the 
costs of running the promotion.
For all these reasons, the Commission considered that UBC’s 
refusal to supply Olesen amounted to an abuse of a dominant position 
which was likely to affect trade between Member States, as due to 
the withdrawal of supplies, Olesen was no longer able to import the 
same quantity of bananas into Denmark.
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Whilst it can be seen that the refusal to supply did, in fact 
affect trade the argument of imports is a weak one as all bananas 
entering Denmark had come from non-Member States, albeit that they 
had been transshipped from Rotterdam or Bremenhaven. Might it not 
have been better to have pointed out, say, that some of Olesen*s 
customers were in other Member States or that Olesen bought and sold 
bananas from and to firms in other Member States?
UBC appealed to the Court of Justice and in November, 1977
the Advocate-General delivered his Opinion.
Mr. Mayras deals only briefly with the question of refusal to 
supply, although he mentions that UBC had sought to justify the 
refusal on the basis of Olesen*s bad financial position as well as 
its allegedly unsatisfactory performance as a distributor. If this 
had been true, why did UBC choose - 2 days before the Commission 
sent its last list of questions to UBC relative to the investigat­
ions which it had started - to put an end to the boycott of Olesen 
of its own accord by entering into an agreement with Olesen. Surely
Olesen*s position had not changed so dramatically during the period
of the refusal that it had become a desirable client for UBC.
Mr. Mayras considered that the course of behaviour by UBC had 
led to a temporary, although serious, deterioration in the situation 
of a distributor; it is even suggested in the Opinion that Olesen 
might have ceased to exist, but this standpoint is difficult to 
justify if, as was shown in the Decision, Olesen also distributed 
other fruit and vegetables and, indeed, sold more Dole than Chiquita 
bananas.
In the first positive statement of the Implication of a refusal 
to supply the Advocate-General states that;-
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"Refusal to sell to a long-standing customer, who cannot make 
any call upon suppliers other than the one with whom he has 
regular dealings, is an abuse prohibited by Article 86 in so 
far as it may affect trade between Member States".
This definition delimits the statement made by the Court in the 
Commercial Solvents case and is a major step in the clarification of 
the legal position.
However, the Advocate-General then proceeds to state that trade 
would be affected where a ripener/distributor may very well dis­
appear from the market and the pattern of trade in a substantial 
part of the common market is appreciably modified thereby. Certain­
ly, if the pattern of trade is modified, trade between Member States 
will be affected, but it is disputed whether a change in the struct­
ure of the market is an abuse per se. Could it not be argued that 
UBC's refusal to supply Olesen amounted to a discrimination pro­
hibited by Article 86(c) since UBC did not cease supplies to other 
distributor/ripeners both in Denmark and elsewhere although they 
engaged in the same practices in Olesen.
It is also interesting to note that the Advocate-General states 
that if UBC had been justified in refusing to supply Olesen because 
it had participated in an advertising campaign for competing brands 
of bananas, this would mean that the undertaking would be entitled 
to enlarge the dominant position which it enjoyed and consequently 
to abuse it. Does this mean that the enlargement of a dominant 
position is per se an abuse or does it require some evidence of 
monopolization on the part of the dominant firm? In any event, does 
Article 86 extend to such behaviour or is it, as has been suggested 
above, neutral vis-a-vis the structure of the market itself, con­
cerning itself only with market behaviour? Is this notion of abuse
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sufficient to encompass the control of mergers and, if so, where is 
the legal justification for such an approach?
Unfortunately, Mr. Mayras does not expand on his statement and 
one is left to ponder the possibilities which are created.
The Court gave a detailed analysis of the nature of a refusal 
to sell in the context of an abuse of a dominant position. It noted 
that UBC had stated that Olesen had applied for preferential treat­
ment compared with the seven other UBC distributor/ripeners in 
Denmark; when UBC refused, Olesen became the exclusive distributor/ 
ripener for Dole bananas. After 1973, when Standard Fruit announced 
that its Dole brand was gong to oust Chiquita as the market leader, 
Olesen had sold consistently fewer and fewer Chiquita bananas and
had pushed the sale of Dole bananas. According to UBC, it had taken 
less care when ripening Chiquita bananas than when ripening other 
brands so compromising UBC's high quality standards.
UBC maintained that it was absolutely justified in refusing to 
supply Olesen because of the fact that if a firm is directly attack­
ed by its main competitor who has succeeded in making one of that 
firm's most important long standing customers his exclusive distri­
butor for the whole of the country, that firm in its own interest 
and that of competition has no option but to fight back or else 
disappear from the national market.
As UBC's arguments differed substantially from those put
forward by the Commission, the Court commenced its analysis by
stating that:-
"an undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of 
marketing a product - which cashes in on the reputation of a 
brand name known and valued by the consumers - cannot stop
supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular 
commercial practice, if the orders placed by this customer are 
in no way out of the ordinary."
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However, unlike the Advocate-General, the Court based its 
determination of such behaviour as abusive on the fact that it would 
be contrary to Article 86(b) and (c), since the refusal would limit 
markets to the prejudice of consumers and would amount to discrim­
ination which might end the existence of a party on the market.
Whilst partially accepting UBC's argument that it was entitled 
to protect its commercial interests, notwithstanding the fact that 
it was in a dominant position, should they be attacked, and that 
such an undertaking was permitted to take steps to protect such 
interests, the Court stated that such behaviour could not be per­
mitted if its true aim was to strengthen that dominant position and 
abuse it. A differentiation can be seen here with the view of the 
Advocate-General; whilst Mr. Mayras stated that the dominant firm 
could not enlarge its dominant position and thus abuse it, the Court 
seems to be implying that there is a distinction between strengthen­
ing a dominant position and abusing it; whilst both were dangers in 
a situation such as UBC's they were two separate dangers.
On balance, the Court considered that UBC's refusal to supply 
Olesen had been in excess of what could be considered as a reason­
able sanction against Olesen in the circumstances.
However, the problem which faced UBC and will face every 
dominant firm in similar circumstances is how it can distinguish 
between protecting its own interests - which the Court has stated is 
permitted - and strengthening its position - which is not - since 
any repulsing of an attack from a competitor will almost certainly 
result in a strengthening of the dominant position. This is a 
tightrope which it would appear the dominant firm must walk without 
any indication of how wide the rope will be at any given point.
119
The other problem for the dominant firm raised in the UBC 
case is the degree of control and guidance which the dominant firm 
may exercise over its distributors in the market; must it stand idly 
by while competitors move in and sell through these same firms. The 
discussion in the earlier Sections of this Chapter would suggest 
that the dominant firm has at best only a limited degree of freedom 
in this matter and the United Brands judgment indicates that it has 
very restricted rights against such distributors should the latter 
not act in its best interests.
The Sugar Case dealing with the behaviour of Pfeiffer & 
Langen on the German market seems to imply that a dominant firm is 
unable to prevent its distributors from dealing in competing goods - 
at least insofar as there are insufficient independent dealers on 
the market to satisfy the requirements of competitors wishing to 
enter the relevant market. Also in the Sugar Case the Court held to 
be abusive the action of a dominant firm which had 'expressly or 
impliedly told dealers or created an impression in their minds' that 
it would not supply them with sugar if they resold it for other than 
permitted purposes.
It is submitted that, whilst it is permissible to warn a dealer 
that he is in breach of his agreement, a threat of withdrawal of 
supplies, a reduction or an outright withdrawal of supplies will 
ultimately have to be justified to the Commission. The inherent 
difficulties in this can be seen from the United Brands Decision. 
The question can also be posed of whether the protection of a 
distributor will in all cases lead to the protection of the con­
sumer. This may not necessarily be so.
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The justification for the finding of abuse against UBC appears 
to be that UBC was using the withdrawal of supplies from Olesen as a 
deterrent to persuade other distributor/ripeners not to deal in the 
products of competitors of UBC ; thus only firms which were totally 
dependent upon UBC would be permitted to remain on the market. 
However, the Court seems to be saying that small and medium-sized 
undertakings are entitled to give preference to competitors' goods 
should they judge such action to be in their best commercial inter­
ests .
In conclusion, the UBC case can be distinguished from the 
Commercial Solvents case discussed supra; whereas in Commercial 
Solvents the party unable to obtain supplies was not, at the time of 
refusal, a contractual customer of the dominant firm, Olesen was in 
such a relationship with UBC, However in United Brands, the refusal 
to supply had less direct and immediate effects on the position of 
the dominant firm than in Commercial Solvents; in that latter case, 
Zoja was one of the only two large competitors of Commercial Sol­
vents in the world, and the refusal seriously risked its continued 
operation on the market. UBC's refusal would, at worst, only have 
had indirect effects on UBC's competitors and there is certainly no 
suggestion that any of them was faced with elimination. Olesen the 
victim of the refusal undoubtedly suffered loss and damage, but even 
its elimination was an unlikely possibility. In any event it could 
possibly be argued that Olesen was partly to blame for what happened 
to it, and if UBC's assertions as to Olesen*s loss were true, 
Olesen's loss would be that much less since it was dependent on UBC 
for less than half of its requirements of bananas at the time.
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Commission Oil Report
Before turning to the third case to be discussed here, that of
BP , mention will be made of the points relative to refusal to
supply and Article 86 which were stated by the Commission in its 
1975 report on the Behaviour of the Oil companies in the Community 
during the period from October 1973j to March 1974^^, on which the 
BP case was based.
In the Oil Report, the Commission makes a number of assertions
as to what is considered to be a collective dominant position held
by the Oil Companies, which points have been considered in more
37detail elsewhere and will not be repeated here. However, more
importantly for our purpose, the Commission states that each of the 
Oil Companies had, during the Oil crisis, an independent dominant 
position vis-a-vis their traditional customers v;ho had no access to 
suppliers other than those with whom they had done business. The 
Commission then proceeds to state that a refusal to supply such a 
customer can constitute an abuse forbidden by Article 86 because it 
would mean an appreciable change in the pattern of supply of oil 
products in a substantial part of the common market.
Several considerations arise from this statement; firstly what 
constitutes a 'traditional customer' « the Commission stated this to 
be anyone who had been a buyer in the previous twelve months, but 
this seems unduly extensive; secondly, the statement appears to be 
an extension of the notions put forward by the Court in the Commer­
cial Solvents case quoted above - if this is the case, the statement 
can be seen as a logical development in the Commission's jurisprud­
ence, albeit subject to a reservation as to what constitutes a 
traditional customer.
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BP/ABG
Turning then to the BP/ABG Decision in April, 1977, which arose 
out of the investigations which the Commission had carried out in 
the preparation of the Oil Report, the Commission considered the 
behaviour of seven major oil companies operating in the Netherlands 
at the time of the oil crisis, although it seems to have devoted 
most of its attention to BP.
As is well known, at the time of the crisis in November, 1973, 
there was uncertainty as to the volume of supplies which would be 
available and there was a shortage scare in most Member States. 
That month the Dutch government set up the Rijksbureau voor Aardolie 
Produkten (National oil products office) (RBAP) to organise and 
carry out the distribution of oil and petroleum products. In 
addition the RBAP acted as an intermediary when independent traders 
and buyers encountered supply difficulties.
The Decision followed out of a complaint by the Avia Group and 
by ABG (which was the purchasing agency for the Avia members in 
the Netherlands).
In normal times ABG required 15,000m per month, and by 
regulation of 4th April, 1974, the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs ordered the nine companies refining in the Netherlands to 
supply ABG with 3,000m per week ~ this took into account the 
Government recommendation that consumption be reduced to 80% to 85% 
of normal consumption. The RBAP had been dissolved on 1st April, 
1974 and from that date ABG had found itself without supplies due to 
the behaviour of certain companies which were refusing to supply 
it.
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At the time of the crisis, ABG's sales structure was as follows: 
49% through the AVIA network;
12% by other persons under binding contracts;
20% by regular, although non-contractual customers;
20% approx., by spot deliveries.
Until the crisis ABG had been assured of adequate supplies 
Until 1968, BP had supplied ABG with oil on the basis of a short­
term contract under which the two sides met annually to set the 
price, quantities and other terms. Thereafter supplies were no 
longer governed by fixed term contracts but by indefinite contracts,
determinable by either party on six months' notice. IVhen reorganis­
ing its business, BP terminated the agreement with ABG on 21st 
November, 1972, with six months' notice and it was agreed between BP 
and ABG that thereafter BP would make refining capacity available to 
ABG.
Thereafter, on the advice of inter alia the Dutch government 
ABG attemped to buy crude petroleum on the world market and have it 
refined. It seems, however, to have met with little success in this 
since, in August, 1973, it advised BP that it could not be assured 
of quantities of crude oil before September, and a second agreement 
was entered into with BP providing that the processing agreement 
would not enter into force until January, 1974. It was agreed that 
the 30,745m , of oil which had been supplied by BP to ABG would be 
treated as an advance on processing for ABG.
Although there was no certainty as to whether ABG would be able 
to obtain crude petroleum to repay these advances BP continued 
to supply ABG with normal quantities.
During the 12 months immediately prior to the crisis, BP
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supplied 81% of ABG's requirements, the next largest proportion 
being Gulf with 8%. During October, 1973, BP's share rose to 100% 
of ABG's needs.
With the advent of the crisis on 1st November, 1973, ABG's 
position changed dramatically. The Dutch authorities had, as has 
been mentioned above, recommended a reduction of 15% - 20% in 
consumption. BP reduced its deliveries to ABG even more. According 
to the Commission's figures, BP had reduced supplies to 'contract­
ual' customers other than ABG by 13%; to non-contractual customers 
by 29%; and to ABG by 74%. The Commission argued that the trading 
relationship between BP and ABG had been very close in the year 
preceding the crisis; BP had supplied 80% of ABG's total motor 
spirit by way of an advance against the prospect of receiving 
quantities of crude oil which ABG was to deliver to BP's refiner­
ies. The Commission thus saw ABG as being one of BP's regular and 
long-standing customers whose supplies were being substantially 
reduced by its chief supplier.
These presumptions of the Commission are open to challenge on 
several counts; firstly, why do the Commission compare the situa­
tion of ABG with that of contractual customer; ABG was not a 
contractual customer of BP since its contract had been terminated in 
May, 1973; secondly, BP's willingness to supply ABG with motor 
spirit can be seen not as evidence of any special relationship but 
merely of a decision by BP to sell its current production of motor 
spirit (of which it must be remembered there was no shortage prior 
to the crisis) in return for future supplies of crude oil which ABG 
would obtain. Surely it is prudent business practice to sell a 
surplus of a product at the present time in order to ensure supplies
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of a product in the future when there is always a possibility that 
such other product will then be in short supply; thirdly whilst BP 
may have supplied 80% of ABG's requirements, this was almost cert­
ainly due to ABG approaching it seeking supplies, rather than to BP 
seeking to corner ABG's business - after all ABG was free to seek 
its supplies anywhere.
It is based on these somewhat dubious premises that the Commis­
sion proceeds to condemn BP. Firstly it notes that the Dutch 
authorities had not made any distinction between contractual and 
non-contractual customers when they recommended a decrease of 20% in 
comsuraption. Thereafter it states that undertakings cannot rely on 
criteria based on the law of contract to prevent the realisation of 
the objectives of the Community's competition law, in particular, 
where their behaviour threatens the continuance of a system of free 
competition.
It states that, from the Community law point of view, it is the 
extent, regularity and continuity of commercial relationships which 
must be taken into consideration since any other basis would mean 
that the availability of supplies during a shortage could be influ­
enced by dominant enterprises for artificial or arbitary reasons. 
It does not, however, make it clear why it is these factors which 
must be considered. Whilst it is recognised that they are of 
relevance, it is not accepted that such factors are more important 
than an analysis of the legal basis on which such supplies are made. 
In a situation where two customers obtain the same proportion, or 
even the same quantity, of their requirements it is surely relevant 
that one does so on the basis of a long-term supply contract with 
the dominant firm whilst the other buys its requirements as and when
J.2ü
it needs them and takes advantages of the opportunities which are 
offered in several markets including the oil market to deal on the 
spot market at prices less than those charged to those with long­
term supply contracts.
It is submitted that one of the characteristics of a long-term 
supply contract is that the purchaser gives up his freedom to deal 
on the spot market for at least part of his requirements and accepts 
prices at fixed levels or calculated in accordance with a set 
formula which may from time to time be higher than those prevailing 
on the spot market in return for the guarantee that such contracted- 
for supplies will be made available to him as they are needed - 
particularly in the case of a crisis or shortage of supplies. 
Surely the Commission cannot be arguing that such contractual 
customers be denied the benefits of their actions whilst still being 
subject to the rigours of being bound to the one supplier. If for 
no other reason such denial of contractual customers by the dominant 
firm could be the basis for an action for damages based on breach of 
contract - and possibly could be considered as a contravention of 
Article 86 (c) of the Treaty in that it would be treating dissimilar 
transactions (those with contractual and non-contractual customers) 
in the same fashion.
Having stated that no distinction should be made between 
contractual and non-contractual customers in allocating scarce 
supplies, the Commission then states that dominant firms can still 
take account of the peculiarities or differences which may exist in 
the commercial situation of their customers. In particular they are 
free to apply the prices and other conditions provided for in the 
supply contracts and to choose an appropriate reference period for
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the period of constraint. Does it matter that one customer has a 
long-term supply contract whilst another purchases albeit similar 
quantities on the spot market from the dominant firm? According to 
the Commission it would appear not. Any difference in treatment of 
customers which results from such peculiarities ought to be object­
ively based and the dominant firm's choice may not have a discrimin­
atory effect.
It is submitted that BP’s treatment of ABG was based on objec­
tive criteria - ABG was not, at the time of the crisis, one of BP's 
contractual customers. Indeed it can be argued that in the period 
from April, 1973, when its contract with BP had come to an end, ABG 
was not a customer of BP at all; certainly BP was supplying it with 
quantities of motor spirit, but this was done on the basis that ABG 
would provide BP with crude oil which the latter would refine (ABG 
having no refining capacity of its own) and thereafter return it to 
ABG. In the event, ABG had difficulty in obtaining crude oil to 
enable it to fulfil its part of the bargain and BP made an advance 
to it on the understanding that ABG would repay such advance as 
soon as it was able to secure its crude oil supplies.
The Commission states that even if BP had grounds for treating 
contractual and non-contractual customers in different ways (which 
it had earlier stated it did not) it should have treated ABG without 
discrimination vis-a-vis its other non-contractual customers. The 
Commission did not consider that the advances made by BP to ABG 
justified a different treatment of ABG in comparison with other 
customers either contractual or non-contractual, having regard to 
the impossibility encountered by ABG in obtaining supplies elsewhere 
during the crisis.
Such conduct in the Commission's view, amounted to an abuse of 
a dominant position because it reduced supplies to ABG not only 
suibstantially but also to a proportionately greater extent than in 
relation to BP's other customers. BP had thus applied dissimilar 
conditions to ABG in imposing on the latter an obvious, immediate 
and substantial competitive disadvantage. That unfair behaviour 
could have jeopardised ABG's existence on the market and ABG was, 
moreover, a competitor of BP on the motor spirit distribution 
market,
These contentions are not acceptable; ABG was not a non­
contractual customer of BP and accordingly its treatment cannot be 
compared with that afforded to persons in that group; ABG was in a 
unique category and as such was not treated differently from firms 
in similar circumstances. If BP had refused under its contract with 
ABG to supply ABG with motor spirit until the corresponding amounts 
of crude oil had been delivered to it by ABG, ABG would have re­
ceived no supplies of oil at all from BP in the period between the 
termination of its supply contract with BP and the start of the oil 
crisis. In such circumstances, it would appear that BP would have 
been under an obligation to supply considerably less motor spirit to 
ABG that it was considered bound to do by the Commission, since it
had made certain voluntary advances to ABG. Surely it is not the
intention of the competition policy to penalise firms which behave 
in a manner more sympathetic than that which they are strictu sensu 
bound to do contractually.
Nevertheless, the Commission stated that:-
"It is abusive to treat a regular, long standing and
substantial customer in a way which is clearly discriminatory
by comparison with other customers."
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This statement does not make it clear whether it is against similar 
customers which the treatment of the firm in question is to be 
judged or against all customers of whatever type. However, the 
Commission had stated earlier in the Decision that as a result of 
the oil crisis the oil companies had found themselves in a dominant 
position vis-a-vis their customers. This would appear to go even 
further and could include not only contractual and non-contractual 
but also occasional or indeed single-transaction customers.
In conclusion, the ratio to be drawn from the BP Decision is 
that a firm in a dominant position cannot, in a shortage situation, 
treat contractual and non-contractual customers in a different 
manner. In particular it cannot reduce the supplies which it makes 
to one party in a greater proportion than that applied to other 
customers. The BP Case can be seen not so much as a consideration
of a refusal to supply in the same way as the Commercial Solvents38
39and United Brands cases can, but it is more an investigation 
of how a refusal to supply, other than an absolute refusal to make 
any deliveries, can be considered as an abuse of a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 86 (c) of the Treaty.
BP appealed to the Court for the annulment of the Decision, and 
in May/June 1978, the Court issued its judgment
The Advocate-General (Warner) examined the background to the 
dispute and noted that, according to BP, crude supplies had been 
available on the world market at the time ABG was due to provide 
crude oil to BP for processing, and BP agreed to make an advance of 
motor spirit on condition that ABG replace the crude before January, 
1974. By the end of the period in which BP was due to supply such 
advance, ABG had not taken delivery of the whole amount because, as
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ABG disclosed it had been able to obtain supplied from Gulf on the 
spot market cheaper than it could from BP under its agreement. 
During this period ABG also made substantial purchases from other 
oil companies; such transactions were stated not to be unusual for 
ABG. At the time BP did not know of the reason for ABG's shortfall 
in delivery orders and agreed to the balance of 41,500 m being 
taken by ABG in October, 1973. This was why BP was shown in the 
Commission's enquiries as having supplied 100% of ABG's requirements 
in October, 1973.
When, at the end of October, the oil crisis arose, there was no 
arrangement of any kind between BP and ABG as to future supplies of 
motor spirit, although the draft of a further processing agreement 
had been discussed.
Mr. Warner then considered the role played by the RBAP in the 
crisis. It was noted that, as regards customers (including ABG) 
towards whom BP felt no particular obligation, BP considered that 
the responsibility for ensuring supplies lay with the RBAP. The 
RBAP set up a pool to help those customers who had difficulty in 
obtaining supplies. The nine major oil companies contributed to 
this pool in proportion of their share of the Dutch market - BP was 
called upon to contribute 9.7%.
ABG's normal requirements of motor spirit was approximately 
q
15,000 ra per month. The RBAP decided that it should be supplied
q
at the rate of 7,000 m a month which would allow ABG to cover 
the needs of the AVIA network (which as mentioned in the Commission 
Decision was approximately 49% of ABG's sales) and of ABG's con­
tractual customers (12% of sales), each reduced by 20% as recom­
mended by the Minister. The RBAP took the view that it should be
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directly responsible for supplying the needs of ABG's other cus­
tomers. Although this approach was almost certainly suggested by BP 
Mr. Warner did not consider there to be anything sinister in ABG's 
largest supplier being consulted. It is postulated by the Advo­
cate-General that this approach might not have been in conformity 
with the statement of the Minister of Economic Affairs that existing 
channels of distribution should be maintained - the approach 
would necessarily involve the possibility that such customers would 
be weaned away from ABG permanently. This possibility is not, 
however, further discussed.
q
In all events, ABG received 6,812m of motor spirit in
q
November, 1973 and 7,265 m in December, - mostly from BP and 
Shell. During the same period ABG also bought substantial quan­
tities from other unidentified companies bringing its total for
q o
November, and December, to 10,812 m and 10,761 m respectively. 
By the end of December, it appeared that ABG had no petrol left in 
stock at all. It was at this time that a complaint was made to the 
Commission.
In January, 1974, the RBAP drew up a fresh programme for 
supplies to ABG at the monthly rate of 7,000 m per month, BP's 
shares of this was to be 3,500 ra per month. In the event, ABG 
received through the RBAP less than the 7,000 m^ envisaged al­
though part of this shortfall was due to a request from ABG to BP 
defer deliveries. In the period January to March, ABG was also able 
to purchase supplies from other companies to supply 3000 m^ a week 
to ABG, Such deliveries were to be made in the proportion in wnicl'. 
each company sold motor spirit in the Netherlands other than '*:■ r
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their own brand name. As a result of this DP’s obligations to 
deliver were reduced.
Having outlined the facts of the case, as expanded during the 
proceedings., Mr. Warner then proceeded to examine the facts in the 
light of Article 86.
He considered that the task of allocating supplies during a 
crisis was primarily one for government - whether it be national or 
Community (Council Directive No. 73/238/EEC of 24th July, 1973 
related to measures to mitigate the effects of difficulties in the 
supply of crude oil and petroleum products).
Mr. Warner noted that government could ensure continuity of 
supplies either voluntarily (as through the RBAP) or by compulsion
(as by Ministerial Order); the only difference in the oil case was
3 3that between 7,000 ra per month and 3,000 ra per week. Even if
the approach of the Dutch government indicated a lacuna in the
measures, Mr. Warner did not consider that it was a lacuna of the
type which Article 86 was designed to fill.
Taking as his starting point the statement of the Commission 
in the United Brands case that a dominant position was one in which 
the firm in question might conduct its business 'without regard for 
the reactions of competitors and customers', Mr. Warner stated that, 
in a situation of crisis such as the oil crisis of 1973, a trader 
could not distribute his product without regard to the attitude of 
his customers - after the emergency was over such customers would 
remember how they had been treated by the dominant firm during the 
period of scarcity.
The Advocate-General seems to accept BP's arguments that
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contractual customers would expect to receive the favourable treat­
ment to which their contracts entitled them, whilst non-contractual 
customers would expect the loyalty which they had shown in normal 
competitive times to be repaid by loyalty to them by the dominant 
firm during a shortage, A firm could only ignore such considerat­
ions at the peril of losing its customers once the crisis was 
over.
As a result of this factor, the Advocate-General did not 
consider that such a firm was, during the emergency, in a dominant 
■position as that expression was used in Article 86.
Even if Article 86 was held to be applicable in such a situat­
ion Mr. Warner did not see any rule express or implicit which 
suppliers in such a position were expected to observe. Mr. Warner 
stated expressly that Article 86(c) is not applicable in considering 
the action of a dominant firm in deciding who to supply and the 
quantities to be allocated to each. Although he considered that a 
denial of supplies could be an abuse of a dominant position, it did 
not fall under paragraph (c). He considered that the Commission 
definition that;-
"abuse within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty may be 
defined as any action by an undertaking in a dominant position 
which reduces supplies to comparable purchasers in different 
ways without objective justification"
was deficient because it did not answer the question of what were
'comparable purchasers' nor what was 'objective justification'. The
following paragraphs of the Commission Decision which were meant to
provide a basis on which the dominant firm calculated the supplies
which it was bound to make were not considered to aid this problem.
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In Mr, Warner’s opinion, with which the author could concur, 
such a rule, which was manifestly not expressed in Article 86, could 
only be implied by that Article if it were equitable, practicable 
and generally accepted. In this instance he considered the rule to 
be none of these things; it was not equitable because it ignored the 
special claims of a supplier’s contractual and regular customers; it 
was impracticable because a supplier would never know when it should 
be applied. It is seldom possible at the start of a crisis to 
determine that its duration or intensity is likely to be. In this 
respect, one of the mitigating factors which led the Commission not 
to impose a fine was that 'the confusion which reigned on the Dutch 
petroleum market, because of the uncertainty as to how the crisis 
might develop, made it difficult to assess the reductions in de­
livery that were needed’; that the rule was not generally accepted 
could be deduced from the very facts of the case. The difference in 
the approaches used by the RBAP and the Minister for Economic 
Affairs showed that there was no generally accepted rule as to 
allocation of supplies in a shortage.
For all these reasons, Mr. Warner considered that the case 
fell outwith the scope of Article 86 but, in the event that the 
Court did not agree, he considered whether there had been any abuse 
by BP of a dominant position, should it be found to possess one.
Mr. Warner noted the position vis-a-vis the RBAP and considered 
that in view of the doubts which had been created on the part of BP 
as a result of its advance of motor spirit to ABG and its supply, 
albeit indirectly, to ABG through the RBAP (which doubts had been 
recognised by the Commission in its Decision) it was reasonable for
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BP to have taken the view which it did. Accordingly, even if BP did 
possess a dominant position, it could not be held to have abused 
that position.
The Court agreed that, at the time of the crisis, ABG was no 
more than an occasional customer of BP, and rejected the Commiss­
ion’s argument of applying reductions in supply to ABG on the basis 
of the previous year’s deliveries. Whilst it was explicable where 
the relationship between seller and customer had continued unaltered 
during the previous year, such a principle was untenable where the 
supplier had, during that period, ceased to carry on such relations 
with its customer.
In the particular case, the Court considered that the fact that 
ABG had been supplied on a continuous basis by BP by way of advance 
of motor spirit could not serve as a valid argument to compare ABG’s 
position with that of a traditional customer of BP during the 
relevant reference period. For that reason, and since ABG was only 
an occasional customer of BP for several months before the crisis, 
BP could not be accused of having applied to ABG during the crisis 
less favourable treatment than that it reserved for its traditional 
customers.
The Court stated that had BP treated ABG the same as its 
contractual customers, it would have resulted in a considerable 
diminution of the deliveries which those customers expected. A duty 
to supply both contractual and non-contractual customers in the same 
fashion during a period of crisis could, in the Court’s view, only 
stem from measures adopted within the framework of the Treaty, in 
particular Article 103, or in the absence of Community measures, 
from measures adopted by the national authorities.
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In view of the stance adopted firstly by the RBAP and latterly 
by the Minister of Economic Affairs, ABG was able during the crisis 
to find supplies sufficient to enable it to overcome the diffi­
culties created by the crisis.
Consequently, the Court was able to state that it did not 
appear that BP had abused a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86 and it therefore annulled the Commission Decision.
Although the Court stated ultimately that there was no abuse of 
a dominant position it did not deal with the question of whether or 
not such a position existed. As will be recalled Mr. Warner con­
sidered that there was no dominant position but the Court started 
with the premise that if there was a dominant position was there any 
evidence that it had been abused. Presumably this approach was 
determined by the Court deciding that there was no abuse and 
consequently it did not require to consider the more difficult 
question of determining whether there existed such a position in the 
first place.
The result of the BP judgment is that it appears clear that, at 
least in the particular circumstances of the oil crisis, there is no 
doctrine of a public utility regulation in a situation of shortage. 
There is no doubt that Article 86 does not require a dominant firm 
to ignore its contractual obligations in order to distribute suppl­
ies equally between all its customers.
For the purposes of this study, it is difficult to draw out any 
ratio in the same way as was done in the Commercial Solvents and 
United Brands cases. However, the one factor to come out of the 
case, other than that relating to supply obligations in a crisis, is
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that in certain circumstances, a refusal to supply may contravene 
Article 86 (c) if it results in similar customers being treated
differently. However, paragraph (c) will not automatically have a 
role to play and its application will require to be determined 
individually in each particular case.
Hugin/Liptons
The next case to be considered is that of Hugin/Liptons in 
4 2December, 1977 • The first point to be remembered about the
43Decision is that it was taken after the BP Decision but before
44the Court had given its judgment in that case
Hugin AB is a Swedish manufacturer of cash registers and 
similar equipment. Within the EEC it has a market share of approx­
imately 12%, although it has a monopoly in the supply of spare parts 
for its machines since these are made to its designs and with its 
tools and through its own sales network.
Liptons is a small London based company specialising in busi­
ness machines, particularly cash registers. It services, repairs, 
reconditions, sells and rents out cash registers of most types and 
has therefore acquired considerable experience and expertise in this 
field.
Liptons first started purchasing Hugin spare parts from the 
importer of Hugin cash registers in the late 1950’s. In 1969
Liptons was appointed the ’main agent’ to sell Hugin cash registers 
in England, Scotland and Wales with the right during the initial 
period of such agency to service and maintain Hugin machines. Under 
the agreement Hugin GB agreed to sell to Liptons cash registers for 
sale within the agreed territory. Liptons continued to purchase
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Hugin cash registers and spare parts for its own use until early 
1972, Thereafter it continued to obtain its supplies from the newly 
created Hugin subsidiary Hugin Cash Registers Limited ("Hugin UK") 
until October, 1972, when supplies ceased following the termination 
of the agreement in May 1972.
Hugin UK stated that they did not supply independent firms in 
the UK and Liptons knew of no such firm dealing in the repair and 
maintenance of Hugin cash registers. Accordingly, Liptons appeared 
to be Hugin UK's only competitor in the United Kingdom.
The Decision narrates the association between Liptons and Hugin 
from which it appears that the agreement between Hugin GB (which was 
not a subsidiary of Hugin AB) and Liptons was not included in the 
assets and liabilities of Hugin GB which were taken over by Hugin UK 
in January 1972, Liptons, however, was not informed of this until 
April, 1972 when Hugin UK offered it a new distributorship agree­
ment. This was refused by Liptons on the basis that it was less 
wide in scope than the previous agreement with Hugin GB, On 26th 
May, therefore, Hugin GB repudiated its agreement with Liptons.
From 23rd October, 1972, Hugin UK refused to supply Liptons 
with any spare parts, other than those of a minor nature not related 
to repair or maintenance and which the dealer could fit himself. 
Thereafter Liptons attempted to obtain supplies from sources in 
other countries but without success. Hugin AB and its subsidiaries 
in other Member States all referred Liptons to Hugin UK.
This refusal, Hugin UK sought to justify on the basis that it 
had to protect its customers and ensure that maintenance was only 
done by competently trained staff. Under no circumstances, would
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Hugin permit the sale of spare parts to independent companies 
outwith the Hugin distribution network which might wish to service, 
maintain, repair or re-condition such machines anywhere in the 
common market.
In its reply to the Commission's statement of objections, Hugin 
stated that it had never been engaged in the sale of spare parts for 
cash registers as a product distinct from cash registers; spare 
parts were an integral part of service and maintenance; there had 
never been a demand for spare parts distinct from that required in 
maintenance service ; and stocks of spare parts were limited to the 
expected needs under guarantees, contracts and service arrangements. 
Liptons according to Hugin AB, had not had the necessary training 
nor access' to manuals and other technical information for several 
years and was not capable of providing reliable services and repair 
on Hugin machines in the United Kingdom. Although Hugin had main­
tained that development in the market was very rapid, it conceded at 
the Commission hearing that it was still supplying the same machines 
(with one exception) in 1977 as it had done in 1972 although there 
were certain differences due to technical development. It agreed 
that its machines were of the same technical complexity as those of 
its competitors.
As a result of the refusal to supply, Liptons could not con­
tinue in business servicing, maintaining and repairing Hugin mac­
hines. It had invested a large amount in Hugin machines which it 
had rented out and could no longer offer the after-sales service 
which its customers required of it. The percentage of Liptons’ 
income attributable to the rental of Hugin machines fell from 62^ in
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1970 to 6% in 1975. For an interim period Liptons had dismantled 
Hugin cash registers which it had had in stock in order to provide 
spares for its rental business but this was an uneconomical practice 
and as a result Liptons ceased to be able to trade in second hand 
Hugin machines.
It was stated by Liptons, and not disputed by Hugin, that it 
was competent to undertake all necessary work on Hugin machines in 
1972 and Liptons maintained that it was still capable and qualified 
to undertake such work at the time of the refusal to supply.
For these reasons the Commission determined that Hugin had a 
dominant position in the market for spare parts for Hugin cash 
registers. Such a position had been abused by Hugin by its refusal 
to supply an existing substantial customer for and user of the 
products thereby eliminating that supplier from the market and by 
its prohibiting its subsidiaries and dealers from supplying those 
products outside its distribution network, thereby making the 
refusal to supply more effective by denying those products to the 
customers and users in question. Such an abuse was likely to 
strengthen and consolidate Hugin’s already dominant position on the 
market. The reason put forward by Hugin as a justification for its 
refusal was not considered by the Commission to be sufficient ; even 
if Hugin cash registers had been of such complexity as to require 
special training beyond that needed for similar products, in view of 
the evidence available, the Commission was not satisfied that at the 
relevant time Liptons did not possess such expertise. Hugin could 
not rely on the fact that Liptons might have lost such expertise 
during the period since Hugin's refusal since such loss would be the 
direct result of Hugin’s action.
141
i|5
Hugin appealed to the Court
In his Opinion, Advocate-General Reischl first considered the 
existence of a dominant position and decided that there existed a 
separate market in spare parts for cash registers, drawing support 
from a Decision of the German Bundesgerichthof in October, 1972 
which also dealt with cash registers. On this market Hugin had a 
dominant position. Turning then to the question of abuse, Mr. 
Reischl stated that the mere fact that Liptons ceased to be author­
ised Hugin distributor in 1972 could not constitute a valid reason 
for the refusal to supply.
The Advocate-General noted that reference to Article 86 was 
justified in his opinion when an undertaking in a dominant position 
makes use of that position in order to eliminate what is in practice 
the only important competitor on a secondary market and thus to 
monopolise the second, related market. In his view, that would 
constitute a forbidden alteration to the competitive structure by 
the strengthening of a dominant position. With respect to Mr. 
Reischl, the author would submit that the mere strengthening of a 
dominant position is not prohibited by Article 86 per se ; what is 
required is some positive attempt to exploit the dominant position 
abusively to the detriment of competitors, customers and suppliers.
It is however, interesting to note that reference is also made 
to such behaviour being prohibited in terms of Article 86 (b) and 
Article 85(1)(e) in that customers for spare parts are also required 
to allow Hugin to provide maintenance for their cash registers. 
The reference to Article 85(1)(e) is an interesting one as it 
is the first time that the possibility of an attempt by a dominant
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firm to extend its dominance into another economic sector has been 
considered as falling within the reach of Article 85(1). The 
approach is not confirmed or rejected by the Court in its judgment 
and must, therefore, remain open to discussion.
Mr. Reischl proceeds to make certain wide-reaching statements
as to the position of a dominant firm on the market and the duties
owed thereby. Firstly he notes that a dominant firm cannot rely on
the argument that the secondary market (in this case of servicing of
machines) is of merely minor importance and that, therefore, its
action will have no significant detrimental effects on competition.
46Although in his Opinion in the Hoffmann-La Roche/Vitamins case , 
he had pointed out the theory of ’perceptibility’ of detrimental 
effect with regard to Article 85, Mr. Reischl did not consider that 
such a theory would extend to Article 86. It would be illogical to 
apply such a doctrine to a market on which competition is already 
seriously restricted by the existence of the dominant position; to 
state otherwise would be to permit the dominant firm to behave as it 
chose and to exclude small undertakings on the basis that they only 
accounted for a small share of competition.
The Advocate-General also criticised Hugin for only having 
regard to existing competitors and their turnover - he argues that 
regard should be had to the extent of the whole of the relevant 
market; that is Hugin’s turnover in spare parts and after sales 
service. If this is done it can readily be seen that the exclusion 
of independent firms from this field of activity (in which they 
might obtain a larger share in the future) is hardly irrelevant for 
the purposes of competition law.
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This point is of great importance - in none of the previously 
discussed cases had there been any concern had for persons other 
than existing customers of a dominant firm - here it seems to be 
being suggested that potential future competition should be taken 
into account in considering the behaviour of a dominant firm. 
Indeed, although there has been no formal Decision or judgment on 
the point, the author understands the Commission attitude to be that 
a dominant firm has an obligation to supply not only its existing 
contractual and non-contractual customers but also occasional and 
irregular customers and even persons with whom the dominant firm has 
never dealt but who approach it seeking supplies. This approach is 
believed to be required even where the whole production capacity of 
the dominant firm is committed to contractual customers if it holds 
a virtual monopoly for the goods in question.
If this Commission view is indeed the law, it is difficult to 
see how a dominant firm can avoid transgressing the prohibition of 
Article 86 if it carries on any coherent form of sales and marketing
policy. It must surely have some discretion as to the persons with
whom it will deal; to state otherwise would be to impose a public 
utility regulation on dominant firms within the Community without, 
it is submitted, there being any legal basis in the Treaty for such 
an approach.
However, having established that Hugin possessed a dominant 
position on the relevant market and had abused that position by its 
conduct towards Liptons, the Advocate-General decided that trade
between Member States had not been affected and, accordingly,
recommended that the Decision be annulled. It should be particular­
ly noted that this determination rested solely on the unique facts
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of this particular case and cannot be seen as a potential escape 
clause for dominant firms. The nature of the relevant market made 
it impossible for Liptons to deal other than in the United Kingdom 
and there was no question of its being engaged in any export act­
ivity .
The Court did not consider the question of abuse, although it 
did decide that Hugin held a dominant position on the market for 
spare parts for Hugin cash registers. Having decided that Hugin’s 
behaviour towards Liptons and the letter's dealings on the relevant 
market did not affect trade between Member States, it was not 
necessary to cover the more thorny question of abuse.
The conclusion which can be drawn from the Hugin/Liptons case 
appears to be that a refusal to supply by a dominant firm in respect 
of spare parts may be an abuse where that refusal is generalised and 
extends to all supplies outwith the dominant firm’s distribution 
network. All the cases discussed in this Part of Chapter 4 have 
been concerned with a refusal to supply an existing customer of a 
dominant firm. This has been so because the Court and the Commiss­
ion have been primarily concerned with protecting the interests of 
existing traders and preventing dominant firms from consolidating 
their market position at the expense of small and medium-sized firms 
such as Liptons, Zoja, Olesen or ABC. If the true aim of Article 86 
is to protect the interests of consumers as a whole, it is suggested 
that it is only a logical extension to that notion to state that the 
supply obligation would extend to new customers.
As w^ as mentioned, supra, in relation to the comments by Advo-
47cate-General Reischl in the Hugin/Liptons case , such an idea has 
merely been hinted at obiter and has never formed the basis of any 
legal determination.
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In the Oil Report, in 1974^^, the Commission queried whether 
in a crisis such as existed on the oil market in 1973, the oil 
companies whom the Commission saw as possessing a collective domin­
ant position on the market should be obliged to supply buyers who, 
prior to the crisis, obtained their requirements from other sour­
ces. This point was never answered in the subsequent Decision 
against and remains open to doubt. In any event, it appears
to be derived from a different legal standpoint from that postulated 
in relation to the Hugin case. The point in the Oil Report appears 
to be that such an obligation would be necessary to maintain the 
competitive structure which existed prior to the crisis. If such is 
the aim of Article 86, then, it is submitted, there can be no quest­
ion of an obligation to supply a new customer since, per definition- 
em, that would result in a change in the competitive structure of 
the market.
It still remains to be determined whether a refusal to supply a 
new customer who requests supplies for the first time may be an 
abuse prohibited by Article 86.
In this respect, the author would criticise any attempt to 
extend to dominant firms in the private sector of the economy any 
form of public utility regulation on the basis that such a control 
is outwith the framework provided for in the Treaty and, in any 
event, presupposes an economic system other than that of free 
enterprise which appears to be at the root of the Community system 
of free competition.
In conclusion, the position with regard to refusal to supply 
may be summarised as follows
a) A refusal to supply may constitute an abuse prohibited by
Article 86 where
1. the dominant firm is a monopoly and the refusal applies to 
one of the principal users, previously a customer; or
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2. the refusal is to a long-standing customer who cannot make
any call upon any supplier other than the one with whom he
has had regular dealings; or
3. the refusal is to a regular, long-standing and substantial
customer and is of such a type as to be clearly discri­
minatory by comparison with other cusotmers; or
4. the refusal reduceds supplies to comparable purchasers in 
different ways;
and there is no objective justification for such refusal.
b) It remains unclear whether there is any obligation of supply 
vis-a-vis new customers.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR A REFUSAL TO SUPPLY
The first Part of this Section discussed the various cases in 
which either the Court or the Commission had condemned the refusal 
to supply by a dominant firm as an abuse of a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 85; however it should not be assumed 
that all refusals to supply by such an enterprise will, per se, 
amount to a practice prohibited by that Article. Indeed, there are 
instances where such a refusal would be permitted and, it is sub­
mitted, could not be prohibited without seriously damaging the 
economic framework of the market as a whole.
Unfortunately, neither the Court nor the Commission has stated 
expressly what types of refusals they would see as justified and 
this analysis must therefore rest on various statements made obiter 
by the Commission, the Court or the Advocate-General. It is neces­
sary, therefore, to examine the various pieces.of jurisprudence to
discover which refusals could be justifiable,
50In Commercial Solvents, in 1972 , Advocate-General Warner 
queried whether it would be an abuse for a dominant firm in a market 
for a raw material to refuse to supply a particular user of the raw
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material, if that raw material was itself a manufactured product 
which existed only because of the efforts of the dominant undertak­
ing in research and development and the dominant firm had decided 
not to sell the product to anyone but had itself met all demand for 
the end product derived therefrom. In the event, the Advocate- 
General was satisfied that neither Commercial Solvents Corporation 
nor its Italian subsidiary, Instituto Chemioterapico Italians, were 
able to satisfy this test as there was evidence that CSC had 
supplied another Italian manufacturer whilst it refused to supply 
Zoja. The Court did not make any comments on Mr. Warner’s statement 
which must, therefore, remain a possible justification for a refusal 
to supply. Such an approach would, of course, assume that there was 
no legal obligation of the public utility type imposed upon a firm 
in a dominant position in respect of products for which it has a 
dominant position (or as in the case of CSC a world monopoly). This 
justification seems somewhat devalued, however, by the views ex­
pressed by the Commission in its later Decisions, notably that 
against BP. Although that Decision was subsequently annulled by the 
Court, it must be considered as representing at least one line of 
Commission opinion.
5 1In United Brands, in 1978 , the Company argued that its
refusal to supply Olesen was partly motivated by that firm’s poor 
financial situation and its unsatisfactory performance as a distri­
butor. Although the Court did not mention these points, as they may 
not have been adequately substantiated, nevertheless they remain a 
possible justification. If the reasons for refusing supplies to 
Olesen were indeed as stated by UBC they seem to be reasonable.
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There is no evidence as to Olesen*s financial situation, but it does 
not appear improper for a firm, even a dominant firm, to warn a 
distributor that it is providing an unsatisfactory service which, if 
not improved will result in supplies being terminated. The problems 
of controlling distributors of a dominant firm have been discussed 
in Section A, supra, and reference is made thereto.
In the UBC Case, Advocate-General Mayras implies that it might 
not be abusive to refuse to supply a long-standing customer if that 
customer were able to call upon other suppliers to meet his require­
ments. This would require that the dominant firm which is the 
subject of the proceedings did not hold a monopolistic position, 
that the product concerned was homogeneous and that there existed a 
number of other firms on the market each capable and willing to 
supply the customer in question with the same quantity of the 
product on similar terms. If the dominant firm is using the refusal 
as a method of controlling the behaviour, and particularly the 
loyalty, of its customers it is improbable that such circumstances 
would arise. There is clearly no point in a dominant firm seeking 
to refuse to supply a customer whom it is able to supply if there 
are other firms capable of fulfilling the order; such a refusal 
would only be to increase competitors’ market shares at the expense 
of its own.
In the same case, the Court implies that a dominant firm could 
cease supplying a particular customer - even a long-standing one - 
if that customer did not abide by regular commercial practice and 
did not place orders which were not ’abnormal’. Although the Court 
does not elucidate on what it meant by ’abnormal’ orders, the
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Report on the OECD in 1969 on Refusal to Sell defines those as 
including orders for derisory quantities, unusual delivery arrange­
ments, or lack of appropriate qualifications or installations. The 
determination of whether or not any of these possible 'abnormal­
ities’ exist in a given case will, of course be a question of fact, 
and it is important, if this justification is to succeed, that the 
dominant firm exercises its rights in an objective a fashion as is
possible in the circumstances.
52 51The BP Case , and Decision which was annulled , imply
that a refusal will not be prohibited per se if it is not discrimin­
atory vis-a-vis similar customers. Equally the Commission Decision 
makes it clear that it is the fact that there is no objective 
justification for the refusal that brings the behaviour of the 
dominant firm within the ambit of Article 86. Thus, if there were 
an objective justification, it is possible that the refusal would be 
acceptable.
54It seems to be suggested in Hugin/Liptons that if a cus­
tomer appears - presumably on an objective test - to lack the 
appropriate skill, expertise, training, experience and facilities to 
carry out the work for which spare parts were purchased, this would 
be a valid reason for the producer of such spare parts refusing to 
supply them. In this instance what has to be weighed up is he 
detrimental effect on competition as against the possible detriment 
to consumers and to the reputation of the dominant supplier of the 
product for which the spare parts were manufactured.
Presumably, other valid reasons for refusal to supply exist and 
provided that these are the result of objective tests designed to
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protect the commercial interests of the supplier, it is difficult to 
envisage their prohibition in terms of Article 86. Obvious instan­
ces of such reasons would be lack of credit worthiness, a decision 
on the part - of the dominant firm to pull out of that particular 
market - with the caveat of the CSC/ICI Decision , and unsatis­
factory performance as a distributor - subject to the United Brands 
56case , It may also be that a decision by the dominant firm to 
streamline its distribution system would justify a refusal to 
supply, but the Hugin/Liptons Decision of the Commission must cast 
doubts on this.
In conclusion, it may be stated that, for there to be any 
possibility that a refusal to supply by a dominant firm will 
escape the prohibition of Article 86, it is essential that the 
refusal be made for objective reasons, that it be made in a non- 
discriminatory fashion vis-a-vis other customers and that it be made 
on the basis of known criteria. There is also possibly more 
likelihood of justification if the customer refused is not long­
standing or regular; however, the position of occasional and new 
customers is far from clear.
For the dominant firm, and its legal advisers, the best 
approach would appear to be one of extreme caution and, indeed, 
it is advisable for the dominant firm to have considered how or 
whether it will remove a customer or distributor at a later stage 
before contractual arrangements are entered into; if the consider­
ation is left to the time when the removal is desired or the refusal 
to supply effected, there is a great likelihood that the action will 
be condemned under Article 86.
151
Ill REMEDIES AVAILABLE AGAINST A REFUSAL TO SUPPLY
The problem of how the supervisory authorities are to deal with 
a refusal to supply which has been found abusive is a particularly 
difficult one. Unlike other contraventions of the competition 
rules, mere ’cease and desist’ type orders will not be sufficient to 
remedy the situation. Whereas a breach of Article 85(1) or of 
other types of abusive practices under Article 86 may be remedied by 
the Commission taking a Decision ordering that the agreement, 
decision or concerted practice be terminated, or that the dominant 
firm cease the abusive behaviour complained of, the remedy against a 
refusal to supply will necessarily involve some form of positive 
order being made directing the dominant supplier to continue or to 
resume supplies to the affected customer or customers.
It is not sufficient, it is submitted, for the Commission or 
the Court merely to instruct the dominant firm to make supplies 
available; some more detailed control of such supplies is essential 
to prevent the dominant firm avoiding the sanction by engaging in 
some other type of behaviour.
It is from this basis that the jurisprudence dealing with the
question of a refusal to supply will be considered.
57In the Commercial Solvents Decision in 1972 , the Commission
ordered CSC and ICI to bring to an end the infringement of Article
86 resulting from its refusal to supply Zoja and in particular
"(a) to supply at once to Zoja 60,000 kg of 1-nitropropane 
or 30,000 kg of aminobutanol at a price no higher than the 
maximum price that they charged for those products; and 
(b) to submit within two months for the approval of the 
Commission proposals for the subsequent supply of Zoja".
Soon after the issue of the Decision, CSC complied, albeit under
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protest with the requirement of paragraph (a) above but at the time
that they lodged the appeal with the Court Registry for annulment of
the Decision they applied for a stay of execution insofar as the
58future supply of Zoja was concerned
By Order dated I4th March, 1973? the President of the Court 
ordered that the time limit for the submission of such proposals be 
extended until 2nd April, 1973? and on 10th April, 1973? a contract 
was entered into between CSC and Zoja for the supply of aminobutanol 
to Zoja for a period of two years commencing 1st January, 1973 and 
thereafter from year to year until terminated by either party. 
Zoja expressed itself satisfied with the terms of such contract and 
the Commission confirmed that it met the requirements of the 
Decision.
In his Opinion, Advocate-General Warner took the opportunity of
examining the whole question of the Commission’s competence to
impose specific supply requirements on CSC and ICI in respect of
Zoja. The applicants had argued that such an order could only be
founded upon a Regulation enacted by virtue of Article 87 of the
Treaty and could not rest on Article 3 (1) of Regulation 17. This
argument was rejected by Mr. Warner who stated that Article 3 CD of
Regulation 17 was not confined to the making of ’cease and desist'
orders in general terms.
Article 3 (1) of Regulation 17 states :-
"Where the Commission, upon application or upon its 
own initiative, finds that there is an infringement of Article 
85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by Decision require the 
undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to bring 
such infringement to an end".
In arguing that such provision permitted the Commission to impose
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specific requirements, Mr. Warner drew attention to the provisions 
of Article 3 (3) of the Regulation which provide that :~
"Without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Regulation, the Commission may, before taking a Decision under 
paragraph (1), address to the undertaking or associations of 
undertakings concerned recommendations for the termination of 
the infringement."
Mr. Warner stated that, in his view, the recommendations which were 
to be made under paragraph (3) must be specific; it was therefore 
illogical if specific recommendations under paragraph (3) could not 
be followed up, where appropriate, with specific requirements under 
paragraph (1). In its pleadings before the Court, the Commission
had maintained that the reason why Article 3 CD was left in such 
general terms was because it would have been impossible for the 
draftsment to have foreseen every eventuality for which a sanction 
would be required and to list such measures in the Regulation. 
Such an argument is one which it is correct to accept.
Finally, in this context Mr. Warner noted that it was in 
general unfair to a defendant to make an order against him requiring 
him to do something positive without specifying in the order pre­
cisely what he must do in order to comply with it. In the case 
being examined, if the Commission had made a general order it would 
have been to the effect that CSC and ICI were to resume supplies to 
Zoja; but it would not have told them what quantities were to he 
made available nor the terras - particularly the prices - on which 
such supplies were to be made in order to comply with the order. 
Since there was a periodic penalty being imposed at the rate of 1000 
ua per day until the Decision was complied with, such a general 
order would have placed them in an intolerable position. The 
Advocate-General did not consider that such was the intention of the
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drafters of Regulation 17.
Mr. Warner then proceeded to examine whether the power con­
tained in Article 3 (1) of Regulation 17 had been properly exercised 
by the Commission. In his view since an abuse of a dominant 
position is an infringement of Article 86 only ’insofar as it 
may affect trade between Member States’, it follows that the 
Commission only has power to order the defendant companies to resume 
supplies insofar as the cessation of such supplies might affect 
trade between Member States. As a matter of fact the applicants 
argued that not more than 10% of Zoja’s sales were made within the 
common market, and accordingly that the Commission should not have 
ordered them to supply more raw materials than was necessary to 
maintain this trade in the EEC. Indeed, throughout the proceedings 
CSC/ICI had repeatedly offered to supply Zoja enough aminobutanol 
for ths purpose but their offers had been rejected by the Commission.
In the Advocate-General’s opinion, the Commission Decision had 
not been adequately reasoned in terms of Article 190 of the Treaty 
since the resumption of supply obligation did not adequately state 
the reasons on which it was based. However, in its statement of 
Defence, the Commission stated that the quantity to be supplied 
could not be based on a distinction between the actual sales of Zoja 
destined for the common market and those for elsewhere because this 
would ignore the necessity of guaranteeing the maintenance of Zoja 
as a viable undertaking; this was because a large decrease in 
Zoja’s turnover could not occur without seriously affecting its 
competitiveness.
Mr. Warner accepted that it could be urgued in any case that 
the export trade was essential for the maintenance of the home trade
155
and vice versa because the loss of either would result in such a 
loss of economies of scale as to make the undertaking uncompetitive 
in the remaining market. However, he considered, correctly in the 
author's opinion, that had the Commission found such to be the case, 
it should have said so expressly in its Decision. The absence of 
such reasoning, in the Advocate-General ' s opinion made the order 
unlawful and it should therefore be annulled were it not for the 
fact that it had already been complied with by CSC/ICI and the Court 
could not abrogate the rights which Zoja had acquired thereby.
In its judgment the Court accepted that the Commission had 
power in terms of Article 3 (1) of Regulation 17 to make the order 
which it had done, but it disagreed with the Advocate-General ' s 
views as to the adequacy of the reasoning on which the order was 
based and therefore rejected the applicant's submissions. The 
Court considered that the Commission had consistently maintained 
that the conduct complained of aimed at eliminating one of CSC's 
principal competitors within the common market. In the Court's 
view, the measures taken were justified by the necessity of prevent­
ing the conduct of CSC and ICI having the effect referred to and 
eliminating Zoja as one of the principal manufacturers of ethambutol 
in the Community. This reason was seen by the Court as being at 
the root of the litigation and could not therefore be considered as 
insufficient.
The CSC-ICI case illustrates the problem with which the control 
authorities are faced. Although the Court ultimately ratified the 
actings of the Commission, it can be argued that the outcome might 
have been different, as Mr. Warner suggested, had it not been for 
the fact that the order in the Decision had already been complied
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with. The Advocate-General's Opinion does, however, illustrate the
necessity of a large amount of detailed reasoning before the
Commission makes a positive requirements order of the type made
against CSC/ICI. This degree of reasoning will itself pose a major
problem for the Commission in that it requires a degree of knowledge
of the undertakings involved and their relative business affairs
greater than that which will be readily ascertainable by the
Commission’s staff. It is for this reason that the author would
expect orders of this type to be made infrequently and only when
there is no other possible method of ensuring compliance with the
Community’s antitrust policy.
In United Brands, the company put an end to the refusal to
supply without the Commission formally ordering it to do so and
before the Commission had taken the formal Decision finding the
59refusal to supply Olesen to be an infringement of Article 86
In Hugin/Liptons in December, 1977^^ the Commission, acting 
by virtue of Article 3 (1) of Regulation 17, stated that it 
required Hugin AB to bring its infringement of Articles 85 and 86 to 
an end without delay. Providing details of how this infringement 
was to be remedied, the Commission stated that it considered 
that :-
"Hugin UK should take immediate steps to ensure that 
supplies of Hugin spare parts are resumed to Liptons in respect 
of its needs in the short term and also, in order to ensure the 
maintenance of effective competitive conditions, that Liptons 
should receive in the long term sufficient supplies of 
available spare parts to meet its reasonably foreseeable 
requirements".
"The price for such spare parts should be an appropriate 
market price between that which is currently charged by Hugin 
AB to Hugin UK and that which is currently charged by Hugin UK 
to end users in the United Kingdom and which allow to Hugin UK
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an adequate margin of profit and to Liptons a reasonable trade 
discount".
In addition, the Commission imposed a periodic penalty on Hugin for 
each day of delay in the submission of proposals for approval by the 
Commission in respect of the resumption of supplies of spare parts 
to Liptons after a period of one month after notification of the 
Decision.
Hugin appealed for the annulment of the Decision^”' .
In its judgment and in the Opinion of the Advocate-General, the 
Court stated that trade between Member States had not been affected 
and, accordingly, there could be no question of an infringement of 
Article 86. The Decision as a whole, including the supply oblig­
ation, was annulled therefore.
It is interesting to note that when it lodged its application 
before the Court, Hugin did not apply for the suspension of the 
operative part of the Decision until the case had been decided, but, 
instead, complied with the obligation imposed on it. On 3rd 
January, 1978 it informed the Commission that it was prepared to 
supply spare parts to Liptons. At the same time it asked for a 
list of Liptons urgent requirements for five months to be sent to 
it. In the subsequent months, however, it received only very small 
orders from Liptons.
The reason for Liptons’ behaviour is difficult to see; if it 
were as short of essential Hugin spare parts as it had maintained 
and really needed such parts to continue the servicing of its 
existing Hugin rental machines, why did it not take the opportunity 
to replenish such supplies. It is probable from the figures quoted 
in the case, however, that Liptons’ withdrawal from the Hugin market
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had resulted in its requiring fewer spare parts than were needed at 
the time the refusal first occurred.
Although there is no mention of subsequent events in the case 
report, presumably Hugin withdrew its offer of spare parts when the 
Court annulled the Commission Decision ordering such supplies to be 
made.
In conclusion, it appears that the only remedy open to the 
Commission is an express order contained in its Decision, properly 
and thoroughly reasoned in accordance with Article 190, requiring 
the dominant firm to resume supplies of a specific quantity of the 
product concerned and specifying in some detail the terms and 
conditions on which such supply is to be made. Whether or not the 
Commission have the necessary expertise to carry such a procedure 
through to a successful conclusion in more than a very limited 
number of cases is open to grave doubt, particularly since some form 
of continuing supervision or attention would be required. By its 
very nature such a control involves a policy shift towards dominant 
firms akin to that of a public utility system; whether or not the 
Community are to embark upon such an approach is a problem which 
requires to be resolved at a political level rather than at a legal 
level, although it will inevitably fall upon the lawyers to trans­
pose the political will into legal reality.
D CONCENTRATION CONTROL
This final Section of Chapter 4 deals with the question of 
whether Article 86 can be used to provide some form of Community 
control over mergers, takeovers and other forms of concentration. 
The position is far from clear and the author does not intend to 
become involved in the debate at this juncture of this study;
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suffice it to say that the jurisprudence of the authorities and 
their subsequent actings make it possible to argue that the pro­
visions of Article 86 may be sufficient to found such a possibility.
The first, and indeed the only, decided case on the subject is 
that of Continental Can in 1971^^ and the subsequent appeal to the
Court decided in 1973^^. In its Decision the Commission stated 
64that
"The purchase of a majority shareholding in a competing 
undertaking by an undertaking or a group of undertakings which 
have a dominant position may, in certain circumstances, con­
stitute an abuse of that position".
"For an undertaking in a dominant position to reinforce 
that position by means of a merger with another undertaking 
with . the consequence that the competition which would have 
existed actually or potentially in spite of the existence of 
the initial dominant position is in practice eliminated for the 
products in question in a substantial part of the common market 
constitutes behaviour which is incompatible with Article 86 of 
the Treaty."
From this initial statement, the Commission decided that the acquis­
ition by Continental Can of the competing undertaking Thoraassen & 
Drijver-Verblifa constituted an infringement and ordered that 
Continental Can put an end to the infringement and submit proposals
in that respect to the Commission within six months.
65Continental Can appealed to the Court
In its judgment the Court stated that the central question to
the resolution of the case was
"Whether the word 'abuse' in Article 86 refers only to 
practices of undertakings which may directly affect the market 
and are detrimental to production or sales, to purchasers or 
consumers, or whether this word refers also to changes in the 
structure of an undertaking, which lead to competition being 
seriously disturbed in a substantial part of the common market."
To resolve this question, the Court considered that it was
necessary to 'go back to the spirit, general scheme and wording of
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Article 86, as well as to the system and objectives of the Treaty*. 
The distinction between measures which concerned the structure of 
the undertaking and practices which affected the market could not be 
decisive, since any structural measure would affect and influence 
market conditions if it increased the size and thereby the economic 
power of the undertaking.
"Article 86 is part of the chapter devoted to the common 
rules on the Community’s policy in the field of competition; 
this policy is based on Article 3 (f) of the Treaty according 
to which the Community’s activity shall include the institution 
of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is 
not distorted".
The applicants’ arguments that this provision contained only a
general programme devoid of legal effect were rejected; Article 3 
(f) propounded an aim which was ’indispensible’ to the achievement 
of the Community’s tasks. With particular regard to Article 3 (f), 
the Treaty in several articles contained more detailed provisions 
for the interpretation of this general aim.
Thereafter the Court stated why Article 86 was expressly
relevant to Continental Can’s position
"But if Article 3 (f) provides for the institution of
a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted, then it requires ^  fortiori that competition must 
not be eliminated. This requirement is so essential that
without it numerous provisions would be pointless".
"In the absence of explicit provisions one cannot assume 
that the Treaty, which prohibits in Article 85 decisions of 
ordinary associations of undertakings restricting competition 
without eliminating it, permits in Article 86 that undertak­
ings, after merging into an organic unity, should reach such a 
dominant position that any serious chance of competition is
practically rendered impossible.... If in order to avoid the 
prohibitions in Article 85, it sufficed to establish such close 
relations between the undertakings that they escaped the 
prohibition of Article 85 without coming within the scope of 
that of Article 86, then, in contradiction to the basic 
principles of the common market, the partitioning of a sub­
stantial part of this market would be allowed."
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The Court noted that whilst Article 85 (3) provided a means of
maintaining real competition even where certain restraints on 
competition were permitted, Article 86 did not recognise any exemp­
tion from the prohibition. With such a system the requirement to 
observe the basic foundations of the Treaty - in particular those 
contained in Article 3 (f) - resulted from the obligatory nature of 
those requirements. In any event the Court stated that Articles 85 
and 86 could not be interpreted in such a way as to contradict each 
other since they each served to achieve the same goal.
In conclusion, the Court stated that Article 86 was aimed not 
only at practices which affected consumers directly but also at 
those which were detrimental to them through their impact on an 
effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in Article 3 
(f) of the Treaty. Abuse could occur if the dominant firm 
strengthened its dominant position in such a manner that the degree 
of dominance attained significantly fettered competition - for 
example, that only firms reliant on the dominant firm were able to 
remain in the market.
Because of this reasoning the Court dismissed the arguments of 
Continental Can that there required to be a causal link between the 
dominant position and its abuse - in the Court’s opinion the 
strengthening of a dominant position might be an abuse prohibited by 
Article 86 irrespective of the means and procedure by which it was 
achieved if it had the anti-competitive effects mentioned by the 
Court.
This is the only statement of the Court on the question of 
control of concentration by use of Article 86. Arguments which 
rely on the spirit, general scheme and wording of Article 86 as well
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as the basic aims and ideals of the Community as set out in Article 
3 of the Treaty are necessarily weak. Although in several 
instances the Court have referred to Article 3 (f) in their judg­
ments, it is to be noted that the invocation of this provision is in 
stark contrast to that in, say. Article 3 (d) which provides for the 
adoption of a common agricultural policy; clearly that provision is 
of little value when a dispute arises as to the content or nature of 
that policy. However, it is submitted, Article 3 (f) may be 
distinguished in that it contains a specific aim - that of ensuring 
that competition is not distorted. In this way, it differs from 
Article 3 (d) which merely provides for the adoption of a policy 
without outlining its aims.
The statement by the Court that Articles 85 and 86 have the 
same aim is also open to question; Article 85 is concerned with the 
prevention restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market by way of agreement, decision or concerted practice, 
the result of which will almost certainly be some form of price 
discrimination - it has nothing to do with market dominance.
Article 86 on the other hand concerns abuse of a dominant position. 
The mere existence or possession of a dominant position is unassail­
able in Community law; Article 86 is not concerned with restoring 
competition but with rectifying abuses of the monopoly situation. 
It could thus be described as being concerned with secondary rather 
than primary price discrimination.
Article 86 is neutral towards monopoly power or the market 
structure as such. Its main concern appears to be that of protect­
ing consumers (as that expression is used in its widest sense)
against abuse of that power. It, unlike Article 85, is not
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concerned with ensuring that competition is not prevented , distorted 
or restricted or eliminated, nor with ensuring the maintenance of 
effective competition as the Court argues. Further it cannot be 
said that any increase in market strength by a dominant firm will be 
abusive per se, irrespective of market conduct; a restriction in 
opportunities for growth might detrimentally affect consumers’ 
interests. Article 86 cannot be seen as being directed at a 
probability of abuse - however likely that may be - but against 
actual abusive exploitation of that market power which the dominant 
firm possesses.
The Court is, it is submitted, wrong in considering that 
Article 86 is an instrument to control ’monopolisation’ in the 
American sense. The Commission may wish it were but it is not. 
It is concerned as Advocate-General Roemer pointed out, only with 
abusive conduct.
Mr. Roemer rejected the Commission’s arguments and, dissented 
from the judgment ultimately rendered by the Court, particularly by 
stating that Article 3 (f) does not provide any clear rules, but it 
is necessary to refer to Articles 85 and 86 to determine the 
Community policy towards competition. He notes that Article 86 is 
not concerned with different degrees of market dominance and will 
even accept the total absence of competition, i.e. a complete 
monopoly.
Further Mr. Roemer noted that Article 86 did not declare 
an attempt to create a monopoly situation to be prohibited as was 
done in Section 2 of the Sherman Act^^ which according to Mr. 
Roemer was well known to the draftsmen of the Treaty. In his view, 
and also that of the author, it was significant that Article 86
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unlike Article 66 ECSC and Article 85 (3) (b) does not contain the 
proviso that 'effective competition' must not be hindered (Article 
66 ECSC), or that there must not be the possibility of eliminating 
competition in a substantial part of the products in question 
(Article 85 (3) (b) EEC).
In conclusion, Mr. Roemer states that, in principle. Article 86 
is not suitable for the purpose of controlling mergers; the 
Commission should not attempt to solve the important problem of 
preventing mergers even partially by means of a wide interpretation 
of Article 86, by bringing within the terms of the law cases where 
an insignificant vestige of competition is destroyed - which cases 
are in any event not the most important kind.
As a result of this the Advocate-General advised that the Court 
should annul the Decision not only on the basis that there was no 
dominant position (as it established) but also that there had not 
been any abuse of any position held. However, the Court did not 
agree.
After the Continental Can judgment, there was a great deal of 
discussion in legal circles as to the actual state of the law and 
with the submission of a Commission proposal to the Council for a 
Regulation on the control of concentration between undertakings in 
July, 1973^^ it was thought that the Commission had, at least for 
the time being, decided to approach the merger control problem from 
a different direction.
The draft Regulation contains extensive provisions to deal 
with concentration, although it states in the Preamble that 'Article 
86 applies to concentrations effected by undertakings holding a 
dominant position in the common market or in a substantial part of
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it which strengthen such position to such an extent that the result­
ing degree of dominance would substantially restrict competition’. 
It does, however, make it clear that whilst Article 86 only extends 
to concentrations which would result in only undertakings dependant 
on the dominant firm remaining in the market, the aim of the Regul­
ation would be to prevent such concentrations from arising.
The Regulation is, however, in the draft stage. Political 
pressures combined with the legal problems of instituting a 
Community-wide system of merger control in spheres where national 
legislatures are anxious to retain control for national policy 
reasons, have meant that the Regulation has not been agreed in the 
Council.
Until 1978, this was the position. However, in the Eighth 
Competition Report the Commission stated that :-
"In the absence of more suitable merger control arrange­
ments for EEC industries, the Commission continues to exercise 
Community surveillance of mergers after they have taken place 
to ensure that they are not contrary to the prohibition on 
abuse of dominant positions in Article 86 of the EEC Treaty".
"In legal terms the Court of Justice has so far ruled 
only on a case where a dominant position already held before a 
merger was strengthened by means of the merger. But the basic 
considerations set forth in Continental Can refer only in 
gerneral terms to the need for preserving a borderline beyond 
which any weakening in competitive forces would jeopardise 
attainment of the objectives of the common market."
During the year the Commission had considered various complaints by
firms who felt that their interests were being prejudiced by mergers
involving other firms, but in none of the cases considered did the
Commission consider that the circumstances were right for a cease
and desist decision.
In the Ninth Report^^, the Commission reported that its
surveillance was continuing but that in some cases, its scrutiny was
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at the request of firms wishing to merge and anxious to make sure, 
beforehand, that they were acting in conformity with the Treaty. 
However, in none of the cases examined, did the Commission have 
grounds for action.
Mention should also be made in relation to the question of
concentration of partial mergers taking the form of joint ventures,
70such as that of SHV/Chevron.
In conclusion, the author would mention that the Commission 
appear to be continuing to examine proposed or actual mergers to 
determine their compatibility with the provisions of Article 86. 
Whilst the author would agree with Advocate-General Roemer's state­
ment that Article 86 is concerned only with abusive conduct, the 
fact that the Commission appear to take a different view should be 
sufficient for firms to take the Continental Can case into consider­
ation in their merger strategy. If the Commission continues to
examine mergers in the way in which the Eighth and Ninth Competition 
Reports suggest that it is doing, it can only be a matter of time 
before it requires to take a formal Decision against a merger. 
Because of the state of the law in this area, it is almost certain 
that such a Decision would be appealed to the Court who would then 
have the opportunity to reconsider the whole question.
Having said that however, it may well be that the course of 
action which will be followed by the Commission in the future will 
be on the basis of the draft Regulation presently before the 
Council. This would have the advantage both of providing a set of 
clear requirements and criteria for the application of the Treaty 
rules and of removing the arguments which exist as to the applic­
ability of Article 86 at least on the practical level.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS
This study has considered firstly the basic legal concepts and 
principles on which any consideration of a refusal to supply must be 
based and thereafter has shown the economic factors which will be 
relevant to such consideration before turning to a detailed examin­
ation of how the Commission and the Court have dealt with the 
problem. It is a problem which cannot be solved merely by the 
application of one of these disciplines; rather they must be 
applied together, possibly in conjunction with another discipline - 
politics.
Having shown the effect which a refusal to supply may have in 
cases where the producer is in a dominant position for that item, it 
can readily be seen that the dominant firm is in a particularly 
precarious position in its dealings with other enterprises on the 
market. Whilst being subject to all the rigours and prohibitions of 
Article 85, the dominant firm must also select its business strategy 
having in mind that it will require to conform with the requirements 
of Article 86.
What may be permitted under Article 85 by way of sales and 
distribution policy may, in certain circumstances, be prohibited in 
terras of Article 86 as being intended to strengthen a dominant 
position and thereby - according to the Commission - abusing that 
position. This is particularly true where the dominant firm wishes 
to reorganise its distribution system with the resultant termination 
of business relationships with one or more of its former distri­
butors. It is in this area, in particular, that the dominant firm 
requires to be especially wary; the dividing line between a per­
mitted refusal to supply and one which is prohibited is not clear 
where the refusal has been made in order to enable the dominant firm 
to take over some or all of the distributive functions previously
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carried out on its behalf by the refused distributor.
Thus the problems of distribution discussed in Section A of
Chapter Four together with those difficulties arising out of
Article 85 create real and significant problems for the dominant 
firm. Section B of Chapter  ^deals with practices which, although 
not going so far as to be capable of definition as refusals to 
supply in their purest sense, can be interpreted as constituting 
implied refusals to supply insofar as they impose on would-be 
customers terms which amount to refusals to supply -or would do so 
were it not for the fact that the customers are obliged to purchase 
from the dominant firm whatever the cost. Such practices are also 
of importance in a study of refusal to supply in that a refusal to
supply, or a threat thereof, is often used as a sanction by the
dominant firm to ensure compliance with otherwise abusive - and 
therefore prohibited - behaviour. Insofar as this is the purpose 
of the refusal to supply, it will always be prohibited in terras of 
Article 86 since, per definitionem, a sanction designed to ensure 
that a type of prohibited behaviour is followed must itself be 
prohibited.
Section C of Chapter 4, deals with the problem of a refusal to 
supply itself and offers possible justifications for such a course 
of action and finally considers the options open to the control 
authorities to remedy a refusal which is perceived to be abusive. 
The position is very far from clear and there remain whole areas 
-notably that of new customers - which have yet to be settled. It 
is noted in this respect that the present Commission attitude 
appears to be that dominant firms are obliged to supply all who 
approach them even if this means reducing supplies to customers who 
are contractually bound to them. This approach, whilst perhaps
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satisfying the exigencies of competition policy, is difficult to 
reconcile with the lav7 of contract and economic reality.
Section D of Chapter 4, whilst not directly applicable to 
the question of refusal to supply, illustrates the problems of the 
control authorities in counteracting certain types of behaviour. 
In this sphere, there is also the problem of whether or not Article 
86 is able to be applied in the control of mergers; the Commission 
and the Court in Continental Can thought that it was; Advocate- 
General Roemer in that case, and many legal commentators since, 
considered that it was not - Article 86 was only designed to prevent 
exploitation, not to deal with the way in which market dominance was 
achieved. It is with this latter view that the author would concur 
However, for the practitioner called upon to advise his clients as 
to whether or not their behaviour or proposed behaviour will fall 
foul' of the Treaty’s antitrust rules, the question is an academic 
one. What is important from the client's point of view is what the 
control authorities consider the position to be - and that can only 
be seen from the one decided case and the numerous press releases on 
informal proceedings since that time - since it is these authorities 
who will issue the statement of complaint, take the Decision and 
settle the case. The fact that there exists a possibility of 
appeal to the Court for the annulment of the Commission Decision is 
not a factor which should hold much sway in the initial stages. 
The costs of such a course of action, even if successful, is such 
that an attempt should be made to comply rather than confront. 
This realisation on the part of large firms would explain why the 
Eighth and Ninth Competition Reports draw attention to the numbers 
of mergers which have been referred to the Commission for some form 
of 'OK' as far as it is concerned.
Finally mention will be made of the public utility approach 
argument. Such an approach implies the existence of a set of 
preferred objectives which are to be striven for by the adminis­
trators of the policy; it is for this reason that the approach is 
confronted with a series of difficulties. If the competition 
policy is seen as a part of the Community's overall strategy with 
objectives such as growth, full employment and price stability or 
with combatting inflation as was stated in the First Competition 
Report, one is immediately confronted with a major difficulty; 
there exist no testable, systematic and constant relationships 
between market structure, conduct and behaviour, performance and 
macro-economic targets which would enable one to state, with a 
reasonable degree of certainty, that the market is competitive in 
the sense that there exists no practicable alteration in market 
structure that would make attainment of the objectives more probable.
Secondly as Jacqumin has pointed out, the available evidence 
is confusing; there is no simple method of distinguishing between 
monopoly profits and the results of particularly efficient manage­
ment, low profits due to competitive pressures and those due to poor 
performance and inefficiency. Also since there exists a plethora 
of public preference, various degrees of public interest and con­
sumer welfare, the choice will require a political compromise 
between conflicting and immeasurable values. In a free market 
economy such as that which exists in differing degrees in all the 
Member States, who is to decide how resources are to be allocated 
and whether a change in such allocation would lead to greater 
consumer welfare?.
The vagueness of this approach and of a public interest type
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exemption system under Article 85 may serve to illustrate the 
problems faced in applying that provision and, it is submitted, any 
attempt to apply some form of public interest criterion would 
involve a political choice which is outwith the ambit of the Comm­
ission's brief. A realisation of this problem is shown by the 
Commission's unwillingness to become embroiled in price regulation 
(it does so in United Brands although it denies doing so) and by its 
attempts to use Article 86 as a means of preventing the consolid­
ation and strengthening of dominant positions, so preserving the 
market structure status quo. Such matters emphasise the short­
comings of Article 86 and, if the Community's approach toward 
dominant positions is to change - and it is submitted, free market 
enterprise may be better served by some form of antitrust policy 
similar to that in the United States - Article 86 will have to 
change with it.
The antitrust policy approach is not one of regulation, such as 
the public utility argument, but one of ensuring the maintenance of 
sufficient competition on the market so that market forces of supply 
and demand will ensure desirable economic performance however that 
may be defined. Such a statement is somewhat simplistic but, unlike 
Article 86, it provides merely a general goal leaving it to the 
administrators of the policy through implementing legislation or 
judicial determination to determine what measures are necessary to 
keep the policy on course.
This decision, like so many in the competition law field, is 
not a legal one but is for the politicians; it is they who must 
decide what the competition law is to achieve and how the potent­
ially detrimental effects mentioned in Chapter Three are to be 
avoided; what are the economic 'norms' against which performance or
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behaviour is to be measured; and what are to be the sanctions to be 
imposed for non-compliance with the rules. It is in implementing 
these policy decisions, or in advising the politicians on the 
reusability of the proposed course of conduct, that the lawyers have 
a role.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the practice of the Comm­
ission and the Court, as detailed in Chapter Four, has begun to 
clarify the concept of 'refusal to supply' by providing examples of 
the cases where this will or will not constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty. 
The problem however, is twofold; firstly the Commission have not 
had their reasoning upheld by the Court in all cases; and, second­
ly, there are as yet too few cases to enable general conclusions to 
be drawn. In all the cases to date the decision which was reached 
depended to a great extent on the particular fact situation and in 
the absence thereof the position might be different. There also 
remain areas where a refusal to supply could occur which have not 
been dealt with by the Commission or the Court and for which the 
position is arguably still open. In this respect reference is made 
to the problem of the supply of new customers, to supply in times 
of crisis or shortage and to the problem of oligopoly.
It is doubtful, in the absence of any clear policy lines from 
the Commission whether there is any increased certainty or predict­
ability in 'refusal to supply' or 'supply' as a result of the 
jurisprudence although the Commission's approach does tend to 
support the economic assumptions drawn in Chapter Three. As more 
jurisprudence emerges, it is likely that a more exact determination 
of the position will be possible but this is likely to take some 
considerable time in the present situation within the Commission
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with its limited staff resources.
It is not possible to state that any of the three elements, 
economics, law or policy, is the more significant in the determin­
ation of a refusal to supply. Each is relevant to a different 
extent in every case. For the practitioner the only safe course is 
probably to have regard for the jurisprudence of the Commission and 
the Court, both formal and through the medium of the annual Compet­
ition Reports and also, if possible to maintain either individually 
or through an interest group adequate channels for contact and 
discussion with the Commission on an informal basis to obtain 
pointers as to its future intentions.
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APPENDIX I
Article 85 1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or 
any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical develop­
ment, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subjects of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared
inapplicable in the case of:
any agreement or category of agreements between under­
takings ;
any decision or category of decisions by associations of 
undertakings ;
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical and economic progress, while allow­
ing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does 
not :
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensible to the attainment of these object­
ives ;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.
Article 86 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far 
as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to
the detriment of consumers;
(c) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, 
by their very nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
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APPENDIX II 
Regulations relative to Competition Law
1. Regulation No. 17/62/EEC of the Council of 6 February 1962;
J.O. No. 13, 21 February 1962, p. 204; O.J. (Special Edition 
1959 - 1962) p.87; CM/L/II/1.
2. Regulation No. 26/62/EEC of the Council of 4 April 1962; J.O. 
No. 30, 20 April 1962, p. 993; O.J. (Special Edition 1959 - 
1962) p. 129; CM/L/II/2.
3. Regulation No.27/62/EEC of the Council of 3 May 1962; J.O. No.
35, 10 May 1962, p. 1118; O.J. (Special Edition 1959 - 1962) p.
132; CM/L/II/3.
4. Regulation No. 141/62/EEC of the Council of 26 November 1962;
J.O. No. 124, 28 November 1962, p. 2751; O.J. (Special Edition 
1959 - 1962) p. 291; CM/L/II/6.
5. Regulation No. 99/63/EEC of the Commission of 25 July 1963;
J.O. No. 127, 20 August 1963, p. 2268; O.J. (Special Edition 
1963 » 1964) p. 47; CM/L/II/7.
6. Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of the Council of 2 March 1965; J.O.
No. 36, 6 March 1965, p. 533; O.J. (Special Edition 1965 -
1966) p. 35; CM/L/II/8.
7. Regulation No. 67/67/EEC of the Commission of 22 March 1967;
J.O. No. 57, 25 March 1967, p. 849; O.J. (Special Edition 1967) 
p. 10: CM/L/II/9.
8. Regulation No. 1017/68/EEC of the Council of 19 July 1968; J.O.
No. L 175, 23 July 1968, p. 1; O.J. (Special Edition 1968 I) p.
302; CM/L/II/10.
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9. Regulation No. 1629/69/EEC of the Commission of 8 August 1969;
J.O. No. L209, 21 August 1969, p. 1; O.J. (Special Edition 1969
II) p. 371; CM/L/II/11.
10. Regulation No. 1630/69/EEC of the Commission of 8 August 1969;
J.O. No. L209, 21 August 1969, p. 11; O.J. (Special Edition
1969 II) p. 381; CM/L/II/12.
11. Regulation No. 2821/71/EEC of the Council of 20 December 1971;
J.O. No L285, 29 December 1971, p. 46; O.J. (Special Edition
1971 III) p. 1022; CM/L/II/13.
12. Regulation No. 2779/72/EEC of the Commission of 21 December
1972; J.O. No. L292, 29 December 1972, p. 23; O.J. (Special
Edition 28 - 30 December 1972) p. 80; CM/L/II/14.
13. ' Regulation No. 2988/74/EEC of the Council of 26 November 1974;
O.J. No. L 319, 29 November 1974, p. 1; CM/L/II/15.
14. Regulation No. 2903/77/EEC of the Commission of 23 December
1977; O.J. No. L 338, 28 December 1977, p. 14; CM/L/II/17.
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